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three faults were considered. Reasons given by experts for their assessments are analyzed, and the differences of 
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Terms and Definitions 
Campaign A set of Autosub3 missions. 
Censored survival 
distance 
A censored survival distance (or mission) is recorded only if fault has not occurred prior 
to termination of the study.  
Death AUV loss due to a High Impact fault. 
Decision maker          The person or group of people that guide and implement the elicitation process.  
Expert An expert is defined here as someone with special knowledge about an uncertain event, 
which in this case is the probability for AUV loss given the emergence of a particular 
fault or failure.  
Failure Failure is an event. This definition works well for software systems where a human 
failure gives rise to a fault. However in hardware systems a component fault (or latent 
fault) may give rise to a system failure to perform a given task.   
Fault A system state that results from a design defect. 
High impact faults      A fault that will give rise to AUV loss. 
Mission A discrete AUV run, which may include parts in different environments, e.g.     launch in 
open water transit under sea ice, study under ice shelf and return. 
Model Mathematical or graphical representation of a physical system or phenomenon in a 
consistent level of abstraction. 
Optimist expert  
 
Expert whose cumulative probability judgment distribution forms a narrow ‘S’ shape. 
Most of the expert’s judgments are in the lower probability ranges. 
Pessimistic expert 
 
Expert whose cumulative probability judgment distribution forms a broad ‘S’ shape. A 
significant amount of the expert’s judgments are in the higher probability ranges. 
Risk The probability of loosing the AUV given the emergence of a fault.       
Responsible Owner    Person or institution accountable for the AUV operation and maintenance. The 
responsible owner varies with the type of operator.  For a commercial operator of an 
AUV the responsible owner with regard to risk management is the chief financial officer.  
In a research environment, in case the AUV was purchased with a grant and the legal 
ownership of the grant is resting with an institution (rather than the grant awarding body) 
the responsible owner is likely to be the principal investigator perhaps with oversight of 
the head of department. When the vehicle is part of a facility – whether the vehicle is 
owned by the facility or by the body that funded the vehicle, the responsible owner is 
typically the director in charge of the facility. 
Abbreviations 
2AFC      Two alternative forced choice. 
AUV       Autonomous Underwater Vehicle. 
ECOR     Engineering Committee on Oceanic Resources. 
NERC     Natural Environment Research Council. 
NOC       National Oceanography Centre. 
USL        Underwater Systems Laboratory. 
Symbols 
!             Uncertain event. 
)(!p        Probability of an uncertain event taken place. 
)(tS         Survival function. 
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1.   Introduction 
Managing AUV operational risk is a complex task that relies heavily on subjective expert judgment 
and knowledge. Capturing this knowledge quantitatively is imperative in order to: 1) build consensus 
amongst individuals involved in the AUV development and operations and 2) support risk management 
strategies at the early phases of the product design as well as in system operation and maintenance.   
In previous work Griffiths (Griffiths, et. al, 2003) conducted a personal judgment and knowledge 
elicitation exercise concerning the AUV probability of loss given a set of operational faults. He was the 
sole expert.  This has been criticised as too insular, and as a consequence, this study has involved more 
people, and a more formal approach has been taken. In this study a total of 28 Autosub3 missions and 
63 faults were considered by ten experts in AUV operations
1
. The missions varied in distance, the 
minimum distance was 1.5 km while the maximum reached 302.5 km. The faults were caused by 
different factors such as human, operational and maintenance errors, and software and hardware design 
errors.  These types of errors were analysed in detail in Griffiths (2006) where he concluded that AUV 
failures can potentially be represented using a Weibull statistical model.   
In this report we study the faults in (Griffiths, 2008), however the aim of this report is to estimate the 
AUV survival given the experts judgments.  Analysing and combining the expert probability judgments 
is a research field in its own right (O’Hagan, et al., 2003). Methods to combine expert probability 
judgments are divided in two groups: Behavioural methods and Mathematical methods.  A behavioural 
method for combining expert probability judgments was used in the Autosub3 loss inquiry (Strutt, 
2006).  This method involves eliciting probability judgments from a group of experts, where experts 
must all agree on each judgment. Mathematical methods make use of analytical algorithms to combine 
individual expert’s probability judgements; in this case experts are kept separate during the elicitation 
process. In the research presented in this report we used two mathematical methods to combine the 
expert judgments, linear opinion pool and the logarithmic opinion pool (Clemens and Winkler, 1999).   
The experts’ combined opinion concerning the risk for AUV loss can be used to estimate the 
probability of survival with range and environment. Methods such as Kaplan-Meier or Weibull can be 
used to estimate mission survival with range.  In previous work, Griffiths (2008) used both Kaplan-
Meier and Weibull to estimate AUV survival given censored data concerning missions 384 to 422. 
There are clear benefits for using these methods. The AUV survival distribution with range can be used 
to support decision making concerning future missions.  Griffiths (2008) applied the Kaplan-Meier 
method to estimate the risk associated with a campaign to the Antarctic (Jenkins, 2007).   
The Kaplan-Meier method is tailored to model censored data; this means that for a given fault 
distribution all faults are classified on whether or not they may result in a AUV loss (these are denoted 
high impact faults). Prior to this report, this judgment was binary – either a fault was considered to lead 
to certain AUV loss or not.  That is, no probability (other than 0 or 1) was assigned. We have now 
removed this constraint. The data obtained from our experts is in the form of probability judgments for 
each fault on a scale of 0 ! 1, therefore traditional methods such as Kaplan-Meier and Weibull must 
be modified to represent the data set.  Modifications to the Kaplan-Meier and Weibull methods were 
derived.  This report gives details concerning the new formulations and also how the new methods can 
be used to estimate the risk of an AUV mission and campaign, focusing on the under ice campaign 
proposed in Jenkins (2007).  
1.1   Objectives 
The central objective of this report is to model AUV survivability with mission distance given its 
history of faults and the experts’ judgments on the criticality of the same faults and to use this survival 
model to assess the risk of the forthcoming scientific campaign to the Antarctic. The model should also 
be able to estimate the effect of different mitigation strategies on the AUV risk. In order to meet this 
central objective the following subsidiary objectives must be met: 
o Comprehensive analysis of individual expert judgments. Expert judgments are constrained 
                                                
1 Over the period of these missions, a further 10 missions showed no faults; there was no need for 
expert judgment and, in later analyses these missions have been included as censored data. 
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by their experiences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Thus understanding the reasons why 
the experts assign a given probability of loss to a particular system failure is imperative in 
order to highlight differences in opinion. This study addresses a series of relevant questions 
such as: Do experts’ judgments group in different schools of thought? What characteristics 
in their experience separate existing groups? How can we capture distinct views in the risk 
model? The analysis of expert reasons can be conducted at different levels of detail. At this 
stage our primary aim is to analyse the data in a way that makes real impact to those 
involved in the AUV design and operation.  
o Construct probabilistic risk model that is consistent with the expert judgments. Expert 
opinion aggregation methods are studied for suitability. There are several mathematical 
methods for multiple experts’ probabilistic judgment aggregation. We select the most 
appropriate method to combine different expert judgments. The selection criteria should 
focus on ease in its application and its correlation with experts’ judgments.  
o Extend statistical methods for supporting AUV survivability study. The non-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier statistical method for survivability analysis is used for computing AUV 
survivability with range based on the AUV risk obtained from the expert’s judgments.  The 
data used for AUV risk analyses is presented in a non conventional format.  Statistical 
methods such as Kaplan-Meier or Weibull must be tailored in order to capture this new 
data. 
o Using a conditional probability approach to model the risk reduction from being able to 
recover the vehicle during a set distance at the start of a mission. 
1.2   Outline 
This report is organised as follows.  
Section 2 describes the knowledge elicitation process. This is a formal and interactive process that 
consists of seven phases.  In order to capture as many diverse judgments as possible two questionnaires 
were created and separate groups of experts answered each questionnaire.  Details concerning these 
questionnaires and also information about the experts used in this exercise are given in this section.   
Section 3 presents the analysis of the expert judgments.  This analysis corresponds to phase five of 
the elicitation process.  Judgments provided by experts are analysed with respect to change in 
environments in order to identify whether discrepancies in judgments are defensible and thus should be 
included in the risk model. Frequency analyses of expert judgments are carried out in order to assess 
individual experts’ variability.  
Section 4 presents a study concerning the possible mathematical methods that can be used to 
aggregate experts risk judgments. The mathematical formulation and practical implications of two 
methods (namely linear pool and log pool) are analysed in detail.  Limitations of each method are 
discussed. The linear weighted opinion pool is chosen as the most suitable method for expert judgment 
aggregation.  
Section 5 presents the risk model.  Risk distributions are obtained using the linear opinion pool. Two 
risk models are presented for each operational environment. An extended version of the Kaplan-Meier 
method is introduced. The new method is applied to estimate Autosub3 survival with range. Section 6 
presents the Weibull survival function tailored to the expert judgments. The Weibull survival function 
and the conditional probability function are used to estimate the effect of different risk mitigation 
strategies on the probability of losing Autosub3 in the forthcoming campaign to the Antarctic. 
Conclusions are presented in section 7 and further work outlined in section 8. 
Annex A comprises the judgments provided by experts that responded to annex A of Griffiths and 
Trembranis (2007) whilst Annex B comprises the judgments provided by experts that responded to 
annex B. Annex C presents brief biographies of the experts that participated in the elicitation exercise. 
Annex D contains the graphs depicting the probability judgment distributions, for all four 
environments. Annex E presents the linear and log aggregated judgments for Annex A. In annex F are 
the optimistic and pessimistic risk models. Annex G presents a summary of the survival estimates for 
Dr. Jenkins’ campaign to the Antarctic. Annex H presents the results of the risk mitigation analyses 
using the Weibull survival function. Annex I presents the probability judgments distributions for the 
-------   7   ------- 
 
experts that responded to Annex B questionnaire.  
2.   The Elicitation Process and Context of Expert Judgments 
Expert probability judgments may be elicited through either an informal or formal expert judgment 
elicitation exercise (Otway and Winterfeldt, 1992). Their formal elicitation process consisted of seven 
steps: 1) identification and selection of experts; 2) training in probability judgments; 3) presentation 
and discussion of uncertain events and quantities; 4) analysis and data collection; 5) presentation and 
discussion of results of the previous step; 6) elicitation; 7) analysis, aggregation, and documentation.  
Keeney and Winterfeldt (1991) followed a similar process to elicit expert knowledge with regard to the 
probability of catastrophic failure in two American nuclear power stations namely Surry and Sequoyah 
following the individual or combined failure of two check valves that connect the reactor cooling 
system and the residual heat removal system. They elicited probability estimates from approximately 
40 experts concerning 50 possible events. 
Section 2.1 describes the formal process we adopted to elicit expert judgments.  Expert judgments 
were elicited with respect to four operating environments.  Details concerning these environments are 
presented in section 2.2.    
2.1   The Elicitation Process  
The goal of our expert elicitation exercise is to capture judgments from a sufficient set of experts 
with diverse background. Provided that the reasoning supporting the probability judgments are 
plausible and defensible they must be somehow captured in our analysis. Biases introduced by either an 
expert or a decision maker can harm the validity of an elicitation exercise. The purpose of adopting a 
formal process was to reduce these types of biases. The elicitation process consisted of the following 
seven steps. 
2.1.1   The Issues 
Given the set of facts on faults and incidents with Autosub3 throughout its life to date, we seek to 
predict the probability of loss of the vehicle in different operating environments. At issue is how likely 
is it that each fault or incident, taken in isolation, but with the expert’s knowledge of the wider issues, 
could lead to loss in the four example environments. The actual question to be asked of each fault or 
incident is set out formally in section 2.1.3.   
2.1.2   Selecting Experts 
For many (but by no means all) of the judgments sought on individual faults or incidents there is 
likely to be a degree of uncertainty over the response. It is here that the experience, background, and 
insight of the individual expert are most important. As a consequence, the success (or not) of the 
elicitation process is strongly dependent on the knowledge of the experts. Ideally, according to 
O’Hagan et al. (2006:27), each expert (a) has specific technical and domain knowledge (e.g. closely 
involved in AUV design or operations), (b) is able to approach a problem via formal principles (e.g. 
through causal reasoning – the analysis of cause and effect), (c) uses established strategies (e.g. 
questioning/reviewing first assessments) and (d) relies more on procedural knowledge (e.g. 
relationships and an appreciation of what is important) and less on declarative knowledge (e.g. facts 
and simple rules). At the highest level of expertise, there is agreement in the literature that judgement is 
intuitive, with “an automaticity of action deriving from a wealth of knowledge and experience”, that 
may typically take ten years to gather (O’Hagan et al., 2006:54). Experts should also have a realistic 
view of their competence for each particular problem. 
Clemen and Winkler (1985) examined the precision and value of information elicited from 
dependent and independent sources. If the experts within a pool have limited diversity or a strong 
dependence (e.g. from one organisation, or all academics), they concluded that this would “have a 
serious detrimental effect on the precision and value of the information”. Our aim is to maximize 
expert’s independence from the Autosub3 design, development or operation, by using experts from 
different backgrounds, areas of expertise, nationality etc. 
Table 1 lists some details concerning the experience of the experts that participated in this exercise. 
All experts have experience in one or more areas of AUV concept design, development and operation.  
Apart from the number of years of experience, the differences between experts lie in the specific area 
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of expertise and also on the nature of their application.  Short biographies of experts involved in this 
study are given in Annex C.    
Table 1    Expert experience data.  Annex A and Annex B are two separate questionnaires.  
Group Expert Main subject Application area Total years 
of 
experience 
Tom Curtin (TC) Technology management Scientific research, Military 
and Commercial 
20 
Barbara Fletcher (BF) Systems control Military 8 
Clayton Jones (CJ) Automation, control and 
antenna design 
Scientific research and 
Military 
11 
Rob McEwen (RM) Control systems design Scientific research 9 
Mark Moline (MM) Operation Scientific research 6 
Adam Skarke (AS) Operation Scientific research 1.5 
Chris Williams (CW) Hydrodynamics Scientific research 10 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 
A 
 
Dana Yoerger (DY) AUV design, operations, control 
systems 
Scientific research 15 
Robert Bogucki (RB) Adaptive navigation and 
mapping 
Scientific research 3 
Neil Bose (NB) Propulsion and hydrodynamics Scientific research and 
Commercial 
24 
 
 
Annex 
B 
Adam Skarke (AS) Operation Scientific research 1.5 
2.1.3   Clearly define issues 
The definition of the problem or issue to be judged is one of the key phases of the elicitation process. 
The stated issue must be presented as clear and concise as possible. Experts were divided in two 
groups, one answered the straightforward question: “What is the probability of loss of the vehicle in the 
given environment X given fault/incident Y?” also referenced as Annex A.  The second group addressed 
the second question: “Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in 
each environment? If you answered that it is loss what is the probability of loss? If you answered that it 
is survival, what is the probability of survival?” also referred to as Annex B. 
These questions are the key yardstick for the evaluation process and a strict and consistent adherence 
to the questions will help to maintain a level of consistency between responses and respondees. It is 
important also to note that our interest in this matter is with respect to the impact of the fault on loss of 
the vehicle, not, for instance, on the impact that the given fault might have on science delivery, but 
rather, will this fault lead to the loss of the vehicle as a complete system given the environmental 
information and one’s own expert opinion. 
2.1.4   Training the Experts and Eliciting Judgements 
The experts completing Annex A (except AS) were briefed on the background and method of 
eliciting expert judgment at a presentation at the Unmanned Untethered Submersible Technology 
symposium at Durham, New Hampshire in August 2007. NB was briefed on the progress at a meeting 
of the ECOR specialist panel on underwater vehicles at Southampton in September 2007. AS and RB 
were briefed personally by Art Trembanis. 
The literature of expert elicitation acknowledges that the precision of estimates is improved if 
experts have access to independent information, to allow a degree of calibration. We have sought, with 
limited success, such independent information. First, for open water and coastal environments 
Leviathan, a leading marine insurance binding authority, stated that they have not paid out on an AUV 
loss in the last two years
2
 as of June 2007. Second, out of some 150 vehicles produced by Hydroid, and 
                                                
2 Personal communication, Keith Broughton of Leviathan with Griffiths, June 2007. 
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used in open and coastal waters, and under sea ice, we believe that none were lost
3
 as of August 2007. 
Third, through the early stages of Seaglider development and operations, eight out of the first ten 
vehicles were lost, in environments that ranged from open water to areas infested with sea ice and of 
the next twelve built, two were lost as of September 2005
4
. 
The questionnaire was envisioned, and was tested by our graduate students, to take approximately 3-
4 hours to complete although it was stressed that there was no time constraint for its completion. The 
fault/incident descriptions, it should be noted, are the distillation of trials and science missions reports 
(by Griffiths) and thus are by nature concise. Where our students felt the initial draft was too terse, we 
expanded the fault/incident descriptions. If for some reason one expert did not feel that sufficient 
description was available we suggested they reflect this in both the confidence level of the probability 
assessment and the comments after each assessment. 
2.1.5   Analyzing and Aggregating 
Research has shown that many experts, when asked to use the full probability range, tend too often 
to opt for values close to 1 or 0
5
, termed ‘anchoring’, O’Hagan et al. (2006: 68). Furthermore, there is 
evidence that an expert’s ability to provide unbiased estimates shows no correlation with the expert’s 
technical or domain expertise. However, if experts are aware that particular types of faults or incidents 
have led to loss, or not, their subjective judgments may be less biased. This outcome feedback is 
clearly important, and it argues for open dissemination of faults and loss within the AUV community. 
Our analysis of the expert judgments was in two steps, first we looked at the distribution of 
probability judgments over all faults. This first assessment was necessary in order to identify and 
understand the main differences between judgments. In the second part of the analysis we try to 
understand how experts assign their judgments. An expert that uses a wide range of probabilities is less 
likely to manifest bias due to anchoring. However the expert judgments variability may vary with 
change in environment. Our observations concerning these analyses are presented in section 3.1. 
Combining experts’ judgments is easier than identifying bias. In their review of combining 
probabilities from experts, Clemen and Winkler (1999) describe mathematical and behavioural 
combination techniques. The Autosub Loss Inquiry used a behavioural approach, requiring the experts 
gathered together to interact and produce a single, agreed, group judgment (Strutt, 2006). This 
approach is not without its problems, including group polarisation (or ‘group-think’). 
Where experts do not exchange information, mathematical combining techniques are appropriate. 
While current research considers Bayesian methods to provide a mathematically defensible, rigorous 
and effective way of combining judgments (O’Hagan et al., 1998; Sigurdsson et al., 2001), they are 
challenging to implement. As a consequence, our initial approach is to use a simple linear or 
logarithmic opinion pool, Clemen and Winkler (1999).  Section 3.3 gives a more detailed review of the 
two methods considered for aggregation; results using both approaches and their limitations are also 
discussed. 
2.1.6 Complete analysis and write up 
This version of our report presents the first draft of the complete analyses.  It will be reviewed by the 
experts and we will take their comments into account in preparing a final version. The final report will 
document the aggregated experts’ judgments on the probabilities of leading to loss for each fault and 
each environment as opinion pool means and a measure of spread. Importantly, the reasons why 
experts arrived at their judgments will be summarised. Using these sets of probabilities, and example 
AUV campaigns for each environment, we will model the overall probability of losing a vehicle in 
each campaign using Kaplan-Meier and Weibull methods as used in Griffiths et al. (2003a). 
Probabilities of loss will be compared with data from independent sources (if available) for 
coastal/open water environments, and with earlier single-expert predictions in Griffiths and Trembanis 
(2007) for under ice. 
                                                
3 Personal communication, Graham Lester of Hydroid with Griffiths, July 2007. This was the case after a REMUS 
100 AUV ‘lost’ for 10 months was recovered, essentially intact. 
4 Personal communication Charles Eriksen with Griffiths, September 2005.  
5 Indeed Griffiths et al. (2003a) only considered 1 or 0 as possible outcomes, while Griffiths and Trembanis (2007) 
considered only 0, 0.25 or 1. 
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2.2   Environments 
We have chosen four contrasting environments as examples for this study. They were chosen 
because they are well known to us and they represent both common and challenging AUV operating 
environments. Clearly the method can be applied in other settings, such as near the seabed, in complex 
terrain, or within enclosed environments such as pipes, cenotes, or lakes. In the following sub-sections 
are concise notes on key factors from each environment that may effect experts’ judgments on 
probability of faults or incidents leading to loss.  
There are some factors that are common to one or more environments. Perhaps the most significant 
is the process of launch and recovery, frequently from a ship. Incidents during launch and recovery are 
not uncommon; they can, and have, led to loss or write-off. The occurrence and impact of such 
incidents has been sufficiently high that some insurance providers have suggested co-insurance, or risk 
sharing, during these specific parts of a mission (Griffiths et al., 2007). 
2.2.1   Open Water 
Open water, away from the coast and traffic lanes, where the water depth is less than the crush depth 
of the vehicle, forms a relatively benign operating environment. An emergency response of rising to the 
surface, or descending to the seabed, is feasible, and from either location telemetry of data and position 
is possible. Clearly the risks are higher if the water depth exceeds the crush depth. While hazards mid-
water are few, on the surface high winds and/or waves, fog and other vessels may increase risk and the 
consequences of technical failures in navigation or communication systems may be more severe. 
Operating close to the seabed can be hazardous, placing reliance on collision avoidance or altitude-
sensing hardware, algorithms and software. 
2.2.2   Coastal 
Coastal settings, defined as waters from the shelf edge (150-200 m water depth) and landward 
towards the shore, and including inland waters, can be challenging locations for AUV operations. 
While usually well below crush depth, many challenges remain. This setting includes shipping lanes 
and bay mouths as well as the near-shore (just outside of the surf zone), and estuaries. Physical hazards 
in this setting include high density ship traffic comprising, among others, commercial, military, and 
personal watercraft; divers (recreational and commercial) (Patterson et al., 2001); engineering 
structures (e.g. bridges, breakwaters, piers, jetties, groins); fishing gear (e.g. pound nets, lobster/crab 
pots). Environmental hazards include turbid waters and strong fluid flows (currents and waves) that 
make search and recovery problematic. Coastal settings do, however, afford a host of launch/recovery 
options including ships, boat ramps, docks and piers, which can be used in tandem or switched to mid-
mission as conditions require. 
Shallow depths and strong hydrodynamic flow present increased risk for collision and thus place 
added importance on collision avoidance systems. The rapid spatial and temporal changes to 
environmental conditions in coastal settings also place a premium on navigation and communication 
systems. The proximity to logistical centres, however, does provide advantages for operational 
adjustments (e.g. operations can be moved to more benign locations and additional support supplies 
can be more readily acquired). For the purposes of the questionnaire, we asked experts to consider a 
semi-open, highly developed coastal embayment with depths of 40 m maximally, relatively sheltered 
from waves but subject to tidal currents of ~1-1.5 m.s
-1
. Vessel traffic to consider included commercial 
and recreational vessels and occasional personal watercraft. 
2.2.3   Sea ice and icebergs 
Sea ice and icebergs pose a wide spectrum of risk that merits an expert elicitation study in its own 
right. There are numerous classes or types of sea ice, and each may pose a threat of some magnitude to 
AUV operations. Ice types are described by Wadhams (2000), and MacDonald (1969) described how 
ice affects vessel operations. More specific information on ice types and their effect on AUV 
operations is available on the Polar AUV Guide website
6
.  
Sea ice and icebergs pose a hazard to AUV operations for several reasons: 
                                                
6
 www.srcf.ucam.org/polarauvguide/environment/icetypes.php  
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o Ice can form a rigid lid to the ocean, hampering or even preventing recovery after a 
technical failure or incident. 
o Afloat, deep ice keels and icebergs pose collision hazards. If in shallow water, especially if 
they are grounded, ice keels and icebergs may test severely the collision avoidance and path 
planning systems within an AUV. 
o Thin ice may pose different hazards: semi-transparent grease ice may be sufficient to 
hamper visual sighting on recovery; nilas, up to 10 cm thick, may damage appendages such 
as antennas. 
o Continuous multiyear ice, such as fast ice or sikussak can form a barrier as effective as an 
ice shelf should an AUV become stranded, especially if the support vessel has limited 
icebreaking capability. 
o Ice need not be continuous to pose a threat; brash ice can be a hazard during launch and 
recovery, especially to appendages and propeller blades. 
An important factor affecting the level of risk posed by sea ice is the icebreaking capability of the 
support vessel as this affects the likelihood of success or failure should recovery from under ice 
become necessary. The risk appetite and time allocated for search and recovery are also factors, as are 
the availability of supporting tools such as an emergency location beacon on the vehicle and whether 
an ROV is on board the vessel to aid recovery. Because of the wide range of risks, for the purpose of 
this study, we asked that experts focus on a scenario where first year ice dominates (0.3–2.0m thick), 
with ice keels to 15m, sporadic icebergs and a support vessel able to break 2 m ice at 2kt. Perhaps not 
surprisingly (because of its complexity), this environment produced a wide range of responses. 
2.2.4   Shelf Ice 
Ice shelves are the floating edges of continental ice sheets, and, with a typical thickness of 180 m at 
the seaward edge, form an impenetrable barrier. If an AUV becomes stranded under an ice shelf 
through a fault or incident, the chance of recovery must be almost zero. An ROV recovery might be 
possible if the stranding was no more than a few hundred metres from the ice front. Further in, it is 
possible to drill through the ice (e.g. using hot water), and if the AUV position is known accurately a 
recovery might be possible. However, such operations are very costly and involve complex logistics. 
Experts were asked to bear in mind, as outcome feedback, that only two AUVs have ever attempted 
under ice shelf missions, and both were lost, one on its first such mission, the other (Autosub2) on its 
second. 
2.3   Summary 
The elicitation process was explained to the experts. It is a formal elicitation process that is widely 
applied in research. It is an interactive process and this report closes the first loop of this process where 
analyses of the expert judgments carried out in order to remove bias. The results of this analysis are 
presented in section 3. Experts provided probability judgments for Autosub3 probability of loss in light 
of a given fault. The question was asked in two different ways, which we denote as ‘Annex A 
questionnaire’ and ‘Annex B questionnaires’ (Griffiths and Tembranis, 2007). In Annex A we asked 
the straight forward question “What is the probability of loss of the vehicle in the given environment X 
given fault/incident Y?” In Annex B we used a two alternative forced choice to elicit the probability of 
loss, the question asked was: “Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or 
incident in each environment? If you answered that it is loss what is the probability of loss? If you 
answered that it is survival, what is the probability of survival?”. 
We found that by separating the experts in two groups and asking each group to answer only one 
question it would allow us to capture a more diverse set of judgments. Ten experts participated in this 
exercise (see Table 1 for more detail). Expert AS kindly accepted to answer both questionnaires. This 
gives us some insight on whether or not the way we put the question affects the outcome judgment. 
 
 
-------   12   ------- 
 
3.   Analysing and Aggregating 
The analysis and aggregation task corresponds to phase five of the judgments elicitation exercise 
(see section 2.1.5). Prior to combining the expert judgments we need to understand whether there are 
significant disagreements in judgments and also we must identify the best way to aggregate these 
judgments. Two types of analyses are relevant to this process. First, the failure judgments distribution 
for all four environments visually highlights major discrepancies in judgments. Second, the individual 
expert frequency distribution gives us information concerning the variability of the expert judgments. 
The analyses supported by these graphs are presented in the following sections, where we also draw 
upon the written comments of the experts, especially where there are major differences in 
interpretation. 
3.1   Experts judgments and the fault distribution 
3.1.1   Annex A 
With eight experts, sixty three faults and four environments, we have a possible total of 2016 expert 
judgments. In practice, we have 1863 as not all combinations were completed. Our intention in this 
section is not to suppress differences of opinion, or to introduce our own views, or to bias the results, 
but to draw our experts’ attention to those faults where there appear to us to be resolvable differences 
of opinion, misunderstandings or typographical errors. Of the 1863, we query some opinions in: 8 
faults in open water, 4 in coastal waters, 7 under sea ice and 6 under shelf ice. This is 10% of faults, 
meaning that in 90% of cases we feel no need to draw attention to differences between experts’ 
opinions. The risk judgment distribution for all eight experts that answered Annex A are presented in 
Annex D of this report. 
3.1.1.1 Open water 
For open water, there are eight faults of particular interest: 385_1_1
7
, 389_1_3, 389_2_3, 418_1_1, 
406_5_7, 406_7_7, 407_1_2 and 407_2_2. Figure 1 depicts the judgment distribution for faults 
385_1_1, 389_1_3 and 389_2_3 by expert by expert designated by their initials, with probability of 
loss on the y axis.  
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Figure 1  Probability judgments for failures 385_1_1 (blue), 389_1_3 (red) and 389_2_3.  These judgments 
concern open water operations only.   
Expert TC assigns a very high probability of loss to fault 385_1_1. Fault 385_1_1 concerns a failure 
in the navigation system due to the removal of the Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler (ADCP). This 
causes the AUV to travel on the wrong heading. Expert TC assumes that this fault takes place after 
15km into the mission and that the navigation failure is further compounded with failure of the AUV 
monitoring system or indeed any other system that could be used to issue an abort-to-surface 
command. In contrast to expert TC, experts AS, RM, CW and CJ assumed that such backup systems 
                                                
7 Our nomenclature is as follows: failure 389_1_3 represents the first failure assessed by the experts concerning 
mission 389. The last digit, i.e., number 3, stands for the total number of failures recorded during the mission. 
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were still available at the time of the fault. There is some evident disagreement between experts and as 
highlighted, this is mainly due to the assumptions on the availability of backup systems.  
The experts comments highlighted several variables that could be taken into account in the 
assessment of this fault, some of these variables are: 1) Time at which the fault took place (e.g. phase 
in the mission, whether or not the mission time was exceeded); 2) battery depletion; 3) weather 
conditions (e.g. fog, size of the waves and currents).  
Recommendation 1: Autosub3 has backup systems that can be used to issue the abort to surface 
command and, in addition, the Autosub3 also has systems that enable the support ship to track the 
AUV position at real time during the initial phase of the mission. We should assume that such systems 
are available at the time of this fault. Thus in order to build expert consensus, it is recommended that 
expert TC should re-assess failure 385_1_1 in light of the assumptions highlighted above. 
Failure 389_1_3 concerns a fault during the homing phase which caused an incorrect setting in the 
AUV speed and heading. As a result the AUV headed in the wrong direction just before dive. Expert 
DY assigns a higher risk to this event than any other expert. According to DY, whilst recovery would 
depend on the types of surface localisation available (Strobes or RF beacon), being able to catch the 
AUV would depend on weather conditions and the capacity of the support ship to chase the AUV. 
Expert DY also argues that a GPS-iridium combination or a timeout in the homing process would 
significantly reduce the likelihood of loss. Other experts consider that systems for monitoring the AUV 
position and abort are available and therefore recovery should be straightforward. The time out process 
in Autosub3 forces the AUV to check for homing signal after every 2 minutes. In case there is no 
signal the AUV will remain circling until it receives another signal. An abort to surface command 
would facilitate the recovery.  
Recommendation 2: Request a revised judgment from DY concerning fault 389_1_3. It is 
recommended that expert DY should assume that Autosub3 is equipped with a timeout system and that 
engineers on the support ship can trace the AUV position. 
Failure 389_2_3 also occurred during homing mode. The Autosub did not exit homing mode after 2 
minutes as expected. As a result the Autosub continued on the last specified heading. Similarly to 
failure 389_1_3 the risk associated with this fault depends on whether or not tracking is maintained and 
also depends on the vessel’s top speed. These risks were clearly highlighted in RMs comments, shown 
below. 
 
RMs views are similar to those of experts AS, CJ, CW and TC. These experts assume that it is 
possible to track the Autosub and therefore it would be possible to intercept the vehicle. Expert DY 
says that the performance characteristics of the Autosub play a key role on the risk. DYs comments are 
below: 
 
Recommendation 3: For the same reasons as highlighted in recommendation 1, it is recommended that 
expert DY should provide new judgment for failure 389_2_3. 
CW’s judgments regarding failures 406_5_7, 406_5_7, 407_1_2 and 407_2_2 for open water (which 
are not captured in Figure 1) are also quite extreme when compared to the judgments provided by 
remaining experts. CW uses as baseline for his judgments the graph in Figure 6.a of Griffiths, et al. 
(2003). Figure 6.a depicts the Autosub survival plot in light of its high impact underway fault history. 
The method used to derive this graph relies on censored data based on Griffiths personal assessment of 
the criticality of these faults. Hence, the graph should not be used for faults that do not have a high 
“Again, a high-speed drive-off is very scary for a vehicle with the speed and endurance of Autosub. Does the 
homing mode have a timeout? If so, the consequences of this failure would be less severe...”  
“ I think this is a dire situation - when the propulsion is on, and the guidance is dead.  #385 and #387 are 
similar.  We've had this happen to us also, but only in Monterey Bay. Risk depends, among other things, on if 
the ship can catch the AUV, and also if the ship can maintain tracking.” 
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probability of leading to loss. In this exercise we are asking independent experts to generate their own 
assessments. 
Recommendation 4: After a debate amongst decision makers we can conclude that CW’s judgment 
should not use the graph in Figure 6a of (Griffiths et. al, 2003) as a reference for his personal 
judgments. Thus it is recommended that CWs should re-assign judgments to faults 406_5_7, 406_5_7, 
407_1_2 and 407_2_2. 
3.1.1.2 Coastal 
The probability of loss judgment distribution for Coastal water shows that in general there is an 
increase in risk as the vehicle moves from open water to coastal water. Interestingly for fault 385_1_1, 
TC assigns a higher probability of loss in open water than in coastal water. TC assigns P(loss) = 0.8 for 
open water and P(loss) = 0.7 for coastal water. TCs rationale is that the closer the AUV is to the coast 
the most likely one is to find the AUV. TCs comment is presented in the box below. 
 
In contrast to TC’s views, experts AS, CW and DY argue that the closest the vehicle is to shore the 
more exposed the vehicle is to additional risk (such as collision with another vessel or rocks). 
Comments made by these experts with reference to fault 385_1_1 are presented below: 
 
Although RMs comments do not reference the change in environment, the probability judgments 
provided by RM show that this expert is in agreement with the rationale presented above by experts 
AS, DY and CW. For fault 385_1_1, RM assigns Ploss = 0.005 for open water, and Ploss = 0.01 for 
coastal water. When it comes to the change in environments from open water to coastal water in 
particular, it is evident that there are three schools of thought. Whilst all experts seem to be aware of 
the risks involving the AUV operation in these environments, some experts choose to take an 
optimistic view of the problem whilst other group of experts seem to adopt a pessimistic view. The 
third school of thought comprises those experts that are indifferent to the change in environment from 
open water to coastal water, namely CJ and BF. CJ assigns the same risk to open and coastal water for 
all 63 faults whilst BF assigns the same risk to 62 faults (fault 384_1_1 being the exception). MM 
assigns the same P(loss) to 63% of the failures.  
For coastal water, there are four faults of particular interest, and these are faults 385_1_1, 388_2_2, 
389_1_3 and 389_2_3. Figure 2 shows the expert judgments for these faults. Both experts TC and DY 
assign a high risk to failure 385_1_1. The reasons for their assessments were discussed in the previous 
section. Failure 388_2_2 is only assessed high risk by DY; we believe that the high P(loss) may be due 
to ‘anchoring’. According to DY, the risk should be small because, “depth instability would not affect 
the function of the surface localization aids”. This rationale is also shared by CW, CJ, AS and TC, their 
comments are below: 
“If it's out of control 15 km out, the chances of loss are pretty high unless it is still being tracked somehow. If 
the vehicle remains water tight (no seal leaks, collisions, …), the chances of ultimate recovery are slightly 
higher in coastal regions due to the likelihood of its being found on a beach .” 
AS: “…Coast: uncontrolled headway risk collision with other vessels as well as the shore. …” 
CW: “…If this event occurs in coastal waters, P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time on 
the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, …” 
DY: “…more potential problem scenarios near the coast, the vehicle could end up running aground which 
could make the vehicle harder to find and complicate the recovery considerable. …” 
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The probability judgment provided by DY does not reflect the argument present in his comments. 
We believe that DYs judgment for coastal water is anchored to the judgment for open water. 
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Figure 2  Expert judgment assessments for failures 385_1_1 (blue), 388_2_2 (red), 391_1_3 (yellow) and 
389_2_3 (green). 
 
Recommendation 5: Despite the fact that DY shows some coherence in his judgments there is a 
significant discrepancy between his judgments for failure 388_2_2 and the judgments provided by the 
remaining experts. Given this discrepancy in judgments it is recommended that expert DY should re-
assess failure 388_2_2. 
Failure 389_1_3 and 389_2_3 were discussed in the previous section. Analyses concerning these 
failures for open water resulted in recommendations 2 and 3 for open water. Similarly to 
recommendation 5, for these failures we argue that the high Ploss judgment provided by DY may also 
be due to anchoring bias. Expert MM also assigned a high Ploss to the same failure. However, there is 
no evidence of anchoring bias in his judgment. MM’s judgments for this failure varies from P(loss) = 
0.01 for open water to P(loss) = 0.3 for coastal water. This may be a typing error given that for most 
judgments the same expert varies from 0.01 for open water to 0.03 for coastal water. Unfortunately 
MM did not provide any comment concerning this failure. A future update of this document should 
include MM’s comments for this failure. 
Recommendation 6: For the reasons mentioned in previous paragraph, it is recommended that expert 
DY should re-asses faults 389_1_3 and 389_2_3, for coastal water. Furthermore, given the high risk 
judgment assigned to failure 389_2_3 by expert MM, it is recommended that MM should re-assess this 
fault and provide the reasons for his judgment. 
3.1.1.3 Sea Ice 
Our perception was that sea ice poses a greater hazard to AUV operation than the previous two 
environments (Griffiths and Tembranis, 2007) and this is substantiated in the expert judgments. The 
risks of loosing the vehicle are greater when the vehicle comes to surface. The AUV has several 
antennas that can be damaged by the ice on the surface, damage to any of these antennas can result in 
CW: “Assuming that the AUV can be located via the acoustic pinger, strobe light or ARGOS position, and, that 
the ship can get to the location of the AUV, then P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time 
on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3.” 
CJ:  “1m oscillation not mission recovery critical.” 
AS: “Ice / seafloor collision possible if the AUV course was planed with less than 1 meter of vertical clearance 
(which would be imprudent). Otherwise no loss risk.” 
TC: “This amplitude oscillation is low risk for loss unless operating near the surface, especially if the surface is 
ice covered.” 
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navigation problems or problems in locating the vehicle. Sea ice can also make it difficult for the 
support ship to reach a stranded vehicle.  
The probability judgment distribution shows that for the majority of failures two or more experts 
assign probability of loss greater than 0.2 (P(loss) " 0.2). Only faults where one or two experts assign a 
P(loss) equal or greater than 0.5 are considered in this exception analysis. According to this criterion, 
failures that show a greater disagreement between experts’ judgments are: 389_1_3, 394_1_1, 
395_1_1, 397_1_1, 402_1_5, 403_1_3 and 416_1_1. Figure 3 shows the experts’ judgments for all 
these faults. 
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Figure 3  Comparison of expert judgments for sea ice. Expert judgment assessments for failures 395_1_1 
(blue), 389_1_3 (red), 394_1_1 (yellow), 402_1_5 (green), 403_1_3 (dark blue), 416_1_1 (orange) and 
397_1_1 (brown). 
 
For failure 394_1_1, RM is to be the only expert whose P(loss) judgment exceeds the threshold of 
0.5. Failure 394_1_1 concerns a problem with the Jack-in-the-box float system. The Jack-in-the-box 
system is suppose to operate when the AUV is at surface after completing a mission. The system is 
used to check and to support its recovery. Here, the jack-in-the-box float came out and its line wrapped 
around the Autosub propeller, jamming it. This led to consequential damage to the upper rudder frame 
and the GPS antenna as the recover was made more difficult. According to RM’s comments, his 
judgment reflects the worst scenario where the vehicle is heading under, rather than away from, the ice. 
This fault is significantly risky under sea ice, four experts assign a P(loss) " 0.2. The judgments 
provided by RM for this fault do not show any evidence of bias due to anchoring nor 
representativeness. 
Failure 389_1_3 was previously discussed for open and coastal waters. Prior to the start of the 
mission, the AUV is put in a holding mode. This means that the AUV is set circling around a pre-
defined area whilst engineers on board the vessel carry out relevant checks. Usually this operation 
occurs directly underneath the support vessel. Here, when the AUV exited from holding mode and 
dived, it was noticed that the AUV was heading in the wrong direction. At this point the vehicle 
mission was stopped by acoustic command. 
Experts DY and RM assigned a high P(loss) to this failure under sea ice; both assigned P(loss) = 0.7. 
For this fault all remaining experts assign a P(loss) < 0.15, in fact three experts (AS, CJ and TC) assign 
P(loss) # 0.05. This shows some significant disagreement between experts. Whilst DYs judgment can 
be explained by the fact that it is anchored to the judgment that he provided for open water, RMs 
judgment does not seem to be anchored to any previous judgment. RMs judgments for this fault across 
different environments are as follows {P(Loss|Open water) = 0.005, P(Loss|Coastal water) = 0.005, 
P(Loss|Sea ice) = 0.7, P(Loss|Ice shelf) = 0.9}. The comment provided by RM does not allow us to 
infer whether his judgment contains bias due to representativeness or availability. 
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Recommendation 7: There is strong disagreement in judgments for failure 389_1_3. The brevity of 
the description may have contributed. As this happened immediately after first dive it was close to the 
ship. Thus it is recommended that if possible, experts DY and RM should re-assess their judgments. 
Expert DY has shown some evidence of anchoring and thus if possible expert DY should re-assess this 
fault for all four environments. Expert RM’s judgments do not show any evidence of bias. However 
expert RM’s judgment is significantly higher than those of the rest of the group. In order to understand 
the reasoning underpinning his judgment it is recommended that RM should add a comment with 
reference to the environment change and its effect on the judgment.  
Failure 395_1_1 is similar to failure 394_1_1, both are a result of the Jack-in-the-box line wrapped 
around the AUV propeller. The main differences between these two faults are: 1) the mission distance; 
2) the damage caused on recovery to the AUV control panels and GPS antenna, this occurred for 
failure 394_1_1 but not for failure 395_1_1. Experts MM, BF, CW and DY assigned the same 
probability judgment for both faults, regardless of the operational environment. Expert TC on the other 
hand considers the mission distance as a major factor and thus assigns a high P(loss) to failure 395_1_1 
when compared with failure 394_1_1. For failure 395_1_1 the highest P(loss) are assigned by experts 
TC (P(loss) = 0.8) and RM (P(loss) = 0.6). These judgments seem plausible, given that at least four 
other experts assigned a P(loss) equal or greater than 0.2. 
All experts received information concerning how the AUV was recovered following failure 
394_1_1. Experts RM, AS and CJ seem to take this information into account when providing their 
assessments. Since no information concerning the recovery was provided (implying no additional 
damage) for failure 395_1_1; the way in which the details of the fault were presented may have 
introduced bias into the expert judgment. Below are the comments made by AS, CJ and RM with 
respect to failure 394_1_1. 
 
Recommendation 8: It is possible that by adding details concerning the recovery procedure following 
a particular fault, we may be directing the expert into a specific rationale, one that would inevitably 
contain bias. This is particularly true with faults 394_1_1 and 395_1_1, where details concerning the 
recovery seem to have more influence on the differences in expert judgments than any other factor, 
such as mission distance and damage to the vehicle. Thus it is recommended that experts CJ, AS and 
RM should re-assess faults 394_1_1 and 395_1_1. Details concerning the AUV recovery should be 
removed from the description of fault 394_1_1. 
Fault 397_1_1 concerns the Autosub3 lifting system; as a result of a human failure the main lifting 
lines became loose. One possible consequence of this failure was that the lifting lines could have 
jammed the motor. RM seems to be the only expert to assign a high probability of losing the AUV in 
light of this fault. RM judged this fault identical to fault 395_1_1 where the Jack-in-the-box becomes 
loose and jams the motor. However, the two faults are different in the sense that fault 397_1_1 took 
place whilst Autosub3 was in the process of being brought alongside the vessel and not in the middle of 
a mission. 
One additional observation is that expert CW argues that failure 397_1_1 is not applicable to sea ice 
or indeed to the ice shelf scenario. CW’s rationale is that when this fault took place, the Autosub is 
very close to the boat and thus the true environment is open water rather than sea ice or shelf ice, and 
so of low risk. This notwithstanding, we are asking experts to consider the surrounding environment. 
Therefore, for fault 397_1_1, we are asking the experts to consider that the vehicle just returned from 
an operation in all four environments. 
Recommendation 9: It is recommended that expert RM should re-assess failure 397_1_1 in light of 
CJ: “Given recovery, albeit with damage, the AUV must have been clear of the shelf ice.  In ice conditions, 
small boat may not be launch able.” 
AS: “Risk of loss in all situations is associated with recovery difficulties. Increased risk includes potential 
collision with boat and compromising of watertight appendages.” 
RM: “… .  Also, the risk of losing the vehicle is increased in open water because the difficult recovery could be 
further complicated by incoming weather, fog, etc.” 
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the fact that the AUV was close to the vessel when this failure took place. As highlighted above, this 
failure differs from failure 395_1_1 and thus they should have different judgments. 
In failure 403_1_3 the recovery line was wrapped around the propeller whilst the AUV was at 
surface. Six experts assigned P(loss) < 0.05. CW did not assign a judgment to this fault on the grounds 
that when this fault took place the AUV could not have been under sea ice (same as for failure 
397_1_1). RM assigned the highest P(loss) for this fault ( P(loss) = 0.6). Expert RM deems this fault 
identical to faults 395_1_1 and 397_1_1, but as previously discussed this assumption is not entirely 
correct. Expert DY states that “any departure from normal recovery procedure increases likelihood of 
loss, especially if the weather is bad”. However he assigned the same judgment to all environments.  
Recommendation 10: Given the differences in judgments, it is recommended that expert RM should 
re-assess failure 403_1_3. 
Failure 416_1_1 consisted of a loss of communication with the AUV at a depth of 1180m. This 
resulted in an unplanned surfacing from a holding pattern. Given that the acoustic telemetry maximum 
range was 500m for digital data, there are two potential risks, one is Autosub3 collision with surface 
hazards and the second is the actual loss of communications at surface. Whilst the majority of experts 
consider this operation of low risk, TC and RM both assign P(loss) > 0.5. Apart from the Acoustic 
telemetry, the RF communication can also be used to locate and update Autosub position. However the 
RF range is also approximately 500 metres. The differences in judgments depend on whether an expert 
has an optimistic or pessimistic view of the problem and therefore there is no recommended 
rectification for these discrepancies in judgments. 
3.1.1.4 Ice Shelf 
This environment is interesting and challenging for two reasons, 1) not many people have experience 
in working in this environment and 2) this is a very unforgiving environment, where a failure deemed 
insignificant under open water may be considered mission critical and fatal under ice shelf. 
Only faults where one or two experts assign a P(loss) equal or greater than 0.5 are considered in this 
exception analysis. According to this criterion, failures that show a greater disagreement between 
experts’ judgments are: 391_2_3, 403_1_3, 404_7_7, 405_1_2, 405_2_2 and 408_1_5. Figure 4 shows 
the experts’ judgments for all these faults. 
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Figure 4  Comparison of expert judgments for ice shelf. Expert judgment assessments for failures 391_2_3 
(blue navy), 403_1_3 (red), 404_7_7 (yellow), 405_1_2 (green), 405_2_2 (dark blue), 408_1_5 (orange). 
Failure 391_2_3 concerns a fault with the GPS antenna. The GPS antenna became flooded near the 
end of a mission. The GPS plays a role in post-mission localisation however its role can be performed 
by location beacons. This would have been a very critical failure if the AUV did not have other means 
to communicate its position. Both the UHF RDF and the acoustic telemetry could locate the AUV. 
Whilst no judgment is provided by CW, four experts (AS, CJ, RM and TC) assign a P(loss) < 0.02 and 
MM assigns a P(loss) = 0.5. This probability is rather high given that the AUV is right at the end of its 
mission.  
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Recommendation 11: Although there is no evidence of bias, MM’s P(loss) judgment following failure 
391_2_3 is significantly higher than the judgments provided by all other experts. It is therefore here 
recommended that expert MM should re-assess fault 391_2_3. 
In failure 403_1_3 the AUV propeller was jammed by the recovery line whilst the AUV was at 
surface. Five experts assign P(loss) < 0.05. Both AS and RM assign P (loss) = 0.8. In his comments AS 
argues that the same P(loss) should be attributed to sea ice and ice shelf. However for this failure he 
assigns P(loss) = 0.05 for sea ice and P(loss) = 0.8 for ice shelf. We believe that this may be a simple 
typo, one that should be addressed by AS. Expert RM considers this failure to have the same criticality 
as failure 395_1_1, where the Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped around the propulsion motor, 
jamming it. However as previously noted, these failures are different because for failure 403_1_3 the 
AUV is at surface and in reach of the ship, the same cannot necessarily be said for failure 395_1_1. 
Recommendation 12: For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that failure 403_1_3 should be 
re-assessed by experts RM and AS. 
In failure 404_7_7, a collision with the vessel caused damage to the AUV acoustic telemetry 
transducer. Six experts judged P(loss) < 0.05. AS assigned P(loss) = 0.5. In his comments AS 
highlights the criticality of this fault in case the AUV needed to manoeuvre in order to be retrieved by 
the vessel. In contrast to AS’s views, most experts assume that the AUV is next to the ship and thus 
recovery should be straightforward. Comments made by three of our experts validate this hypothesis. 
 
Recommendation 13:  Given the discrepancy in judgments for fault 404_7_7 and also given that this 
discrepancy is due to differences in assumptions. It is recommended that expert AS should re-assess 
this failure. For the new assessment expert AS should consider that the AUV does not need to 
manoeuvre in order to be retrieved.  
Failure 405_2_2 concerns a fault found during pre-launch, the starboard lower rudder and sternplane 
were loose. This fault was detected and corrected whilst the AUV was on-board, thus the risk should be 
low. Six experts (namely AS, MM, BF, CJ, TC and DY) assigned a risk lower than 0.01. Two experts 
(namely RM and CW) went beyond the assumptions present in the fault description. Both assumed that 
either the fault went undiscovered or that the fault was only discovered whilst the AUV was in the 
middle of a mission.  
Recommendation 14:  Failure 405_2_2 was detected and corrected whilst the AUV was still on-board 
the vessel. In order to reduce discrepancies in judgments, this assumption should be considered by all 
experts. It is therefore recommended that experts RM and CW should re-assess this fault, assuming that 
there was a high probability that it was detected and corrected whilst the AUV was on-board. 
Similar to the previous failure, failure 408_1_5 was discovered whilst the AUV was on board of the 
vessel. The failure description states: “Propulsion motor felt rough when turned by hand – bearings 
replaced before deployment”. Five experts (namely DY, AS, BF, CJ and TC) assigned a low 
probability of loss (P(loss) < 0.03). In a similar fashion to failure 405_2_2, experts RM and CW seem 
to be the only experts to assign a very high probability of loss. Again both experts assume that the 
failure was discovered whilst the AUV was in the middle of a mission. On a separate issue, MM 
assigned P(loss) = 0.1. This is a significant increase from the assessment that he provided for failure 
405_2_2. Failures 408_1_5 and 405_2_2 are different; however they were both discovered and 
rectified whilst the AUV was on board of the vessel. MM did not provide a comment for this failure 
but perhaps MM’s reasoning is that he considered the case where the fault was not correctly rectified. 
Below are the comments provided by DY, AS, BF, CJ and TC. 
BF: If caught and corrected pre-launch, then low risk of loss 
CJ: Given pre-launch identification, then low expectation of loss. 
RM: This situation and the above two seem similar and low risk in that the vehicle is on the surface next to the 
ship 
CW: This incident occurred in open water, at the end of the mission, during recovery. What is P(loss) during 
recovery after this incident occurred? It is no different that a normal open-water recovery, hence P(loss) is 0.01, 
confidence is 4. Ensure that the transducer is checked, and, repaired or replaced and tested prior to the next 
deployment. 
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Recommendation 15:  Given that failure 408_1_5 was discovered and rectified whilst the AUV was 
on-board and that this was the assumption taken by the majority of experts; it is recommended that both 
RM and CW should re-assess this failure in light of the assumption presented in the failure description 
that there is a high probability of this fault being caught pre-launch. 
3.2 Frequency distribution of experts’ judgments 
This section looks at two types of variability typically present in expert probability judgments. First 
we look at expert judgment variability across different environments and secondly we look at 
variability in the totality of their assessments between experts (variability within contentious fault 
assessments was discussed in the previous section; here we look at this from a different perspective). 
The variability in judgments is analysed first in terms of how often experts use different ranges of 
probability judgments. In our initial analysis we use a total of nine intervals of probability. The 
cumulative distribution of the relative frequency at which P(loss) lies in any particular range is plotted 
to support analysis, see Figure 5. 
3.2.1   Open water 
The cumulative distribution for all experts shows that some experts use a wider range of probability 
in their judgments than others. A P(loss) of 0 is only assigned by five experts (RM = 4, AS = 5, MM = 
25, TC = 10 and DY = 12). The minimum P(loss) assigned by BF and CJ is 0.001 and the minimum 
P(loss) assigned by CW is 0.01. TC is the only expert to assign P(loss) values between 0.001 and 0 (in 
four instances TC assigns a P(loss) of 0.0001). For this environment, it can also be observed that 90% 
of CW’s judgments are lower than 0.03 and 92% of DY’s judgments are below the same value. All 
remaining experts have at least 98% of all their P(loss) judgments under 0.03. For open water CJ uses 
three interval ranges; BF, MM and DY use four; AS,RM,CW and TC use five. One additional 
observation is the spread of these judgments; are these intervals clustered? 94% of CJ’s judgments 
were in the interval range of ]0.0003, 0.001] (CJ assigned P(loss) = 0.001, 59 times), however the other 
two interval ranges used by this expert are at least one interval range apart. Open water is the most 
forgiving of all four environments and given that the vast majority of CJ’s judgments are in the lower 
interval ranges, in our view CJ’s overall judgments distribution does not represent any problem to the 
elicitation process.  
In contrast to CJs judgments, CW’s judgments seem to be clustered in the upper interval ranges. This 
can be explained by the fact that CW did not provide any judgment for 12 failures (namely 391_3_3, 
404_4_7, 404_5_7, 404_6_7, 406_2_7, 408_3_5, 408_5_5, 409_1_1, 410_1_1, 415_2_3, 415_3_3, 
416_1_3). CW’s comments present a detailed argument on the criticality of each of these faults (see 
Annex A). CW considers all these failures to be of low risk and that may be the reason why he did not 
assign a probability judgment to the above failures. In some of CW’s comments, the expert quite 
frequently referenced the graph in Figure 6a of Griffiths, et. al (2003) and recommends a judgment 
based on this graph. For the reason mentioned in recommendation 4, it was decided not to use CW’s 
judgment for these particular faults. As a result, 19% of CW’s judgments are omitted from our 
analyses. Coincidently, these were some of the failures for which the remaining experts assigned a low 
P(loss) value. It is our belief that if CW re-assesses these failures, a greater range will be exhibited in 
CW’s P(loss) distribution.  
Recommendation 16:  CW provided insightful comments to failures 391_3_3, 404_4_7, 404_5_7, 
404_6_7, 406_2_7, 408_3_5, 408_5_5, 409_1_1, 410_1_1, 415_2_3, 415_3_3, 416_1_3. However 
CW omitted the probability judgments for each of these failures. These failures are considered of low 
DY: This problem was diagnosed so it did not put the vehicle at risk. However, this could mean that the 
bearing could wear prematurely, which could result in a problem during a long mission. 
AS: If bearings were problem, than there is no risk of loss as they were replaced prior to deployment. 
BF: If caught and corrected pre-launch, then low risk of loss 
CJ: Pre-launch check, mitigates loss risk. 
TC: Since fault found pre-launch and fixed, risk is negligible. If fault not found or repair unreliable, the risk 
is higher. 
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risk by all experts, including CW. Thus it is recommended that CW should re-assess failures 391_3_3, 
404_4_7, 404_5_7, 404_6_7, 406_2_7, 408_3_5, 408_5_5, 409_1_1, 410_1_1, 415_2_3, 415_3_3, 
416_1_3 for all operating environments. 
 
Figure 5  Cumulative probability distributions. Open water (top left), Coastal water (top right), Sea ice 
(bottom left) and Ice shelf (bottom right). 
3.2.2   Coastal water 
The spread of the cumulative distribution varies with the operational environment. Considering 
coastal water, this phenomenon is most notable if we observe the cumulative distribution obtained for 
MM and TC. Both experts reduce the number of times that they assign a P(loss) < 0.0001 compared 
with open water. For open water MM assigns P(loss) < 0.0001 in 44% of his judgments whereas for 
coastal water the same expert assigns P(loss) < 0.0001 in 29% of his judgments. Looking at expert 
TC’s judgments we can also see that the expert reduced the number of times that P(loss) ranges under 
0.0001 are used. For open water, TC assigned P(loss) < 0.0001 in 29% of his judgments whereas for 
coastal water the same expert assigned P(loss) < 0.0001 in 25% of his judgments.  
For coastal water, Figure 5 also shows that there is a cluster of experts (formed by AS, MM, BF, RM 
and TC) that quite frequently use the mid-lower ranges of ]0.0003, 0.001] and ]0.001, 0.003]. 
3.2.3   Sea ice and Ice shelf 
The reduced slope of the cumulative distributions for sea ice and ice shelf shows that a greater 
number of probability intervals are used by our experts (see distributions for RM, CW, TC and BF). 
The shape of the cumulative distribution for sea ice highlights a phenomenon that is not captured in the 
previous two environments. Whilst some expert’s cumulative judgments distribution have a narrow ‘S’ 
shape (AS, BF, CJ, CW, MM and TC) others display a broad ‘S’ shape (DY and RM). Together with 
the clustering in the median probability, this inspired us to classify experts into two groups, those that 
are optimist (namely experts whose judgments cumulative distribution follows a narrow ‘S’ shape) and 
another group formed by the pessimist (namely, those experts whose judgments cumulative distribution 
displays a broad ‘S’ shape). We do not intend to be judgmental in using these terms; our observation 
that there may be two “schools of thought”, especially for operations under sea ice means that caution 
is needed when using an average over all experts. 
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The main difference between the judgments provided for sea ice and ice shelf are in the number of 
judgments that lie in the range of ]0.3, 1.0]. RM, DY, AS, MM, CW and DY seem to be the experts 
who most frequently assign P(loss) values in this range when assessing ice shelf scenario. Looking at 
the shape of the cumulative distribution, it is visible that two experts form the group of optimistic 
(namely BF and CJ), the other experts who were in the optimistic group for sea ice moved to the 
pessimistic group for ice shelf. If we compute the un-weighted average of the expert judgments for all 
four environments we obtain the distribution depicted in Figure 6. The un-weighted average may be 
interpreted as a single expert. 
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Figure 6  Comparison of the cumulative probability distribution of the un-weighted average for four 
operating scenarios. Open water (blue), Coastal water (red), Sea ice (brown) and Ice shelf (black).  
The distributions across all four environments cluster into two groups. Group 1 formed by the open 
water and coastal water distribution and group 2, sea ice and ice shelf. These two groups are separated 
by a significant gap. As previously highlighted for ice shelf the average judgments are dominated by a 
pessimistic view of the risk. The distributions presented in Figure 6 do not capture the influence of the 
expert’s confidence on his risk assessment. The following section will look into how the experts’ self 
assessment influences the aggregated opinion of the risk perception associated with each of the four 
environments.  
3.3 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to identify major discrepancies in judgments and to raise 
recommendations whenever we felt that these discrepancies could be resolved. People employ different 
types of instinctive processes when making judgments under uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). Thus, first we were looking to see whether discrepancies in judgments were caused because our 
experts introduced bias whilst following a particular instinctive process (anchoring, representativeness 
or availability) also denoted as heuristics. Secondly we were also interested to see whether some 
discrepancies in judgments were caused by misunderstandings or typographical mistakes. We raised 
sixteen recommendations and a summary of our recommendations is presented in Table 2. On one 
occasion we believe that one expert may have introduced bias due to anchoring and this raised 
recommendation 5, all remaining fifteen recommendations were raised to tackle misunderstandings in 
the assumptions. 
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Table 2    Summary of recommendations for Annex A. No recommendations were raised due to expert 
BF’s judgments. 
TC BF CJ MM RM AS CW DY 
1  8 6 7 8 3 2 
   11 8 12 4 3 
    9 13 14 5 
    10  15 6 
    12  16 7 
    14    R
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4   Knowledge Aggregation 
As previously mentioned in section 2.1.5 two mathematical methods were selected to aggregate the 
experts’ judgments. Mathematical approaches construct a single combined assessment per event by 
applying analytical models that operate on the individual assessments. The aggregated opinion may be 
viewed as that of a single expert. The methods used for aggregating the expert judgments were the 
linear weighted pool and the logarithmic opinion pool (Winkler, 1968). The linear and logarithmic 
pools lead to quite different aggregated distributions. This section gives details concerning these 
methods, it discusses assumptions and compares results obtained using both methods. A simple non-
weighted aggregated mean for all individual assessments is also computed to support arguments. 
Detailed results for the two aggregated methods are presented in Annex E for all operational 
environments.  
4.1   Linear Weighted Pool 
The linear weighted opinion pool was applied to combine expert judgments concerning all 63 faults. 
Results of the weighted opinion are presented in Annex E. This is the most popular method for expert 
opinion aggregation (O’Hagan, et al., 2003). A single probability judgment is created by summing the 
products between an individual expert’s weights (
i
w ) and their judgments ( )(!
i
p ) for the n experts. 
Where !  is the uncertain event (which in our case is AUV loss). The weight 
i
w  may be chosen by the 
decision maker (for example the authors of the report) to reflect their assessment of the relative 
expertise of the experts, or may be based on the experts self ratings (Genest and McConway, 1990). 
Some researchers argue that self rating produces better results (e.g. Dalkey, et al., 1969). In this report, 
where we have used weightings they have been those of experts themselves. We have not altered any 
self ratings. 
Equation 4.1 below captures the mathematical formulation of the linear pool aggregation method. 
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""       4.1 
The elicitation exercise here presented, considered the weight as a measure of how confident the 
expert was about their own assessment. The weight varies in a range of 1 to 5, an expert assigns weight 
5 to their assessment in case (s)he is very confident about their judgment, in contrast an expert assigns 
weight of 1 in case (s)he is not very confident about their judgment. Table 3 shows an extract of the 
expert elicitation table, where the probability judgments provided by eight experts are aggregated into a 
single judgment using the linear pool method.  
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Table 3   Fraction of the Expert elicitation table. Eight expert judgments are considered. 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice 
Homing failed, and the vehicle headed 
off in an uncontrolled direction. 
Mission was stopped by acoustic 
command. Problem was due to (a) the 
uncalibrated receiver array, and (b) a 
network message (“homing lost”) 
being lost on the network. 
0.001      
0.01        
0.001      
0.01 
0.01    
0.001    
0.01 
0.1 
0.01 
0.01           
0.001 
0.01 
0.2 
0.001         
0.03 
0.1 
0.05 
0.07 
0.1 
0.01 
 
0.2 
0.01 
0.1 
0.5 
0.5 
0.2 
0.2 
0.8 
0.9 
0.01 
0.8 
0.5 
Weights 
3, 5, 5, 5, 3, 4, 2,5 4, 4, 5, 5, 1, 3, 2,5 2, 3, 3, 5, 1, 3, 2,4 1, 3, 3, 4, 1, 3, 2,4 
Range 0.001 – 0.1 0.001 - 0.2 0.01 - 0.5 0.01 – 0.9 
Linear Opinion Pool 0.0210 0.0519 0.1470 0.4781 
The linear weighted frequency distribution is depicted in Figure 7 for each of the four environments. 
Looking at open water first, approximately 46% of all probability judgments are within the range of: 
]0.01, 0.03]. For the same environment, the linear weighed opinion does not judge any single failure 
with a P(loss) > 0.3. In addition the graph also shows that approximately 16% of all 63 faults, exactly 9 
faults, lie in the region of ]0.03, 0.1]. Failure 385_1_1 is the most critical failure in open water with a 
probability of AUV loss of 0.1109 or probability of survival of 0.85537 (1 - 0.1109). Failure 407_1_2 
is the second most critical failure, with P(loss) = 0.05023. The relatively large aggregated P(loss) 
obtained for failure 385_1_1 may be due to TCs and DYs judgments on this failure (this is discussed in 
section 3.1.1.1). As previously mentioned, TC assigned a P(loss) of 0.8 and self assessment weight of 
2. The weight assigned by TC is small when compared to weights assigned by other experts (for 
instance DY’s weight = 5), however TC’s contribution to the linear weighted aggregated judgment is 
1.6 (i.e p*w). Having assigned a P(loss) of 0.3 and a self assessment weight of 5, DYs contribution to 
the weighted sum is 1.5. The combined weighted distribution of both TC and DY is approximately 14 
times the combined contribution of all remaining 6 experts put together (which is 0.228). This 
discrepancy between different weighted contributions, for failure 385_1_1, may be reduced if 
recommendation 1 (proposed in section 3.1.1 of this report) is addressed in a future work. Similarly, 
failure 407_1_2 is also significantly influenced by the weighted contribution provided by CW (which 
equals 1.2). Again the aggregated P(loss) for this fault may be reduced if recommendation 4 
(proposed in section 3.1.1) is addressed in future work.  
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Figure 7   Relative frequency for the linear weighted mean 
Comparing the relative frequency of the judgments for open and coastal water, the distribution 
shows that whilst the shape of both distributions are similar, the coastal water distribution presents a 
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shift of judgments towards greater risk. Similarly to open water, the majority of probability judgments 
for coastal water lie in the range ]0.01, 0.03]. However there was 17% increase in judgments in the 
range ]0.03, 0.1] and a 2% increase in judgments in the range ]0.1, 0.3]. The latter implies that two 
failures are assigned a P(loss) greater than 0.1 and lower than 0.3. These are namely failures 385_1_1 
(P(loss) = 0.124) and 389_2_3 (P(loss) = 0.118). The P(loss) for these failures will reduce significantly 
if recommendations 1 and 6 are addressed in future work. Interestingly failure 407_1_2 (deemed the 
second most critical failure for open water) for coastal water is considered a failure of low criticality 
(P(loss) = 0.0104 instead of 0.0502). The reason for that is because, for coastal water, CW did not 
assign a P(loss) for this failure whilst for open water the expert assigned a very high P(loss). The linear 
aggregated opinion on this judgment is likely to change if recommendation 4 is addressed in future 
work.  
The shift of probability judgments towards greater risk becomes more evident if one looks at the 
relative frequency distribution of the aggregated judgments for the sea ice and ice shelf. Ice shelf is the 
most severe environment where 41% of all failures are assigned a P(loss) > 0.3.  
A summary of the statistical properties of the P(loss) distribution obtained using the linear 
aggregated opinion pool is presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4    Statistical properties of the linear aggregated opinion pool. 
                                                    Environment                                                      
 
Open water Coastal Sea ice Ice shelf 
Quantile 25% 0.0083 0.0083 0.045 0.072 
Median 0.018 0.021 0.088 0.17 
Quantile 75% 0.026 0.037 0.17 0.40 
Quantile 95% 0.049 0.090 0.36 0.75 
 
 
4.2   Logarithmic Weighted Pool 
The logarithmic weighted pool was introduced to tackle an important theoretical limitation of the 
linear weighted opinion pool. Analytical methods for combining expert judgments are expected to 
comply with axioms of probability theory such as marginalization and Bayesian theory. Unlike the 
linear weighted opinion pool the logarithmic opinion pool complies with the principles of Bayesian 
theory (Genest, 1984). This is better explained if we consider the scenario where, in light of new 
evidence, one expert (let us call him expert A) wants to update his judgment and thus a new aggregated 
judgment must be computed. The decision maker has two alternatives as to how to achieve this; the 
decision maker can remove expert A’s previous judgment and re-combine all judgements (including 
expert A’s new judgment) or alternatively, the decision maker can update the old aggregated judgment 
using Bayes theory. An aggregation method that complies with the Bayesian theory would provide the 
same results regardless of the process followed by the decision maker to update the aggregated opinion. 
The logarithmic opinion pool is mathematically captured with the following equation:  
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The equation presented above differs slightly from the logarithmic opinion pool equation presented 
in the literature (Clemen and Winkler, 1999). Although mathematically equivalent, equation 4.2 makes 
the normalization factor explicit. An evident detail encapsulated by the equation is that if one expert 
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assigns a probability of 0 to an event, this expert’s judgment will overrule all other experts’ judgments.  
This reflects a characteristic of the logarithmic opinion pool denoted by right of vetoing.  One expert 
has the right to veto the remaining experts’ opinions by assigning 0 to a probability of an event taking 
place.  In practical terms this may be an unacceptable limitation of the logarithmic aggregation method.  
As previously discussed, on many occasions an expert may be inclined to assign probability of 0 
instead of 0.0001 for instance. Training provided to experts prior to the elicitation exercise should 
cover this situation, however, unlike behavioural methods, mathematical methods rely on data provided 
by single experts, and the experts are not monitored nor guided through this process. Table 5 shows an 
extract of the expert elicitation table, where the logarithmic opinion pool is used to aggregate the 
probability judgments provided by eight experts (the same extract as in Table 3). Note that in each 
environment the log opinion pool leads to a lower estimate of loss. 
 
   Table 5    Fraction of the Expert elicitation table.  Eight expert judgments are considered. 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice 
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0.01 
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0.5 
Homing failed, and the vehicle 
headed off in an uncontrolled 
direction. Mission was stopped by 
acoustic command. Problem was 
due to (a) the uncalibrated 
receiver array, and (b) a network 
message (“homing lost”) being 
lost on the network. 
3, 5, 5, 5, 3, 4, 2,5 4, 4, 5, 5, 1, 3, 2,5 2, 3, 3, 5, 1, 3, 2,4 1, 3, 3, 4, 1, 3, 2,4 
Range 0.001 – 0.1 0.001 - 0.2 0.01 - 0.5 0.01 – 0.9 
Logarithmic Opinion Pool 0.0065 0.0156 0.0646 0.2425 
Linear Opinion Pool 0.0210 0.0519 0.1470 0.4781 
 
Figure 8 depicts the relative frequency distribution for aggregated probability judgments, using the 
logarithmic pool. It should be noted that the relative frequency distribution only takes into account 
those failures that were not vetoed. For open water 35 events were vetoed by at least one expert thus 
the figure shows the relative distribution for the 28 events that were not vetoed. The logarithmic pool 
for open water uses only two classes of probability ranges, namely:] 0.003, 0.01] and ] 0.01, 0.03], with 
] 0.003, 0.01] used in 79% of all non vetoed judgments (23 judgments).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8  Relative frequency for the logarithmic weighted pool 
Approximately 50% of the probability judgments for coastal water lie in the range ]0.01, 0.03]. 
There is a significant decrease of probability judgments in the range of ]0.003, 0.01]. The figure also 
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shows that 5% of all judgments are in the range of ]0.03, 0.1]. Failure 389_2_3 is assigned the 
maximum probability of loss, this failure was caused by a mission control error. The P(loss) for this 
fault is 0.037 which is still quite small given that the maximum value for its class (interval range) is 
0.1.  
The coastal water logarithmic weighted distribution is significantly more pessimistic than the 
distribution obtained for open water. According to experts there is an evident increase in risk by 
moving an operation from open water to coastal water, this is discussed briefly in section 3.1. The 
aggregated distribution for coastal water makes use of three probability ranges:] 0.003, 0.01],] 0.01, 
0.03] and ] 0.03, 0.1]. We note that the median for open water is 0 because more than 50% of the 
judgments were vetoed by one expert or other. 
The distribution obtained for sea ice denotes a significant increase in risk when compared to open 
and coastal water. The spread of the distribution highlights the effect of the environment change on the 
risk assessment, and there is more uncertainty. Whilst some faults are still deemed of low risk, perhaps 
because these faults took place when the AUV was close to the vessel, other faults are considered of 
high risk, for example fault 402_2_5. This fault was caused by network failure, the AUV was 274 km 
into the mission; the logarithmic aggregated opinion assigns a P(loss) of loss of 0.31.  
The logarithmic distribution obtained for ice shelf is quite optimistic when compared to the linear 
weighted and non-weighted distributions obtained for the same environment. Whilst the logarithmic 
pool assigns P(loss) > 0.3 to 26% of all non-vetoed faults (42 faults) the linear weighted pool assigns 
P(loss) > 0.3 to 41% of the faults and the non-weighted pool assigns P(loss) > 0.3 to 38% of all faults. 
Failure 395_1_1 is classified as the second worst failure for sea ice, for ice shelf the same failure is 
deemed the worst failure, with a P(loss) = 0.81. The average expert self-assessment weight for this 
failure is 3.14, this is smaller than the average self-assessment weight for failure 402_2_5 (which is the 
second worst failure with an average self-assessment weight of 3.42); this shows that experts were 
slightly more confident in assessing fault 402_2_5 than fault 395_1_1. However, for this particular 
environment failure 395_1_1 was generally assigned a higher probability of loss, the non-weighted 
probability of loss of 0.82 is almost 20% higher than the non-weighted probability of loss assigned to 
fault 402_2_5. This numerically explains why failure 395_1_1 is classified as the most critical failure 
for ice shelf. A summary of the statistical properties of the P(loss) distribution obtained using the 
aggregated logarithmic pool is presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6    Statistical properties of the logarithmic opinion pool. 
Environment Statistics 
Open water Coastal Sea ice Ice shelf 
Quantile 25% 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
Median 0.0000 0.0054 0.018 0.023 
Quantile 75% 0.0065 0.012 0.062 0.15 
Qunatile 95% 0.014 0.028 0.20 0.65 
 
4.3   Other Mathematical Opinion Aggregation Methods 
Methods that apply Bayesian formalism have been continuously gaining reputation amongst 
researchers. Such methods required the definition of a likelihood function which is typically elicited 
from the human experts. The likelihood combined with the prior belief in the probability of an event 
taken place is used to compute a posterior belief (Clemen and Winkler, 1990).  Future extension to this 
work would be to study the feasibility of applying such techniques to our problem. The current expert 
data seems to be insufficient to apply successfully any of the Bayesian methods.  
4.4    Top Risks following Aggregation 
The aggregated judgments for all 63 failures is presented in Annex F, an extract of the table 
containing the five most critical faults for each environment is presented in Table 7.  
Except for fault 385_1_1 the single expert analysis (Griffiths, 2008) identified the same most critical 
faults as in Table 8 for the Ice shelf environment, and these we discussed in detail with the AUV 
-------   28   ------- 
 
leader. 
Interestingly, the pessimistic group deem failures 407_1_2 and 407_2_2 as the two most critical 
failures for open water but not for the remaining environments. This is related to recommendation 4, 
highlighted in section 3.1.1.1 of this report. CW is one of three experts that form the pessimistic group 
for open water. As discussed earlier CW assigns a very high probability of loss to these failures. Future 
work may see the removal of these faults from the top five risks. 
 
Table 7   List of the five most critical failures for each of the four environments.  
Experts Open water Coastal Sea ice Ice shelf 
Failure Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
384_1_2 
 
------ ------ ------ ------ 0.1944   0.8389 
385_1_1 
 
0.0981 0.1277 0.1127 0.1329 ------ ------ 0.6500 0.7842 
388_2_2 
 
------ ------ ------ 0.0937 ------ ------ ------ ------ 
389_1_3 
 
------ 0.1339 ------ 0.1788  0.3375 ------ ------ 
389_2_3 
 
------ ------ ------ 0.2136 ------ ------ ------ ------ 
391_2_3 
 
0.0285 ------ ------ ------  0.4706 ------ ------ 
392_1_1 
 
------ ------ 0.0600  ------ ------ ------ ------ 
394_1_1 
 
------ ------ ------ 0.0925  0.3063 ------ ------ 
395_1_1 
 
------ ------ ------ ------ 0.4100  0.9786 0.8293 
402_1_5 
 
------ ------ ------ ------ 0.3549 0.3750 0.8929  
402_2_5 
 
0.0268 ------ 0.0436  0.6667  0.7333 0.7611 
402_3_5 
 
------ ------ ------ ------  0.3125  0.7250 
407_1_2 
 
------ 0.1417 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
407_2_2 
 
------ 0.1356 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
415_1_3 
 
0.0387 ------ 0.0298  ------ ------ 0.4143  
415_2_3 
 
0.0404 ------ ------ ------  0.3150 ------ ------ 
416_1_1 
 
------ ------ ------ ------ 0.2673  ------ ------ 
418_1_1 
 
------ 0.1322 0.0454  ------ ------ ------ ------ 
 
4.5   Summary 
Mathematical methods for aggregating experts’ judgments were reviewed in this section; the 
feasibility of applying such methods to aggregate experts’ probability judgment concerning the 
probability of loosing the AUV was also assessed. The point is not that one or another method is more 
appropriate overall, but that different models may be appropriate for different situations, depending on 
the nature of the situation and an appropriate description of the experts’ probabilities. The linear and 
logarithmic opinion pool, have the advantage of being simple and practical. In contrast, methods based 
on Bayesian theory are quite complex to apply and require expert data that was not elicited during our 
survey.  
The cumulative distribution shows that the logarithmic pool generally provides a better fit than the 
linear pool (this was discussed in section 3.2). Other authors agree with our views (O’Hagan et. al., 
2006). However for our problem the benefit of using logarithmic pool comes at the expense of ignoring 
failures for which the logarithmic pool results in the vetoing by a single expert. For open water it 
means that approximately 50% percent of all failures are vetoed. The percentage of failures vetoed 
decreases as the risk posed by the environment increases, thus open water has more vetoes than coastal, 
and coastal has more vetoes than sea ice and sea ice more vetoes than ice shelf. The number of failures 
that were vetoed for open water is large, results in a median of 0, and therefore it is not practical to 
create our risk model using the logarithmic opinion pool. Thus, from hereafter the linear opinion pool 
will be used to generate our risk model.  
Our analyses also highlighted that experts often cluster in different groups that represent different 
perceptions of risk. For reasons of simplicity we decided to treat separately those that are optimistic 
from those that are pessimistic. The terms are not used with the intention of criticizing the expert 
views. The goal here is to help us to build a more detailed model of the AUV mission risk. We do keep 
in mind that by choosing the linear opinion pool we are choosing the most pessimistic aggregation 
model. 
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5.   Risk Model and Survival Analysis 
The AUV risk model consists of an aggregated opinion of the risk of loosing the AUV given its 
history of faults. In order to capture the expert judgments in a more realistic form than forming a single 
opinion pool it was decided to aggregate experts in two schools of thought, the optimists and the 
pessimists. Table 8 shows the different groups for each environment. 
Table 8   Experts groups description. 
Model Experts 
Optimist MM,CJ,RM,TC and AS 
Open water Pessimist BF, CW and DY 
Optimist AS, CJ, RM and TC 
Coastal Pessimist BF, MM, CW and DY 
Optimist TC, CJ and AS 
Sea ice Pessimist MM,BF, RM, CW and DY 
Optimist CJ and TC 
Ice shelf Pessimist AS,MM,BF,RM,CW and DY 
 
Arguably, it is also possible to create three groups of experts, one formed by the optimists, another 
by the pessimists and a third group formed by ‘moderate’ experts, i.e. experts that are neither optimistic 
nor pessimistic. However, whilst the discrimination of these three groups is easy for open and coastal 
water environments, for sea ice and ice shelf it is only possible to create two groups (for more detail 
see cumulative distribution presented in Figure 5). 
5.1.   AUV Survival Analysis using Kaplan-Meier 
Statistical methods for estimating survival functions use a sample of observations to infer the 
survivability distribution for the system of interest. Early application of such methods was in the field 
of statistical medicine where many parametric and nonparametric survival models were developed to 
estimate patient survival over time (Gross and Clark, 1975). Results obtained using such models were 
used by medical doctors to manage the frequency of patient visits, type of analysis and the drugs 
prescription regime. The product-limit method derived by Kaplan and Meier (also referred as the 
Kaplan-Meier approach) is a well established nonparametric model for estimating and displaying 
survival functions based on a small or medium sample of data (Kaplan and Meier, 1958). With medical 
statistics the formulation of the Kaplan-Meier survival estimator is typically presented as a function of 
time. In the context of AUV risk management, the Kaplan-Meier approach has been used to estimate 
the AUV survival as a function of range. Using the survival estimator in its usual form, we can only 
deal with losses (death), as was done in the simplified analysis in Griffiths (2006). 
Given a set of data comprising ordered mission ranges, and whether each mission ended with a fault 
that would lead to certain loss (a “death”) or not, the survivor function S(r) with range r is defined as: 
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where ni is the number (of missions) at risk immediately prior to range ri and di is the number of 
losses at range ri. The process followed to apply the Kaplan-Meier approach to an AUV is described in 
detail in Griffiths (2008). A summary of the results obtained using this approach to estimate the risk of 
a campaign to the Antarctic, planned for January-March 2009, using a single expert and a simple 
‘loss’/‘no loss’ approach is presented in section 5.2. Section 5.3 details the mathematical manipulation 
needed in order to extend the Kaplan-Meier approach to estimate AUV survival based on any 
probability between 0 and 1 of a fault leading to loss, with the results presented in section 5.4. Section 
5.5 presents the summary. 
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5.2   Autosub3 Survival Under Ice Shelf – Single Expert Kaplan-Meier Assessment 
The Kaplan-Meier approach was previously used to model Autosub3 survival with distance (e.g. 
Griffiths et al., 2003a, 2003b) and most recently in (Griffiths, 2008). Historical fault data was censored 
by a single expert (GG). Recognizing that only assigning ‘loss’ or ‘no loss’ to each fault was an 
oversimplification, GG derived two sets of outcomes. The first set (‘optimistic’) marked as ‘loss’ only 
those missions for which he was very sure of the outcome (P(loss) > 0.7). The second set 
(‘pessimistic’) also marked as loss those missions for which there was an estimated probability of > 
0.25 of the fault leading to loss under ice shelf. GG assessed 63 faults which occurred during missions 
384-422, ten of these missions did not record any failure and hence were always censored. An 
unpublished analysis (Griffiths, 2008) resulted in the survival estimates shown in Figure 9 for the under 
ice shelf environment. In this analysis, 34 missions out of 39 were censored in the optimistic case and 
30 in the pessimistic. Where more than one fault occurred on a mission, only the most severe was 
considered. 
The survival function obtained from this analysis was used to estimate the risk of a scientific 
campaign to the Antarctic. The scientific campaign proposed by Dr Adrian Jenkins (BAS) (Jenkins, 
2007) consisted of several open water, under sea ice in the Amundsen u.c.ea and under ice shelf 
missions on Pine Island Bay glacier.  
The following four scenarios were derived from the operational requirements:  
• Scenario 1 – Minimum set with no fast ice 
o Three 60 km open water missions 
o Three 60 km missions under outer half of the ice shelf cavity 
• Scenario 2 – Minimum set with fast ice 
o Three 120 km under fast ice missions 
o Three 120 km missions: 60 km under fast ice and 60 km under outer half of the ice 
shelf cavity 
• Scenario 3 – Desirable set with no sea ice 
o Three 60 km open water missions 
o Three 60 km missions under outer half of the ice shelf cavity 
o Three 120 km missions under ice shelf cavity 
• Scenario 4 – Desirable set with fast ice 
o Three 120 km under fast ice missions 
o Three 120 km missions: 60 km under fast ice and 60 km under outer half of the ice 
shelf cavity 
o Three 180 km missions: 60 km under fast ice and 120 km under ice shelf cavity 
The survival distributions depicted in figure 9 in blue were used directly to estimate the probability 
of loss for the missions stated. For each under ice shelf mission, of a required range r, the probability of 
survival was read off the Kaplan-Meier graph. However the campaign also involved missions under 
open water and sea ice. For these missions GG used an empirical factor, based in his own judgment, 
that would reflect the decrease in risk from ice shelf to sea ice and from ice shelf to open water, with 
under Shelf ice weighted as 1, the risk factor for under sea ice was 0.3 and 0.1 for open water. These 
were selected before the expert judgment exercise, and compare with 1:0.53:0.11 for the medians of the 
linear opinion pools. Table 9 presents the summary of the overall campaign risk obtained for each 
scenario.  
 
Table 9    Probability of losing Autosub3 based on Kaplan-Meier analyses for each scenario (GG 
assessment). The optimistic estimate is the first number in each cell, the pessimistic is the second. 
Analysis Model Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Kaplan-Meier 0.33 – 0.48 0.44 – 0.64 0.54 – 0.80 0.65 – 0.84 
The results in table 10 correspond to the unmitigated risk assessment. These high estimated 
probabilities of loss led to a number of risk mitigation measures, including those set out in section 6. 
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5.3   Extending the Kaplan-Meier Approach 
The aggregated expert judgments presented in section 4 contain a representation of uncertainty on 
whether or not a given failure would lead to loss, represented as a probability. The conventional 
Kaplan-Meier approach was modified in order to model this uncertainty (Griffiths, et. al., in prep.), 
leading to the expression:  
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For the survival function, where 
i
n  is the number of events at risk at range 
i
r , and )(
i
eP the 
probability of fault leading to loss. Thus if )(
i
eP is zero we have what is called a censored case, i.e. no 
death is observed during the interval of interest. Else if )(
i
eP equals one, death is observed during the 
interval of interest. The approach reduces to the original version of the Kaplan-Meier method. One 
additional advantage of the new method is that it is now possible to capture the effect of one or more 
failures at a particular distance. In the original version of the Kaplan-Meier method if we had more 
than one failure at a particular range we would only consider the most critical one. The new version 
allow us to capture the contribution of each failure.  
5.4   Using the Extended version of the Kaplan-Meier method 
The mathematical formulation in equation 5.2 was implemented in a Visual Basic program running 
on Excel 2003. Figure 9 presents the survival distribution obtained for the ice shelf environment in red 
and GG’s single expert (loss/ no loss) assessments in blue.  
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Figure 9 Kaplan-Meier (left) optimistic assessment and (right) pessimistic assessment. In red is 
the estimate provided by the independent experts that answered Annex A whereas that in blue is 
the assessment provided by GG. 
 
Whilst differences in shape of the survival distributions are visible, and the number of steps (events) 
in GG’s analysis are fewer, the actual probabilities of survival at a given range are quite similar. If we 
consider optimistic predictions first, from GG’s survival distribution it is possible to see that for ranges 
between 25 km and 274 km the probability of survival is 0.89 whereas for the same range the 
probability of survival using the independent experts assessment varies from 0.91 to 0.85. GG 
probability of survival between 100 km and 274 km is slightly greater than the probability of survival 
obtained using the independent experts. For ranges lower than 100 km and greater than 274 km GG’s 
probability of survival is more pessimistic. For the pessimistic assessment, GG provided the most 
pessimistic probability of survival for ranges greater than 140 km and lower than 18 km.  
The differences in shape between survival distributions can be explained by the fact that in case of 
the independent experts’ survival distribution any interval range can have more than one fault and any 
fault within this range can cause a decrease on the probability of survival (provided that the aggregated 
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P(loss) is greater than zero). In contrast, for the survival distribution in GG’s assessment, only one fault 
per interval range can cause a decrease in the probability of survival. 
5.4.1 Dr. Jenkins Pine Island Bay plans – Expert Judgment Kaplan-Meier Assessment 
The extended survival function was used to compute the probability of Autosub3 loss for the four 
scenarios provided by Dr. Jenkins for the Pine Island Bay glacier campaign (see section 5.1 for more 
detail). For each scenario a probability of loss was computed using an optimistic and pessimistic model 
of the expert judgments, the results are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10    Probability of losing Autosub3 based on Kaplan-Meier analyses for each scenario. The 
optimistic assessment is the first number in each cell, the pessimistic the second. The second row 
presents the difference in estimates using Annex A experts and GGs personal assessment, where a (-) 
signifies the EEJ estimates are less than GG. 
Analysis Model Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Kaplan-Meier  0.26 – 0.56 0.40 - 81 0.53 – 0.86 0.64 – 0.96 
Difference EEJ-GG  (-)0.07 - (+)0.11 (-)0.04 - (+)0.17 (-)0.01 – (+)0.06 (+)0.01 – (+)0.12 
 
Considering the optimistic prediction, the results show that the probability of loss for scenarios 1, 2 
and 3 are lower than the probability of loss obtained using GG’s assessment. For scenario 4 the 
probability of loss provided by Annex A is slightly higher than the one estimated by GG’s model. For 
the pessimistic case, the differences are greater, with the experts predicting a greater likelihood of loss.  
5.5   Summary 
This chapter presented a real application of the expert judgment elicitation exercise described in 
chapters 2 to 5. A new version of the Kaplan-Meier approach was introduced. The extended Kaplan-
Meier method allows us to estimate AUV probability of survival with range using expert judgment. 
The method was applied to assess the risk of the upcoming scientific campaign to the Antarctic (this 
campaign will take place in January 2009). An estimate of the risk for this campaign was previously 
produced by GG using his own judgments and very simple loss/ no loss model. Pessimistic estimates 
provided by GG’s model are slightly less pessimistic than those estimates provided by our independent 
experts that answered Annex A. In contrast the optimistic estimates provided by the independent 
experts are slightly more optimistic than the estimates provided by the GG’s personal assessment. This 
notwithstanding, the results here presented used the first probability judgments elicited from our 
experts. And as highlighted in section 3 and 4 the elicitation process is iterative. If recommendations 1 
to 16 are addressed they will significantly influence the estimates presented in this chapter. It is our 
expectation that a more optimistic outcome would be forthcoming, as all of our queries have been on 
risks marked high by individual experts compared with the others.  
 
6.   Risk Mitigation  
The probability of loss estimated in Section 5.4.1 exceeds the risk acceptance limits defined by the 
Autosub3 responsible owner, even after the Norway trials of 2007. In a previous exercise the Autosub3 
responsible owner defined the following risk acceptance levels for Dr Jenkins’ Antartic mission to the 
Pine of Island Bay: for scenario 1 the acceptable risk is 10%, scenario 2 is 17%, scenario 3 is 20% and 
scenario 4 is 23%
8
. A list of mitigation measures is given in Griffiths (2008). These include 
rectification of the faults found, ensuring that the recovery lines cannot became tangled in the propeller 
and using penetrators for critical connections.  
The survival distribution gives a good insight concerning the AUV risk with range and as previously 
mentioned, this information is important to support strategic decision making. The survival distribution 
obtained using the failure data presented in this report takes one of many possible shapes (Kalbfleisch 
                                                
8 The difference in risk acceptance comes from a risk model (Griffiths and Trembranis, 2007a) that 
takes into account the different mission environments, the number of missions etc. Scenario 1 only 
requires three under ice missions while scenario 4 calls for nine.  
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and Prentice, 1980). As discussed in section 5 and highlighted in Figure 9, the survival distribution for 
ice shelf shows a steep decline in the probability of survival at shorter distances, whereas at mid 
distances the survival distribution is almost flat. In terms of managing the risk, this means that if we 
can monitor the AUV at shorter ranges and address any problems if they emerge, than we will 
significantly reduce the risk posed by those failures and thus reduce the mission probability of loss. In 
practical terms this means that if the AUV is about to undertake an under shelf ice operation, the AUV 
should cover some distance in open water before diving under the ice shelf. Section 6.1 shows how it is 
possible to model the effect of the monitoring distance on the AUV probability of loss. The method is 
applied to estimate the optimal monitoring distance for the forthcoming scientific campaign to the 
Antarctic.   
6.1   Modeling the effect of mitigation 
The flat shape of the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival distribution does not lend itself to an 
analysis to quantify the effect of mitigation measures such as the increase of the monitoring distance. 
This effect is better captured if a parametric survival distribution is used instead, for example a Weibull 
distribution (Griffiths, 2008). Similarly to the Kaplan-Meier survival distribution defined in 5.4 and 
5.5, the Weibull survival function was derived from the failure data and the expert judgments on the 
probability of loss for each failure.  
We took a simulation-based approach to deriving the Weibull parameters for the case of loss given 
our expert’s judgments. For each fault or incident we generated 1000 copies, with (1 – P(ei))*1000 
entries censored, the others marked as losses. The scale (alpha) and shape (beta) parameters of the 
Weibull distribution were obtained using JMP tool from SAS, results are presented in Annex H. The 
Weibull survival distribution was first used to compute the unmitigated probability of AUV loss for the 
four missions proposed by Dr. Jenkins. Results of this exercise are presented in Table 11. The Weibull 
survival distribution for ice shelf environment is presented in Figure 10. 
Table 11    Probability of losing Autosub3 based on Weibull analyses for each scenario. The optimistic 
assessment is the first number in each cell, the pessimistic the second. The second row presents the 
difference in estimates using Weibull survival function based on Annex A judgments and the Weibull 
survival function based on GGs personal judgment, where a (-) signifies the EEJ estimates are less than 
GG. The third raw presents the difference in estimates provided by Weibull survival function based on 
Annex A judgments and the Kaplan-Meier survival function also based on Annex A judgments. 
 
Analysis Model Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
EEJ Weibull  0.29 – 0.63 0.47 – 0.85 0.57 – 0.90 0.72 – 0.97 
Difference EEJ Weibull –     
GG Weibull 
(-)0.16 - (-)0.03  (-)0.13 - (+0.05) (-)0.17 – (+)0.02   (-)0.12 - (+)0.01 
Difference EEJ Weibull – 
EEJ Kaplan-Meier 
 (+)0.03 - (+)0.07  (+)0.07 - (+)0.04  (+)0.03 - (+)0.04  (+)0.08 - (+)0.01 
 
One obvious observation that can be drawn from Table 10 is that the optimistic predictions 
provided by the independent experts are more optimistic than GG optimistic predictions for all 
four environments.  
The conditional probability of the AUV surviving distance X given that it has survived distance Y, 
where distance Y corresponds to the monitoring distance, is mathematically captured in equation 6.1. 
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Where F(·) is the Weibull cumulative distribution function. 
The Weibull survival function was used to estimate the effect two mitigation strategies (we denote 
these as mitigation strategy A and B) on Dr. Jenkins’ mission scenarios described in section 5.2. The 
description for each strategy and a summary of the results are as follows: 
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Figure 10 EEJ Weibull survival distribution (left) optimistic assessment and (right) pessimistic 
assessment. The straight red line is the best fit used to estimate the Weibull parameters alpha 
and beta.  
 
Mitigation A 
Dr Jenkins’ scenarios with the following assumptions: 
• The faults on mission 402 removed. These faults have been understood and completely 
rectified. The other faults have been left in. 
• Where successful open water/under sea ice runs are assumed pre ice shelf, and the Weibull 
parameters recalculated. 
• Also includes Conditional probability - where vehicle monitored for first 25km. 
• Optimistic scenario only. 
The calculations in Annex H show that for scenario 3 (optimistic) the probability of loss would be 
reduced to 0.30 and for scenario 4 to 0.39. While these are indicative of a significant risk reduction, 
these risk estimates are higher than the acceptable limits defined by the Autosub3 Responsible Owner. 
An increase of the monitoring distance from 25km to 50 km would allow compliance with the risk 
levels established by the responsible owner. Results presented in Annex I show that if the AUV is 
monitored for the first 48km the probability of loss would be 0.035 for scenario 1, 0.09 for scenario 2, 
0.18 for scenario 3 and 0.23 for scenario 4. A monitoring distance of 48km is optimal for scenario 4 but 
not for scenarios 1, 2 and 3. The P(loss) of 0.04 obtained for scenario 1 is well below the acceptable 
P(loss) of 0.10 and would result unnecessary use of ship time. A monitoring distance of 28km for 
scenario 1 would provide a P(loss) estimate of 0.10. For scenario 2, a monitoring distance of 33km 
would provide a P(loss) estimate of 0.17, whereas for scenario 3, a monitoring distance of 43km would 
provide a P(loss) estimate of 0.20. These are all within the acceptable risk margins defined by the 
responsible owner. 
 
Mitigation B 
Dr Jenkins’ scenarios with the following assumptions: 
• The faults on mission 402 were removed i.e. their cause established and retired for future 
missions. 
• Simulates completion of summer 2008 reliability demonstration trials: one short 0.5km 
mission and missions of 15, 53, 181 km with only one high impact faults underway. 
• Also includes Conditional probability - where vehicle monitored for first 25 km. 
• Optimistic scenario only. 
 
The calculations presented in Annex H show that for scenario 3 (optimistic) the probability of loss of 
0.33 would be obtained whereas for scenario 4 the probability of loss would be reduced to 0.43. 
Similarly to what was discussed for Mitigation A, these risk levels would not be accepted by the 
Responsible owner. The probability of loss can be brought down to acceptable levels if the monitoring 
distance is increased to 53km. For such conditions the probability of loss for scenario 1 would be 
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0.022, scenario 2 would be 0.08, scenario 3 would be 0.17 and for scenario 4 would be 0.23. Whilst 
this monitoring distance is optimal for scenario 4, for the remaining scenarios this would result in 
unnecessary use of ship time. Similar to what was discussed for Mitigation A, each scenario has an 
optimal monitoring distance; for scenario 1 is 30km, scenario 2 is 34km and scenario 3 is 48km.  
 
6.2   Summary and Further Analyses of the Results 
The Weibull survival distribution was used to estimate the effect of two potential risk mitigation 
strategies on the probability of losing Autosub3 in the forthcoming Pine Island Bay glacier campaign, 
which is taking place in January 2009. The results show that an acceptable risk reduction would be 
achieved if an AUV monitoring distance of 50km is covered prior to the start of an under shelf ice 
mission. This estimate doubles the figure of 25km obtained using GGs assessment of the same 
campaign (Griffiths, 2008). This discrepancy can be explained by comparing the shape of GGs survival 
distribution to that of EEJs survival distribution (Figure 9). The optimistic GG Kaplan-Meier survival 
distribution depicted in Figure 9 (in blue) shows that there is a steep decline of probability of survival 
within the first 7km of the mission. GG’s survival distribution is constant from 7km to up to 274km. 
Thus, according to GG’s Kaplan-Meier survival distribution, a monitoring distance greater than 7km 
would significantly reduce the probability of losing the vehicle. The EEJ survival distribution (in red) 
does not fall as steeply within the first 7km, it takes approximately 110km for the survival distribution 
to fall to the value that reads in the first 7km of GG’s survival distribution. Thus our experts’ optimal 
monitoring distance should be expected to be much greater than the optimal monitoring distance 
obtained using GG’s personal assessment.  
 
7.   Conclusions 
This report uses independent expert judgments concerning the probability of faults leading to AUV 
loss to create a risk model that can be used to compute the AUV probability of survival with range for a 
series of science missions under different operating environments (Open water, Coastal, Sea ice and Ice 
shelf). The method was applied to assess the risk of loosing Autosub3 in the forthcoming Pine Island 
Bay glacier campaign, which is taking place in January 2009. 
A formal judgment elicitation process consisting of six sequential steps was adopted. Ten experts 
provided their judgments considering the probability of AUV loss over sixty three faults under four 
operating environments. All experts had previously received training on how to assign probability 
judgments to uncertain events. Graphical methods were used to analyse and identify discrepancies in 
judgments. A total of sixteen recommendations concerning possible misunderstandings were raised 
from our analyses. On only six occasions did one expert judgment strongly disagree with the others. 
These disagreements were discussed in section 3.2. TC provided a sound argument supporting his two 
judgments where there is an obvious disagreement with all other experts’ judgments. The remaining 
four major disagreements in expert judgments concerns CW judgments on faults 406_5_7, 406_5_7, 
407_1_2 and 407_2_2. As highlighted in section 3.2, CW’s judgments were based on assumptions that 
were not entirely correct; he used GG’s previous assessment of the faults to create his own probability 
judgments. This would inevitably introduce bias into the elicitation exercise and thus it is highly 
recommended that CW should re-assess his judgments concerning these four faults.     
Two mathematical methods were considered for aggregating experts’ probability judgments. The 
results obtained using the expert opinion aggregation methods are encouraging since both methods 
provide plausible estimates for the probability judgments. The linear weighted and the logarithmic 
opinion pools have been extensively discussed in the literature. The aggregated judgment distribution 
obtained using the linear weighted pool shows a greater variability. In contrast the distribution obtained 
using the logarithmic opinion pool shows an over-confidence in the judgments (see Figures 5 and 6 for 
more detail). However, the log opinion pool allows one expert to veto all remaining experts’ 
judgments. For open water environment, this means that 35 faults out 63 would have an aggregated 
probability of loss equal to zero, and this was not acceptable. Therefore, the risk model presented in 
this report is a result of using the linear weighted pool to aggregate the expert judgments.  
In light of the cumulative judgment distributions obtained for sea ice and ice shelf and also in order 
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to have a more detailed AUV risk model it was decided to aggregate the experts in two schools of 
thought, the pessimists and the optimists (details are given in section 5). Thus, for each environment, 
two risk models were created by aggregating the pessimists and the optimists using the linear weighted 
pool. The top risks for each operational environment are presented in section 4.4. For ice shelf 
environment, both pessimists and optimists agree on three of the top five risks. Whilst fault 402_2_5 
(which concerns a problem with the rudder actuator) has been addressed for Autosub3 by re-designing 
the system; faults 385_1_1(Jack in the box line wrapped around the propeller) and 395_1_1 (problem 
with the navigation system due to the removal of the ADCP system) are still of some concern for this 
environment.   
The Autosub3 survival function with range based on the expert judgments (risk model) was 
formulated using the extended version of the Kaplan-Meier model, Griffiths et al. (2008). The method 
was applied to estimate the probability of the Autosub3 surviving the forthcoming Pine Island Bay 
glacier campaign. This scientific campaign involves four series of missions (or scenarios) and these 
take place in a mix of open water, sea ice and ice shelf conditions. Initial risk estimates were 
unacceptable to the Autosub3 responsible owner, this is in agreement with the analyses previously 
conducted by Griffiths (2008). In a previous discussion with members of the Autosub team it was 
agreed that mitigation measures would include rectification of the faults found, ensuring that the 
recovery lines could not become tangled in the propeller, use penetrators for critical connections and 
also use of a pre-defined distance for monitoring the Autosub performance prior to start of a mission. 
The conditional probability function permits us to capture quantitatively the effect of the monitoring 
distance on the risk reduction. The shape of the Kaplan-Meier survival distribution is not suitable for 
applying the conditional probability function (Griffiths, 2008). Thus, the Weibull survival function was 
derived based on the expert judgments on the fault history (section 6). Results show that different 
monitoring distances had to be set for different scenarios. In conclusion, the optimal monitoring 
distance for scenario 1 is 28km, scenario 2 is 33km, scenario 3 is 43km and finally scenario 4 is 48km. 
 
8.   Future work 
The task of eliciting expert probability judgments is not an exact science. This report presents our 
first attempt to framework our independent experts’ risk assessments in a concise model that can be 
used to estimate AUV survival for a series of science missions or campaigns. Probability judgment 
elicitation exercise is an iterative process where the number of iterations depends on the level of detail 
carried out in the analyses of the same judgments. We raised 16 recommendations where we think that 
differences in experts’ opinion can be resolved by re-assessing particular judgments. The next phase of 
this project is to update the risk estimates according to future changes in our experts’ judgments. 
Research has shown that the way in which a question is presented results in different risk models 
(O’Hagan, et al., 2003). We elicited expert probability judgments using a direct and an indirect 
approach (the two alternative forced choice (2AFC), discussed in 2.1.3). The model obtained using the 
2AFC was not considered in our analyses for removing biases and misunderstandings. Only three 
experts participated in this exercise. The probability judgments obtained through the 2AFC were 
nevertheless processed and a risk model was created, results are presented in appendix I. However as a 
future extension to the work here presented we would like to ask more experts to answer the 
questionnaire presented in Annex B. The experts’ judgments will then be analysed in order to remove 
bias and build consensus in the assumptions. 
The risk register is a live document that must be frequently updated. Likewise the Autosub fault 
history should be updated according to future missions or campaigns. This information could then be 
sent to our independent experts in order to update the risk model.  
 
9.   Acknowledgment 
We thank the ten AUV experts from outside the UK that gave freely of their time in assessing the 
fault history of Autosub3 and in providing the baseline probabilities without which this work would not 
have been possible. We are especially grateful to the Autosub technical team for their source data on 
-------   37   ------- 
 
faults and incidents and to Peter Challenor for providing divine insight into the statistical methods 
covered in this report. 
-------   38   ------- 
 
10.   References 
Clemen, R.T. and Winkler, R.L. 1999. Combining probability distributions from experts in risk 
analysis, Risk Analysis 18(4), 463-69. 
Dalkey N., Brown B. and Cochran S. 1969. The Delphi method III: Use of Self Ratings to Improve 
Group Estimates. United States Air Force Project RAND. RM-6115-PR.  
Genest, C. 1984. A Characterization Theorem for Externally Bayesian Groups. The Annals of Statistics 
12 (3) (Sep., 1984): 1100-1105. 
Genest, C. and McConway, K.J. 1990. Allocating the weights in the linear opinion pool. Journal of 
Forecasting 9, 53-73. 
Griffiths, G. 2006. Fault assessment and estimated probability of loss under ice shelf for Autosub3. 
Unpublished document, 31 July 2006.  
Griffiths, G. 2008. Fault Assessment and Estimated Probability of Loss Under Ice Shelf for Autosub3. 
National Oceanography Centre, Southampton internal report. 
Griffiths, G., Millard, N. W., McPhail, S. D. and Riggs, J. 2003. Effect of upgrades on the reliability of 
the Autosub AUV. Proc. UUST 2003, AUSI, New Hampshire. 
Griffiths, G., Millard, N. W., McPhail, S. D., Stevenson, P. and Challenor, P. G. 2003a. On the 
Reliability of the Autosub Autonomous Underwater Vehicle. Underwater Technology 25(4): 175-184. 
Griffiths, G. and Trembanis, A. 2007. Eliciting expert judgement for the probability of AUV loss in 
contrasting operational environments. In, Proceedings 15th International Symposium on Unmanned 
Untethered Submersible Technology. 
Griffiths, G, Challenor, P. and Brito, M.P. 2008. An Extension to the Kaplan Meier Nonparametric 
Estimator when Death is not Inevitable. In preparation. 
Gross, A. and Clark V. 1975. Survival Distributions: Reliability Applications in Biomedical Sciences. 
John Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0-471-32817-0  
Jenkins A., 2007. Requirements for the Pine Island Bay Glacier cruise of February 2007. National 
Oceanography Centre. Email correspondence.   
Kalbfleisch, J.D. and Prentice, R.L. 1980. The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data. John Wiley 
and Sons. 
Kaplan, E. L. and Meier, P. 1958. Nonparametric estimation from incomplete observations. Journal of 
the American Statistical Association 53(282): 457-481. 
Keeney, R.L. and Winterfeldt, D. 1991. Eliciting Probabilities from Experts in Complex Technical 
Problems. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 38 (3): 191-201. 
MacDonald, E.A., 1969. Polar operations. US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. 242pp. 
Morris, P.A. 1977. Combining Expert Judgments: A Bayesian Approach. Management Science 23 (7): 
679 - 693 
O’Hagan, A., Buck,C.E., Daneshkhah, A., Eiser, J.R, Garthwaite, P.H., Jenkinson, D.J., Oakley J.E. 
and Rakow, T. 2003. Uncertain Judgments: Eliciting Experts’ Probabilities. John Wiley and Sons  
Otway, H. and Winterfeldt, D. 1992. Expert Judgment in Risk Analysis and Management: Process, 
Context, and Pitfalls. Risk Analysis 12 (1): 83-93 
Patterson, M.R., Sias, J.H. and Gouge, D.V., 2001. AUVs and scientific diving: a looming conflict? 
Journal of the Marine Technology Society, 34: 75-81. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D., 1974. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 
185 (4157), pp. 1124-1131. 
Wadhams, P,, 2000. Ice in the ocean. Taylor and Francis, London. 364pp. 
Winkler, R.L., 1968. The Consensus of Subjective Probability Distributions. Management Science 15 
(2): B61-B75 
 
   ----------------------------------------   ANNEX A – EXPERTS RESPONSES ---------------------------------------- 
A1 
  Adam Skarke 
 
 
Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
   
   
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
  (km)       
384 1.5 0.001 0.004 0.05 0.8 
  
Mission aborted (to surface) due to network 
failure. (Much) later tests showed general 
problem with the harnesses (bad crimp joints).  
3 4 2 1 
Open: fault would have to combine with failure of acoustic beacon to 
result in loss. Coast: Free floating on surface exposes AUV to hazards of 
vessel traffic and shoreline. Sea Ice: Surfacing under ice could result in 
damage to AUV, though recovery is likely. Ice Shelf: Surfacing under 
ice make loss very likely if the vessel is way from the shelf edge. 
  0.001 0.004 0.05 0.8 
  
Loop of recovery line came out from storage 
slot, long enough to tangle propeller. 
3 4 2 1 
Assuming the AUV is positively buoyant, risk arises from uncontrolled 
surfacing and assessment is same as above. If the AUV is negatively 
buoyant, loss risk increases to 1 if operating in depth greater than crush 
depth, or under ice away from shelf edge. Otherwise risk remains the 
same. If the AUV retains neutral buoyancy Open risk remains the same. 
Coast risk decreases to 0.001 because vessel is not exposed to surface 
hazards. Sea ice risk decreases because there is no surfacing hazard.  
Shelf ice risk remains the same. 
385 15.2 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.5 
  
Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled way, 
due to a side effect of the removal of the 
upwards-looking ADCP. 
3 4 2 1 
Open: fault would have to combine with failure of acoustic beacon to 
result in loss. Coast: uncontrolled headway risk collision with other 
vessels as well as the shore. Sea ice: if surrounded by icebergs risk of 
collision is high. Ice shelf: If vessel heads in the direction of the shelf, 
collision with ice or transit under ice may result in loss. 
386 26 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  
GPS antenna failed at end of mission. 
3 4 2 1 
Because this fault occurred at the end of the mission, I assume the AUV 
is on the surface and near the launch / recovery ship. If so risk arises if 
there is reduced visibility (night, fog, high seas) and the support vessel 
pilot relies on a GPS fix to know where the AUV is in relation to the 
ship. If so, collision with the ship is possible. 
0.001 0.01 0.05 0.5 387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle headed off in 
an uncontrolled direction. Mission was 
stopped by acoustic command. Problem was 
due to (a) the uncalibrated receiver array, and 
(b) a network message (“homing lost”) being 
lost on the network.  3 4 2 1 
The risk factors are the same as No. 385. 
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   
   
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
  (km)       
388 0.5 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.01 
  
Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, due to 
network failure. Logger data showed long 
gaps, up to 60s, across all data from all nodes, 
suggesting logger problem. 3 4 2 1 
The AUV should not have travelled far from the ship in 4 minutes, 
resulting in a very low loss risk. Risk in Sea ice and Ice shelf would 
be associated with surfacing at an unplanned location after aborting 
the mission. 
  0 0 0 0 
  
Depth control showed instability. +/- 1m 
oscillation due to incorrect configuration gain 
setting. 3 4 2 1 
Ice / seafloor collision possible if the AUV course was planed with 
less than 1 meter of vertical clearance (which would be imprudent). 
Otherwise no loss risk.  
389 3 0.002 0.01 0.05 0.5 
  
Vehicle went into homing mode, just before 
dive and headed north. Vehicle mission 
stopped by acoustic command.  It was 
fortunate that the ship-side acoustics 
configuration allowed the ship to steam at 9kt 
(faster rather than 6kt with the towfish) and 
catch the AUV. 3 4 2 1 
Open: low risk assuming the support ship can chase and catch the 
AUV. Coast: holding an unplanned course risk collision with other 
vessels and the shoreline. Sea ice: holding an unplanned course risk 
collision with icebergs. Ice shelf: If vessel heads in the direction of the 
shelf, collision with ice or transit under ice may result in loss.  
  0.002 0.05 0.05 0.7 
  
Separately, homing mode not exited after 2 
minutes, as expected. It will continue on last-
determined heading indefinitely – a Mission 
Control configuration error. 
3 4 2 1 
Open: low risk assuming the support ship can chase and catch the 
AUV. Coastal: High risk of collision with other vessels and shoreline. 
The ship may be limited in its ability to give chase by depth and 
navigational restrictions (such as channels). Sea ice: holding an 
unplanned course risk collision with icebergs. The ship might be 
limited in ability to give chase by the ice field. Ice shelf: indefinite 
course holding in the direction of the shelf, will result in collision with 
ice or transit under ice. 
  0.002 0.01 0.01 0.5 
  
Problem with deck side of acoustic telemetry 
receiver front end, unrelated to vehicle 
systems. 
3 4 2 1 
Open: Loss of telemetry introduces risk of collision when trying to 
retrieve the AUV with ship. Coast: There is a risk of collision with 
support ship as well as other vessels and shoreline. Sea ice: There is a 
risk of collision with the support ship as well as icebergs. Shelf Ice: 
Loss of telemetry while the AUV is under the ice could result in the 
inability to modify AUV behaviour if a system error occurs. 
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. (Cont.) 
No. Distance 
km 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.001 0.05 0.05 0.5 391 31 ADCP down range limited to 360m, reduced 
accuracy of navigation. 
3 4 2 1 
Open: minimal risk from reduces navigation ability. Coast: minimal 
risk of collision with vessel traffic or shoreline. Sea Ice: minimal 
risk of collision with iceberg. Shelf ice. If navigation error places 
AUV under ice shelf risk of loss is significant. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point of 
mission. 
  
3 4 2 1 
This fault must be combined with a fault in location beacons on 
AUV to risk loss of vessel. Secondary risk arises if there is reduced 
visibility (night, fog, high seas) and the support vessel pilot relies 
on a GPS fix to know where the AUV is in relation to the ship. If 
so, collision with the ship is possible. 
0 0 0 0   EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging during 
mission. 4 4 4 4 
There is no risk from this fault unless the swath sonar is used for 
navigation. 
0.005 0.25 0.25 0.5 392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on M391, 
AUV ended up 700m N and 250m E of 
expected end position. 
3 4 2 1 
Open: minimal risk of loss. Coast: Significant risk of collision with 
vessel traffic or shoreline. Sea Ice: Significant risk of collision with 
iceberg. Shelf ice. If end position is under ice loss is certain, if not 
recovery is likely. 
0.002 0.01 0.01 0.5 393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges and no 
acoustic telemetry. 
3 4 2 1 
Open: Loss of telemetry introduces risk of collision when trying to 
retrieve the AUV with ship. Coast: There is a risk of collision with 
support ship as well as other vessels and shoreline. Sea ice: There is 
a risk of collision with the support ship as well as icebergs. Shelf 
Ice: Loss of telemetry while the AUV is under the ice could result 
in the inability to modify AUV behaviour if a system error occurs. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came out, 
wrapping its line around the propeller, 
jamming it, and stopping the mission. Caused 
severe problems in recovery, some damage to 
upper rudder frame, sub-frame and GPS 
antenna. Required boat to be launched. 4 4 4 4 
Risk of loss in all situations is associated with recovery difficulties. 
Increased risk includes potential collision with boat and 
compromising of watertight appendages. 
0.001 0.004 0.05 0.8 395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped 
around the propulsion motor and jammed. 
3 4 2 1 
Assuming the AUV is positively buoyant, risk arises from 
uncontrolled surfacing and assessment is same as above. If the 
AUV is negatively buoyant, loss risk increases to 1 if operating in 
depth greater than crush depth, or under ice away from shelf edge. 
Otherwise risk remains the same. If the AUV retains neutral 
buoyancy Open risk remains the same. Coast risk decreases to 
0.001 because vessel is not exposed to surface hazards. Sea ice risk 
decreases because there is no surfacing hazard.  Shelf ice risk 
remains the same.   
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. (Cont.) 
No. Distance 
km 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
396 4 Current estimation did not work, because 
minimum time between fixes for current to be 
estimated had been set to 15min; leg time was 
only 10min. Mission stopped and restarted 
with configurable time set to 5min. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Given short duration of mission, risk of navigation errors from lack 
of current data, and associated risk seems minimal. 
   4 4 4 4  
397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, could have 
jammed motor. 
0.001 0.004 0.05 0.8 Assuming the AUV is positively buoyant, risk arises from 
uncontrolled surfacing and assessment is same as above. If the 
AUV is negatively buoyant, loss risk increases to 1 if operating in 
depth greater than crush depth, or under ice away from shelf edge. 
Otherwise risk remains the same. If the AUV retains neutral 
buoyancy Open risk remains the same. Coast risk decreases to 
0.001 because vessel is not exposed to surface hazards. Sea ice risk 
decreases because there is no surfacing hazard.  Shelf ice risk 
remains the same.  
   3 4 2 1  
398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, they 
believed the AUV was missing waypoints. In 
fact, a couple of waypoints had been 
positioned incorrectly. 
0.001 0.005 0.005 0.5 Open: Very minimal risk. Coast: Risk of ending mission in a 
hazardous location. Sea Ice: Risk of ending mission at a location 
resulting in collision with iceberg. Shelf ice: risk if mission ended 
prematurely under ice. Otherwise no risk. 
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.001 0.02 0.02 0.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up 
configured as down- looking ADCP 
causing navigation problems through 
tracking sea surface as reference. This 
data was very noisy and put vehicle 
navigation out by a factor of 1.5. 
3 4 2 1 
Navigation error exposes AUV to risk of collision with vessels, 
shorelines and icebergs. If error places AUV under ice risk of loss is 
significant. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.01 
401 7.5 
Damaged on recovery, “moderately 
serious” to sternplane, shaft bent. 
4 4 4 4 
In all situations AUV is in recovery and so loss of vehicle is 
minimal. The only risk of loss would arise from compromising the 
water tight status of the sternplane. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to 
dive, 2d 20h into mission. Stern plane 
actuator had flooded.   4 4 4 4 
There should be minimal risk of loss unless flooding of actuator 
makes the vessel positively buoyant, or introduces water into critical 
part of hull  
        Abort due to network failure. Abort 
release could not communicate with 
depth control node for 403s. Possibly 
side-effect of actuator or motor 
problems. 
        
There is not enough information for me to asses risk with my level 
of understanding about the AUV 
        Motor windings had resistance of 330 
ohm to case. Propeller speed dropping 
off gradually during a dive         
The fault stated is not clearly written. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0,001 Only one position fix from tail mounted 
ARGOS transmitter. 
4 4 4 4 
As long as the vehicles position is known, the ARGOS transmitter is 
unnecessary and its malfunction wouldn’t lead to a loss. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
402 274 
GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 
4 4 4 4 
This fault must be combined with a fault in location beacons on 
AUV to risk loss of vessel. Secondary risk arises if there is reduced 
visibility (night, fog, high seas) and the support vessel pilot relies on 
a GPS fix to know where the AUV is in relation to the ship. If so, 
collision with the ship is possible. 
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic (Cont.) 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.001 0.004 0.05 0.8 Recovery light line was wrapped 
around the propeller on surface. Flaps 
covering the main recovery lines (and 
where the light line was towed) were 
open.  
3 4 2 1 
Assuming the AUV is positively buoyant, risk arises from 
uncontrolled surfacing and assessment is same as above. If the AUV 
is negatively buoyant, loss risk increases to 1 if operating in depth 
greater than crush depth, or under ice away from shelf edge. 
Otherwise risk remains the same. If the AUV retains neutral 
buoyancy Open risk remains the same. Coast risk decreases to 0.001 
because vessel is not exposed to surface hazards. Sea ice risk 
decreases because there is no surfacing hazard.  Shelf ice risk 
remains the same.  
        Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final 
waypoint. 
        
This fault must be combined with a fault in location beacons on 
AUV to risk loss of vessel. Secondary risk arises if there is reduced 
visibility (night, fog, high seas) and the support vessel pilot relies on 
a GPS fix to know where the AUV is in relation to the ship. If so, 
collision with the ship is possible. 
        
403 140 
Propeller speed showed same problem 
as m402. Subsequent testing of motor 
with Megger showed resistance of a 
few kohm between windings. 
          
The fault stated is not clearly written. 
0.001 0.01 0.01 0.25 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be 
loaded successfully due to distorted 
keeper. “If not spotted, could have 
dropped out during mission”, 
considered low probability of distortion 
and not checked.  
3 4 2 1 
If weight is dropped during mission it could result in an unplanned 
surfacing. Open: minimal risk of loss. Coast: exposure of AUV to 
surface hazards. Sea ice: risk of collision with icebergs. Shelf ice: If 
weight is dropped under ice loss is certain, if not risk of loss is 
moderate. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
404 75 
Pre-launch, potential short circuit in 
motor controller that could stop motor. 4 4 4 4 
In all environments, the risk nominal because the problem was 
discovered before the AUV was launched. 
        
        
    Propeller speed showed same problem 
as on m402 and 403. 
3 4 2 1 
The fault stated is not clearly written. 
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic (Cont.) 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0 0 0 0 CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-
outs noted in previous missions). 
4 4 4 4 
Loss of instrument not critical to navigation presents no risk of loss. 
        M404 recovery was complicated when 
lifting lines and streaming line became 
trapped on the rudder (probably stuck 
on the Bolen where the two were 
attached).  Recovery from the situation 
required the trapped lifting lines 
grappled astern of the ship, attached to 
the gantry lines, and the caught end cut.         
The fault stated is not clearly written. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 The forward sternplane was lost due to 
lifting line trapping between the fin and 
its flap on recovery. 
4 4 4 4 
Since the AUV is captured, loss of vehicle could only occur if the 
rudder cut the lift line and released the AUV 
404 75 
The acoustic telemetry nose transducer 
was damaged due to collision with the 
ship. 
0.002 0.01 0.01 0.5 Open: Loss of telemetry introduces risk of collision when trying to 
retrieve the AUV with ship. Coast: There is a risk of collision with 
support ship as well as other vessels and shoreline. Sea ice: There is 
a risk of collision with the support ship as well as icebergs. Shelf Ice: 
Loss of telemetry while the AUV is under the ice could result in the 
inability to modify AUV behaviour if a system error occurs 
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
  
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Fault found pre-launch, LXT tracking 
transducer had leaked water – replaced.  4 4 4 4 
In all environments, the risk nominal because the problem was 
discovered before the AUV was launched. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
405 2.5 
Fault found pre-launch, starboard lower 
rudder and sternplane loose.  4 4 4 4 
In all environments, the risk nominal because the problem was 
discovered before the AUV was launched. 
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 AUV ran slower than expected and speed 
dropped off during mission, due to motor 
problem. 
4 4 2 1 
A drop in speed may result in navigational errors or the inability to 
remain submerged leading to risk of collision with vessels, the 
shoreline, or icebergs. Loss of speed when retuning from under an 
ice shelf may result in a loss if the AUV expends all energy before 
emerging. 
0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 Current spikes of 3A and voltage drops in 
first part of mission. 
3 3 2 1 
Voltage drops could result in loss of instruments necessary to 
navigation such as the DVL or GPS. Additionally, voltage drops 
could interrupt critical systems such as the CPU of computers. 
        Propulsion motor failed 500V Megger on 
recovery on windings to case.         
I don’t have enough knowledge of the Autosub to understand the 
fault. 
0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 One battery pack out of four showed 
intermittent connection. 
3 3 2 1 
Loss of battery could result in voltage drops. These could lead to 
loss of instruments necessary to navigation such as the DVL or GPS. 
Additionally, voltage drops could interrupt critical systems such as 
the CPU of computers 
0.002 0.01 0.01 0.5 Acosutci telemetry unit gave no replies. 
3 4 2 1 
Open: Loss of telemetry introduces risk of collision when trying to 
retrieve the AUV with ship. Coast: There is a risk of collision with 
support ship as well as other vessels and shoreline. Sea ice: There is 
a risk of collision with the support ship as well as icebergs. Shelf Ice: 
Loss of telemetry while the AUV is under the ice could result in the 
inability to modify AUV behaviour if a system error occurs. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km out. 
3 4 2 1 
This fault must be combined with a fault in location beacons on 
AUV to risk loss of vessel. Secondary risk arises if there is reduced 
visibility (night, fog, high seas) and the support vessel pilot relies on 
a GPS fix to know where the AUV is in relation to the ship. If so, 
collision with the ship is possible. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
406 104 
Spikes in indicated motor rpm 
4 4 4 4 
Risk is very minimal since navigation is independent of motor rpm. 
Only risk arises from possible failure of motor, which would result 
in the risk associated with an unplanned surfacing. 
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea (Cont.) 
No. Distance 
(Km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.002 0.01 0.01 0.5 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies at 
all – no tracking or telemetry. 
3 4 2 1 
Open: Loss of telemetry introduces risk of collision when trying to 
retrieve the AUV with ship. Coast: There is a risk of collision with 
support ship as well as other vessels and shoreline. Sea ice: There is a 
risk of collision with the support ship as well as icebergs. Shelf Ice: 
Loss of telemetry while the AUV is under the ice could result in the 
inability to modify AUV behaviour if a system error occurs. 
0 0 0 0 
407 204 
Noise spikes on both channels of 
turbulence probe data. 4 4 4 4 
Assuming that the turbulence probe data is not incorporated into the 
navigation or control of the AUV, there is no risk of loss. 
0 0 0 0 Propulsion motor felt rough when turned 
by hand – bearings replaced before 
deployment. 4 4 4 4 
If bearings were problem, than there is no risk of loss as they were 
replaced prior to deployment.  
0.001 0.004 0.05 0.05 Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as no 
depth mode commanded. Unless 
compounded by another problem,  
this would show itself immediately on 
first dive. 3 4 2 1 
Minimal risk since problem is evident immediately. Only risk is from 
un planed surfacing after 50 m which introduces risk of collision with 
vessels, shoreline, or iceberg. 
0.002 0.01 0.01 0.5 No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry 
unit. 
3 4 2 1 
Open: Loss of telemetry introduces risk of collision when trying to 
retrieve the AUV with ship. Coast: There is a risk of collision with 
support ship as well as other vessels and shoreline. Sea ice: There is a 
risk of collision with the support ship as well as icebergs. Shelf Ice: 
Loss of telemetry while the AUV is under the ice could result in the 
inability to modify AUV behaviour if a system error occurs. 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 Difficulty stopping Autosub on surface 
via radio command. Separate problems 
with the two WiFi access points. 
4 4 4 4 
Relatively high risk in all environments. The inability to stop the AUV 
when it is headed for a collision with the ship, other vessels, the 
shoreline, or ice is potentially catastrophic. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
408 302.5 
Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 
4 4 4 4 
Risk is very minimal since navigation is independent of motor rpm. 
Only risk arises from possible failure of motor, which would result in 
the risk associated with an unplanned surfacing. 
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
  (km)       
384 1.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due to 
network failure. (Much) later tests 
showed general problem with the 
harnesses (bad crimp joints).  
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.7  
   5 5 3 2  
  Loop of recovery line came out from 
storage slot, long enough to tangle 
propeller. 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.95  
   5 5 3 4  
385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled 
way, due to a side effect of the removal of 
the upwards-looking ADCP. 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.95  
   5 5 3 4  
386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of mission. 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.2  
   4 4 3 2  
387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle headed off 
in an uncontrolled direction. Mission was 
stopped by acoustic command. Problem 
was due to (a) the uncalibrated receiver 
array, and (b) a network message 
(“homing lost”) being lost on the 
network.  
0.01 0.2 0.2 0.9  
   5 4 3 3  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
388 0.5 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, due 
to network failure. Logger data showed 
long gaps, up to 60s, across all data 
from all nodes, suggesting logger 
problem. 
0 0 0.1 0.75  
   5 5 4 3  
  Depth control showed instability. +/- 
1m oscillation due to incorrect 
configuration gain setting. 
0 0 0.15 0.8  
   5 5 4 3  
389 3 Vehicle went into homing mode, just 
before dive and headed north. Vehicle 
mission stopped by acoustic command.  
It was fortunate that the ship-side 
acoustics configuration allowed the 
ship to steam at 9kt (faster rather than 
6kt with the towfish) and catch the 
AUV. 
0 0.05 0.15 0.8  
   5 5 4 3  
  Separately, homing mode not exited 
after 2 minutes, as expected. It will 
continue on last-determined heading 
indefinitely – a Mission Control 
configuration error. 
0.01 0.3 0.5 0.5  
   5 4 3 2  
  Problem with deck side of acoustic 
telemetry receiver front end, unrelated 
to vehicle systems. 
0 0 0.2 0.9  
   4 4 4 3  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. (cont.) 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
391 31 ADCP down range limited to 360m, 
reduced accuracy of navigation. 
0 0.03 0.1 0.8  
   5 4 3 3  
  GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end 
point of mission. 
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.5  
    5 4 4 4  
  EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging 
during mission. 
0.01 0.01 0.15 0.1  
   3 3 3 3  
392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on 
M391, AUV ended up 700m N and 
250m E of expected end position. 
0.01 0.01 0.15 0.1  
   3 3 3 3  
393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges 
and no acoustic telemetry. 
0.02 0.02 0.2 0.6  
   3 3 3 3  
394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came 
out, wrapping its line around the 
propeller, jamming it, and stopping the 
mission. Caused severe problems in 
recovery, some damage to upper rudder 
frame, sub-frame and GPS antenna. 
Required boat to be launched. 
0.01 0.05 0.2 0.96  
   5 5 4 4  
395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped 
around the propulsion motor and 
jammed. 
0.01 0.05 0.2 0.96  
   5 5 4 4  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. (cont.) 
  Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0 0 0.1 0.15  396 4 Current estimation did not work, 
because minimum time between fixes 
for current to be estimated had been set 
to 15min; leg time was only 10min. 
Mission stopped and restarted with 
configurable time set to 5min. 
5 5 4 3  
397 4 0.01 0.05 0.2 0.96  
  
Main lifting lines became loose, could 
have jammed motor. 5 5 4 4  
0 0.01 0.05 0.1  398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, 
they believed the AUV was missing 
waypoints. In fact, a couple of 
waypoints had been positioned 
incorrectly. 5 5 4 4  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0 0.01 0.05 0.1 401 7.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up configured as 
down- looking ADCP causing navigation 
problems through tracking sea surface as 
reference. This data was very noisy and put 
vehicle navigation out by a factor of 1.5. 5 5 4 4 
 
0 0 0 0   Damaged on recovery, “moderately serious” to 
sternplane, shaft bent. 
5 5 4 4 
 
0.01 0.01 0.45 0.95 402 274 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 2d 
20h into mission. Stern plane actuator had 
flooded.   
5 5 4 4 
 
  0.01 0.01 0.1 0.6 
  
Abort due to network failure. Abort release 
could not communicate with depth control node 
for 403s. Possibly side-effect of actuator or 
motor problems. 
5 5 4 4 
 
  Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm to 
case. Propeller speed dropping off gradually 
during a dive 
0.01 0.01 0.2 0.8  
   5 5 4 4  
  Only one position fix from tail mounted ARGOS 
transmitter. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
   5 5 4 4  
  GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 0 0 0 0  
   5 5 4 4  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
403 140 Recovery light line was wrapped around the 
propeller on surface. Flaps covering the main 
recovery lines (and where the light line was 
towed) were open.  
0 0 0.01 0.01  
   5 5 4 4  
  Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final 
waypoint. 
0 0 0.01 0.01  
   5 5 4 4  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as 
m402. Subsequent testing of motor with 
Megger showed resistance of a few kohm 
between windings. 
0.01 0.01 0.2 0.8  
   5 5 4 4  
404 75 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be loaded 
successfully due to distorted keeper. “If not 
spotted, could have dropped out during 
mission”, considered low probability of 
distortion and not checked.  
0 0.01 0.1 0.5  
   5 5 4 4  
  Pre-launch, potential short circuit in motor 
controller that could stop motor. 
0 0.01 0.1 0.5  
   5 5 4 4  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as on 
m402 and 403. 
0.01 0.01 0.2 0.8  
   5 5 4 4  
 
 
 
   ----------------------------------------   ANNEX A – EXPERTS RESPONSES ---------------------------------------- 
A16 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic (cont.) 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
403 140 Propeller speed showed same problem as on m402 and 
403. 
0.01 0.01 0.2 0.8  
   5 5 4 4  
  CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-outs noted in 
previous missions). 
0 0 0.01 0.01  
   5 5 4 4  
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01   M404 recovery was complicated when lifting lines and 
streaming line became trapped on the rudder (probably 
stuck on the Bolen where the two were attached).  
Recovery from the situation required the trapped lifting 
lines grappled astern of the ship, attached to the gantry 
lines, and the caught end cut. 5 5 4 4 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01   The forward sternplane was lost due to lifting line 
trapping between the fin and its flap on recovery. 5 5 4 4 
 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02   The acoustic telemetry nose transducer was damaged due 
to collision with the ship. 5 5 4 4 
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
405 2.5 Fault found pre-launch, LXT tracking 
transducer had leaked water – replaced.  
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
   5 5 4 4  
  Fault found pre-launch, starboard lower 
rudder and sternplane loose.  
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
   5 5 4 4  
406 104 AUV ran slower than expected and speed 
dropped off during mission, due to motor 
problem. 
0 0 0.1 0.1  
   5 5 4 4  
  Current spikes of 3A and voltage drops in first 
part of mission. 
0 0 0.1 0.1  
   5 5 4 4  
  Propulsion motor failed 500V Megger on 
recovery on windings to case. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
   5 5 4 4  
  One battery pack out of four showed 
intermittent connection. 
0 0.02 0.15 0.3  
   5 5 4 4  
  Acosutci telemetry unit gave no replies. 0 0.02 0.15 0.3  
   5 5 4 4  
  On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km out. 0 0 0.1 0.1  
   5 5 4 4  
  Spikes in indicated motor rpm 0 0 0.1 0.1  
   5 5 4 4  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
  (km)       
407 204 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies at all – 
no tracking or telemetry. 
0 0.02 0.15 0.3  
   5 5 4 4  
  Noise spikes on both channels of turbulence 
probe data. 
0 0 0.1 0.1  
   5 5 4 4  
408 302.5 Propulsion motor felt rough when turned by 
hand – bearings replaced before deployment. 
0 0 0.1 0.1  
   5 5 4 4  
  Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as no depth 
mode commanded. Unless compounded by 
another problem,  
0 0 0.1 0.1  
  this would show itself immediately on first 
dive. 
5 5 4 4  
  No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry unit. 0 0 0.1 0.1  
   5 5 4 4  
  Difficulty stopping Autosub on surface via 
radio command. Separate problems with the 
two WiFi access points. 
0.01 0.02 0.15 0.3  
   5 5 4 4  
  Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 
0 0 0.1 0.1  
   5 5 4 4  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway.    
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
        
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
409 1.5 No acoustic  telemetry or 
transponding. LXT ship side USBL 
receiver had leaked during mission 
giving poor bearings to sub, replaced 
with spare. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
   5 5 4 4  
410 9 No acoustic  telemetry or 
transponding. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
   5 5 4 4  
411 128 No GPS fix at the end of the mission. 
GPS antenna bulkhead had water 
inside and had flooded. 
0.01 0.02 0.1 0.15  
   5 5 4 4  
412 270 No GPS fix at end of mission. After 
next mission, GPS fixes started 
coming in after vehicle power 
up/power down; perhaps problem was 
due to initialisation with receiver – 
and not this time the antenna. 
0.01 0.02 0.1 0.15  
   5 5 4 4  
  Problem at start for holding pattern. 
Holding pattern timed out due to 
programming mistake. 
0.01 0.02 0.1 0.15  
   5 5 4 4  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. (cont.) 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 
(lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
  (km)       
0.1 0.12 0.17 0.25 415 6 Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque on rudder 
actuator. Actuator replaced with new one - first use for this 
new design of actuator motor and gearbox. However, AUV 
spent most of mission “stuck” going around in circles at depth 
due to rudder actuator fault. The new actuator overheated, 
melting wires internally, the motor seized, and internal to the 
main pressure case, the power filter overheated. Some of the 
damage may have been caused by an excessive current limit 
(3A); correct setting was 0.3A. But this does not explain high 
motor current. Possible damage during testing when motor 
stalled on end stop? Compounded by wiring to motor held 
tightly to case with cable ties, and worse, covered with tape 
(acting as an insulator). Wires were not high temperature rated. 5 5 4 4 
  
0.1 0.12 0.17 0.25 415 6 Three harness connectors failed due to leakage, affecting 
payload systems: EM2000 tube, ADCP_down, and Seabird 
CTD. Despite connector problems the system worked without 
glitches and failed only when the power pins had burned 
completely through on the connector feeding power to the 
abort system 
5 5 4 4 
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0.01 0.02 0.1 0.15   Although it worked properly at the start of the mission at a 
range of 1200m, the acoustic telemetry stopped working at the 
end of mission. Hence could not stop the mission acoustically 
when needed. 
5 5 4 4 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. (cont.) 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
0.01 0.02 0.15 0.8  416 18 Not possible to communicate with vehicle 
at 1180m depth; holding pattern caused a 
timeout, and AUV surfaced. Acoustic 
telemetry max range was 500m for digital 
data. 
5 5 4 4  
0 0.03 0.15 0.5  418 15 When homing was stopped deliberately 
after 10 min, the AUV did not go into a 
“stay here” mode. Rather it continued on 
the same heading; stopped by acoustic 
command 500m from shore. Cause was 
incorrect configuration of mission 
exception for homing. Default in campaign 
configuration script was not set due to 
inexperience with new configuration tools. 
5 5 4 4  
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.01 0.005 0.1 0.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due to 
network failure. (Much) later tests showed 
general problem with the harnesses (bad 
crimp joints).  4 4 3 3 
Limited experience with ice conditions 
  
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 
384 1.5 
Loop of recovery line came out from 
storage slot, long enough to tangle 
propeller. 
4 4 3 3 
Depends on if it actually did entangle the 
propeller-  obviously, much higher risk if it did. 
0.03 0.03 0.1 0.5 385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled 
way, due to a side effect of the removal of 
the upwards-looking ADCP. 
4 4 3 3 
Depends on when the uncontrolled heading was 
noted and whether the mission could be aborted. 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of mission. 
5 5 3 3 
  
0.01 0.01 0.07 0.2 387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle headed off 
in an uncontrolled direction. Mission was 
stopped by acoustic command. Problem 
was due to (a) the uncalibrated receiver 
array, and (b) a network message 
(“homing lost”) being lost on the network.  
5 5 3 3 
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.05 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, due to 
network failure. Logger data showed long gaps, 
up to 60s, across all data from all nodes, 
suggesting logger problem. 4 4 3 3 
  
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 
388 0.5 
Depth control showed instability. +/- 1m 
oscillation due to incorrect configuration gain 
setting. 4 4 3 3 
  
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 Vehicle went into homing mode, just before 
dive and headed north. Vehicle mission stopped 
by acoustic command.  It was fortunate that the 
ship-side acoustics configuration allowed the 
ship to steam at 9kt (faster rather than 6kt with 
the towfish) and catch the AUV. 4 4 3 3 
  
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.2 Separately, homing mode not exited after 2 
minutes, as expected. It will continue on last-
determined heading indefinitely – a Mission 
Control configuration error. 4 4 3 3 
  
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01 
389 3 
Problem with deck side of acoustic telemetry 
receiver front end, unrelated to vehicle systems. 3 3 3 3 
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. (cont.) 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.03 0.03 0.07 0.07 ADCP down range limited to 360m, 
reduced accuracy of navigation. 
4 4 2 2 
Dependent on degree of reduced accuracy and 
amot of accuracy required 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point 
of mission. 
  4 4     
  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
391 31 
EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging 
during mission. 
3 3 3 3 
Assuming this is a data collection sensor 
rather than a mission-critical sensor 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.2 392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on M391, 
AUV ended up 700m N and 250m E of 
expected end position. 4 4 3 3 
Depends on whether the position was under 
ice or not! 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges 
and no acoustic telemetry. 4 4 3 3 
So what else is new?  A  common problem… 
sigh 
0.07 0.07 0.2 0.2 394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came out, 
wrapping its line around the propeller, 
jamming it, and stopping the mission. 
Caused severe problems in recovery, 
some damage to upper rudder frame, sub-
frame and GPS antenna. Required boat to 
be launched. 
4 4 2 2 
  
0.07 0.07 0.2 0.2 395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped 
around the propulsion motor and jammed. 
4 4 2 2 
Was the wrapped line the same as in No. 394? 
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.01 396 4 Current estimation did not work, 
because minimum time between 
fixes for current to be estimated 
had been set to 15min; leg time 
was only 10min. Mission stopped 
and restarted with configurable 
time set to 5min. 4 4 3 3 
Depends on how critical current estimation 
is to navigation accuracy 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, 
could have jammed motor. 
4 4 3 3 
Of course if a line "could" jam a motor, it 
WILL jam it sooner or later….  Murphy's 
law of vehicles 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 398 8 Operators ended mission 
prematurely, they believed the 
AUV was missing waypoints. In 
fact, a couple of waypoints had 
been positioned incorrectly. 5 5 5 5 
Better safe than sorry! 
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15 Configuration mistake; ADCP up 
configured as down- looking ADCP 
causing navigation problems through 
tracking sea surface as reference. This 
data was very noisy and put vehicle 
navigation out by a factor of 1.5. 4 4 3 3 
  
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
401 7.5 
Damaged on recovery, “moderately 
serious” to sternplane, shaft bent. 4 4 4 4 
If damaged on recovery, then chance of loss due to this specific is 
low provided that it is fixed 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.3 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to 
dive, 2d 20h into mission. Stern plane 
actuator had flooded.   4 4 3 3 
Here's where I see the risk of loss…. 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.2 Abort due to network failure. Abort 
release could not communicate with 
depth control node for 403s. Possibly 
side-effect of actuator or motor problems. 
4 4 2 2 
Concern with getting stuck under ice 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 Motor windings had resistance of 330 
ohm to case. Propeller speed dropping off 
gradually during a dive 
3 3 2 2 
  
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 Only one position fix from tail mounted 
ARGOS transmitter. 4 4 3 3 
  
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 
402 274 
GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 
4 4 3 3 
Gotta protect that antenna better! 
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 Recovery light line was wrapped around 
the propeller on surface. Flaps covering 
the main recovery lines (and where the 
light line was towed) were open.  
4 4 3 3 
Vehicle is on surface, so risk of loss is low 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final 
waypoint. 
4 4 3 3 
  
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 
403 140 
Propeller speed showed same problem 
as m402. Subsequent testing of motor 
with Megger showed resistance of a few 
kohm between windings. 
  3 3 2 2 
  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be 
loaded successfully due to distorted 
keeper. “If not spotted, could have 
dropped out during mission”, considered 
low probability of distortion and not 
checked.  
4 4 3 3 
If caught and corrected pre-launch, then low risk of loss 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
404 75 
Pre-launch, potential short circuit in 
motor controller that could stop motor. 
4 4 3 3 
If caught and corrected pre-launch, then low risk of loss 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 Propeller speed showed same problem 
as on m402 and 403. 3 3 2 2 
  
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    
CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-
outs noted in previous missions). 4 4 3 3 
Depends on criticality of data for mission execution 
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic. (cont.) 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 M404 recovery was complicated when 
lifting lines and streaming line became 
trapped on the rudder (probably stuck on 
the Bolen where the two were attached).  
Recovery from the situation required the 
trapped lifting lines grappled astern of 
the ship, attached to the gantry lines, and 
the caught end cut. 
5 5 5 5 
On recovery, does not appear to imperil vehicle 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 The forward sternplane was lost due to 
lifting line trapping between the fin and 
its flap on recovery. 
5 5 5 5 
On recovery, does not appear to imperil vehicle 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
404 75 
The acoustic telemetry nose transducer 
was damaged due to collision with the 
ship. 
5 5 5 5 
If caught and corrected pre-launch, then low risk of loss 
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 Fault found pre-launch, LXT 
tracking transducer had leaked 
water – replaced.  5 5 5 5 
If caught and corrected pre-launch, then low 
risk of loss 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
405 2.5 
Fault found pre-launch, starboard 
lower rudder and sternplane loose.  5 5 5 5 
If caught and corrected pre-launch, then low 
risk of loss 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 AUV ran slower than expected and 
speed dropped off during mission, 
due to motor problem. 3 3 2 2 
Depends on criticality of expected speed for 
navigation 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 Current spikes of 3A and voltage 
drops in first part of mission. 2 2 2 2 
Unknown impact 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 Propulsion motor failed 500V 
Megger on recovery on windings to 
case. 2 2 2 2 
Unknown impact 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 One battery pack out of four 
showed intermittent connection. 4 4 2 2 
Depends on planned safety margin of battery 
life during mission 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 Acosutci telemetry unit gave no 
replies. 
5 5 5 5 
Hard on the observer, but not directly 
threatening to vehicle safety (unless I'm 
missing something) 
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 On surfacing first GPS fix was 
1.2km out. 4 4 2 2 
How were subsequent fixes? 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 
406 104 
Spikes in indicated motor rpm 
3 3 2 2 
Depends on criticality of expected speed for 
navigation 
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
  
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no 
replies at all – no tracking or 
telemetry. 
5 5 5 5 
Hard on the observer, but not directly 
threatening to vehicle safety (unless I'm 
missing something) 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 
407 204 
Noise spikes on both channels of 
turbulence probe data. 
2 2 2 2 
Unknown impact 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 Propulsion motor felt rough when 
turned by hand – bearings replaced 
before deployment. 4 4 3 3 
If caught and corrected pre-launch, then low 
risk of loss 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 Aborted at 50m due to overdepth 
as no depth mode commanded. 
Unless compounded by another 
problem, this would show itself 
immediately on first dive. 
4 4 3 3 
  
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 No telemetry from Acoustic 
telemetry unit. 
5 5 5 5 
Hard on the observer, but not directly 
threatening to vehicle safety (unless I'm 
missing something) 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 Difficulty stopping Autosub on 
surface via radio command. 
Separate problems with the two 
WiFi access points. 5 5 4 4 
If on surface, relatively low chance of loss 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 
408 302.5 
Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 2 2 2 2 
Unknown impact 
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
 
Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 409 1.5 No acoustic  telemetry or 
transponding. LXT ship side USBL 
receiver had leaked during mission 
giving poor bearings to sub, 
replaced with spare. 5 5 3 3 
Hard on the observer, but not directly 
threatening to vehicle safety (unless I'm 
missing something) 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 410 9 No acoustic  telemetry or 
transponding. 
5 5 3 3 
Hard on the observer, but not directly 
threatening to vehicle safety (unless I'm 
missing something) 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 411 128 No GPS fix at the end of the 
mission. GPS antenna bulkhead had 
water inside and had flooded. 4 4 3 3 
The antenna strikes again! 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 No GPS fix at end of mission. After 
next mission, GPS fixes started 
coming in after vehicle power 
up/power down; perhaps problem 
was due to initialisation with 
receiver – and not this time the 
antenna. 4 4 3 3 
  
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 
412 270 
Problem at start for holding pattern. 
Holding pattern timed out due to 
programming mistake. 3 3 3 3 
Unknown impact 
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 415 6 Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque 
on rudder actuator. Actuator replaced with 
new one - first use for this new design of 
actuator motor and gearbox. However, AUV 
spent most of mission “stuck” going around in 
circles at depth due to rudder actuator fault. 
The new actuator overheated, melting wires 
internally, the motor seized, and internal to the 
main pressure case, the power filter 
overheated. Some of the damage may have 
been caused by an excessive current limit 
(3A); correct setting was 0.3A. But this does 
not explain high motor current. Possible 
damage during testing when motor stalled on 
end stop? Compounded by wiring to motor 
held tightly to case with cable ties, and worse, 
covered with tape (acting as an insulator). 
Wires were not high temperature rated. 4 4 2 2 
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 Three harness connectors failed due to 
leakage, affecting payload systems: 
EM2000 tube, ADCP_down, and Seabird 
CTD. Despite connector problems the 
system worked without glitches and failed 
only when the power pins had burned 
completely through on the connector 
feeding power to the abort system 4 4 2 2 
  
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 
415 6 
Although it worked properly at the start of 
the mission at a range of 1200m, the 
acoustic telemetry stopped working at the 
end of mission. Hence could not stop the 
mission acoustically when needed. 
4 4 2 2 
Is acoustic the only stopping technique for the sub? 
416 18 Not possible to communicate with vehicle 
at 1180m depth; holding pattern caused a 
timeout, and AUV surfaced. Acoustic 
telemetry max range was 500m for digital 
data. 
          
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 418 15 When homing was stopped deliberately 
after 10 min, the AUV did not go into a 
“stay here” mode. Rather it continued on 
the same heading; stopped by acoustic 
command 500m from shore. Cause was 
incorrect configuration of mission 
exception for homing. Default in campaign 
configuration script was not set due to 
inexperience with new configuration tools. 
4 4 3 3 
Since it stopped with acoustic command, "all's well 
that ends well", but could be issue with ice or other 
obstacles. 
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.1 384 1.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due to network 
failure. (Much) later tests showed general 
problem with the harnesses (bad crimp joints).  5 5 5 4 
Surfacing under ice may lead to damage of propeller and/or 
control surfaces upon acoustic mission homing command.  
Any surface constraint inherently increases risk of successful 
recovery. 
  Loop of recovery line came out from storage 
slot, long enough to tangle propeller. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 If a tangle renders the propeller inoperable, the vehicle would 
surface, however, have no means for shelf ice extrication.  
Yet, as described, it did not tangle and therefore is not an 
issue. 
   5 5 5 4  
385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled way, 
due to a side effect of the removal of the 
upwards-looking ADCP. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.5 Presume that incorrect flight was being tracked after hardware 
modification and mission terminated.  Flight control is key to 
getting back out from under ice - this may prove difficult. 
   5 5 5 4  
386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of mission. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Proper mission termination is in open water.  Use of ARGOS 
and UHF RDF should bring to acoustic and visual range. 
   5 5 5 5  
387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle headed off in 
an uncontrolled direction. Mission was 
stopped by acoustic command. Problem was 
due to (a) the uncalibrated receiver array, and 
(b) a network message (“homing lost”) being 
lost on the network.  
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01 Acoustic command is viable, use a bearing and distance to 
replace acoustic tracking to get out from under ice. 
   5 5 5 4  
 
 
 
 
   ----------------------------------------   ANNEX A – EXPERTS RESPONSES ---------------------------------------- 
A35 
 
 
 
Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
  (km)       
388 0.5 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, due to 
network failure. Logger data showed long 
gaps, up to 60s, across all data from all nodes, 
suggesting logger problem. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.02 Presuming that a pre-dive checkout would occur prior to an 
under ice run. 
   5 5 5 4  
  Depth control showed instability. +/- 1m 
oscillation due to incorrect configuration gain 
setting. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 1m oscillation not mission recovery critical. 
   5 5 5 5  
389 3 Vehicle went into homing mode, just before 
dive and headed north. Vehicle mission 
stopped by acoustic command.  It was 
fortunate that the ship-side acoustics 
configuration allowed the ship to steam at 9kt 
(faster rather than 6kt with the towfish) and 
catch the AUV. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01 3km range should be adequate to stop mission.  Comment 
regarding ship speed belongs in next issue description. 
   5 5 5 5  
  Separately, homing mode not exited after 2 
minutes, as expected. It will continue on last-
determined heading indefinitely – a Mission 
Control configuration error. 
0.001 0.01 0.01 0.01 Given a nominal speed of 2m/s, the unit would have traversed 
120 m in the two minutes, still well within the range for an 
acoustic abort.  
   4 4 3 3  
  Problem with deck side of acoustic telemetry 
receiver front end, unrelated to vehicle 
systems. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01 In conjunction with the above faults, this could give tracking 
issues that may have missed the homing mode issue. 
   3 3 3 3  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
391 31 ADCP down range limited to 360m, reduced 
accuracy of navigation. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Not the only navigation set.  Reduced accuracy will still allow 
a successful mission and acoustic homing. 
   4 4 4 4  
  GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point of 
mission. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Proper mission termination is in open water.  Use of ARGOS 
and UHF RDF should bring to acoustic and visual range. 
    5 5 5 5  
  EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging during 
mission. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Not the primary collision avoidance sensor. 
   4 4 4 4  
392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on M391, 
AUV ended up 700m N and 250m E of 
expected end position. 
0.001 0.001 0.05 0.2 If position coincides to ice coverage, could be an issue of 
surfacing under ice damage to propeller or control actuators. 
   5 5 5 4  
393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges and no 
acoustic telemetry. 
0.001 0.001 0.02 0.05 Other mission systems should enable successful mission and 
recovery. 
   4 4 3 3  
394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came out, 
wrapping its line around the propeller, 
jamming it, and stopping the mission. Caused 
severe problems in recovery, some damage to 
upper rudder frame, sub-frame and GPS 
antenna. Required boat to be launched. 
0.001 0.001 0.02 0.02 Given recovery, albeit with damage, the AUV must have been 
clear of the shelf ice.  In ice conditions, small boat may not be 
launch able. 
   5 5 4 4  
395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped 
around the propulsion motor and jammed. 
0.001 0.001 0.2 0.95 Presuming that the line came out while underway in a 
mission, not during a normal recovery.  Smaller boat may not 
be able to be launched in sea ice. 
   5 5 4 3  
 
 
 
 
   ----------------------------------------   ANNEX A – EXPERTS RESPONSES ---------------------------------------- 
A37 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. (cont.) 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
396 4 Current estimation did not work, because 
minimum time between fixes for current to be 
estimated had been set to 15min; leg time was 
only 10min. Mission stopped and restarted 
with configurable time set to 5min. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Issue identified and rectified within 4 km. 
   5 5 5 5  
397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, could have 
jammed motor. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01 Could have, however, did not. 
   5 5 4 4  
398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, they 
believed the AUV was missing waypoints. In 
fact, a couple of waypoints had been 
positioned incorrectly. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Still in control of vehicle. 
   5 5 5 5  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
401 7.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up configured 
as down- looking ADCP causing navigation 
problems through tracking sea surface as 
reference. This data was very noisy and put 
vehicle navigation out by a factor of 1.5. 
0.001 0.001 0.02 0.05 Wonder if the shelf ice would have been a more stable 
navigation reference.  At 7.5 km distance, acoustic comms 
and other navigation methods should enable a recovery. 
   4 4 3 3  
  Damaged on recovery, “moderately serious” 
to sternplane, shaft bent. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Recovery damage, signifies "no loss". 
   5 5 5 5  
402 274 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 
2d 20h into mission. Stern plane actuator had 
flooded.   
0.001 0.001 0.1 0.75 Problem with flying up into ice and loss of control capability 
at a significant range from ship. 
   4 4 3 3  
  Abort due to network failure. Abort release 
could not communicate with depth control 
node for 403s. Possibly side-effect of actuator 
or motor problems. 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.2 Concern with getting stuck under ice 
   4 4 2 2  
  Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm to 
case. Propeller speed dropping off gradually 
during a dive 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.3 If under ice, reduced propulsion could result in not clearing 
ice in time.  The range should be OK given fresh batteries. 
   4 4 4 3  
  Only one position fix from tail mounted 
ARGOS transmitter. 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.05 Have to be out from under the ice.  As this is the long range 
recovery mechanism some concern is due.  Iridium 
availability could mitigate. 
   4 4 4 4  
  GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Recovered, no loss. 
   5 5 5 5  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
403 140 Recovery light line was wrapped around the 
propeller on surface. Flaps covering the main 
recovery lines (and where the light line was 
towed) were open.  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 On surface, therefore loss unlikely. 
   5 5 4 4  
  Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final 
waypoint. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01 Proper mission termination is in open water.  Use of ARGOS 
and UHF RDF should bring to acoustic and visual range. 
   5 5 4 4  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as 
m402. Subsequent testing of motor with 
Megger showed resistance of a few kohm 
between windings. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.2 If under ice, reduced propulsion could result in not clearing ice 
in time although 140 km seems well in range with fresh 
batteries. 
   4 4 4 3  
404 75 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be loaded 
successfully due to distorted keeper. “If not 
spotted, could have dropped out during 
mission”, considered low probability of 
distortion and not checked.  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Low chance of loss given pre-launch checks and that the weight 
had to be loaded prior to launch. 
   4 4 4 4  
  Pre-launch, potential short circuit in motor 
controller that could stop motor. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Given pre-launch identification, then low expectation of loss. 
   4 4 4 4  
  The forward sternplane was lost due to lifting 
line trapping between the fin and its flap on 
recovery. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Damage not leading to loss. 
   5 5 5 5  
  The acoustic telemetry nose transducer was 
damaged due to collision with the ship. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Given pre-launch identification, then low expectation of loss. 
   5 5 5 5  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
405 2.5 Fault found pre-launch, LXT tracking 
transducer had leaked water – replaced.  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Pre-launch check. 
   5 5 5 5  
  Fault found pre-launch, starboard lower 
rudder and sternplane loose.  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Pre-launch check. 
   5 5 5 5  
406 104 AUV ran slower than expected and speed 
dropped off during mission, due to motor 
problem. 
0.001 0.001 0.02 0.2 If under ice, reduced propulsion could result in not clearing 
ice in time although 104 km seems well in range with fresh 
batteries. 
   4 4 3 3  
  Current spikes of 3A and voltage drops in first 
part of mission. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 Tolerance of system not known. 
   2 2 2 2  
  Propulsion motor failed 500V Megger on 
recovery on windings to case. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Recovered, no loss. 
   4 4 4 4  
  One battery pack out of four showed 
intermittent connection. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.05 Energy safety margin used in mission planning? 
   4 4 3 3  
  Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies. 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 Only one of the tracking/recovery systems. 
   5 5 5 5  
  On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km out. 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 1.2 km should be in acoustic range. 
   4 4 3 3  
  Spikes in indicated motor rpm 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 Magnitude and associated navigation error? 
   4 4 3 3  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
407 204 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies at all – 
no tracking or telemetry. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 Only one of the tracking/recovery systems. 
   5 5 5 5  
  Noise spikes on both channels of turbulence 
probe data. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Science, not mission recovery critical. 
   5 5 5 5  
408 302.5 Propulsion motor felt rough when turned by 
hand – bearings replaced before deployment. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Pre-launch check, mitigates loss risk. 
   5 5 5 5  
  Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as no depth 
mode commanded. Unless compounded by 
another problem,  
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 Presume that this would be caught and rectified well within 
acoustic range if under ice. 
  this would show itself immediately on first 
dive. 
4 4 3 3  
  No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry unit. 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 Only one of the tracking/recovery systems. 
   5 5 5 5  
  Difficulty stopping Autosub on surface via 
radio command. Separate problems with the 
two WiFi access points. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 On surface signifies low probability of loss.  WiFi indicates 
close range, expect that the AUV could have been stopped 
acoustically. 
   5 5 4 4  
  Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 Magnitude and associated navigation error? 
   4 4 3 3  
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
384 1.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due to 
network failure. (Much) later tests 
showed general problem with the 
harnesses (bad crimp joints). 
0.01 0.015 0.5 0.8 I'm assuming that the ARGOS transmitter is independent 
and pressure activated, and will transmit without an on-
board network.  
   2 2 3 3  
  Loop of recovery line came out from 
storage slot, long enough to tangle 
propeller. 
0.005 0.01 0.5 0.8 In this case the vehicle can transmit its location in the 
normal way, once on the surface. 
   2 2 3 3  
385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled 
way, due to a side effect of the removal of 
the upwards-looking ADCP. 
0.005 0.01 0.7 0.9 It may not be possible for the ship to follow the AUV if it 
goes under thick ice, whereupon tracking may  be lost. 
(Depends on the directionality of the USBL). 
   2 2 3 3  
386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of mission. 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.01 I'm not sure if you typically use GPS to help locate the 
vehicle after the mission.  We usually do. 
   3 3 3 3  
387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle headed off 
in an uncontrolled direction. Mission was 
stopped by acoustic command. Problem 
was due to (a) the uncalibrated receiver 
array, and (b) a network message 
(“homing lost”) being lost on the 
network. 
0.001 0.001 0.1 0.2 I'll assume the mission would have been stopped before it 
reached the ice edge, and that the location is well known.  
There is a higher danger near the ice due to possible 
collisions with ice fragments. 
   3 1 1 1  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches.     
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
        
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
388 0.5 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, 
due to network failure. Logger data 
showed long gaps, up to 60s, across 
all data from all nodes, suggesting 
logger problem. 
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 I'm assuming that only 4 minutes into the mission the vehicle is not yet 
near ice, and its position is known. 
   3 3 1 1  
  Depth control showed instability. +/- 1m oscillation due to incorrect configuration 
gain setting. 
I would have to know if by "instability" you mean a limit cycle, that is, a 
sustained oscillation of constant amplitude, or you mean in the sense of 
unbounded and growing amplitude.  Also,  what was the frequency?  
High enough to cause damage? 
   1 1 1 1  
389 3 Vehicle went into homing mode, just 
before dive and headed north. 
Vehicle mission stopped by acoustic 
command.  It was fortunate that the 
ship-side acoustics configuration 
allowed the ship to steam at 9kt 
(faster rather than 6kt with the 
towfish) and catch the AUV. 
0.005 0.01 0.7 0.9 What was the programmed speed for this mission?  Are we to assess risk 
in a general case of homing mode malfunction, or this specific case, with 
this specific ship that goes 9 kts?  I'll assume the latter. 
   2 2 2 2  
  Separately, homing mode not exited 
after 2 minutes, as expected. It will 
continue on last-determined heading 
indefinitely – a Mission Control 
configuration error. 
0.01 0.02 0.7 0.9 I think this is a dire situation - when the propulsion is on, and the 
guidance is dead.  #385 and #387 are similar.  We've had this happen to 
us also, but only in Monterey bay.  Risk depends, among other things, on 
if the ship can catch the AUV, and also if the ship can maintain tracking. 
   3 3 4 4  
  Problem with deck side of acoustic 
telemetry receiver front end, 
unrelated to vehicle systems. 
0.001 0.003 0.1 0.1 Does the navigation accuracy depend on surface aiding?  For example are 
USBL fixes telemetered to the AUV?  
   2 2 2 2  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
391 31 ADCP down range limited to 360m, 
reduced accuracy of navigation. 
0.001 0.01 0.3 0.5 It depends on proximity to the shore, and to ice keels 
or ice bergs. 
   4 2 2 2  
  GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point 
of mission. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 It depends on whether GPS plays a role in post-
mission location. 
    2 2 2 2  
  EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging 
during mission. 
0 0 0 0 I'm assuming that the navigation does not rely in any 
way on the EM2000 
   3 3 3 3  
392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on M391, 
AUV ended up 700m N and 250m E of 
expected end position. 
0.001 0.003 0.3 0.3 It's unclear how this would happen.  How would the 
GPS failing upon mission completion cause a 
position error? 
   4 4 2 2  
393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges 
and no acoustic telemetry. 
0.001 0.05 0.3 0.6 No chance to abort the mission if the operator detects 
an error. 
   4 2 2 2  
394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came out, 
wrapping its line around the propeller, 
jamming it, and stopping the mission. 
Caused severe problems in recovery, 
some damage to upper rudder frame, sub-
frame and GPS antenna. Required boat to 
be launched. 
0.003 0.006 0.6 0.8 I'm assuming that in the under-ice cases the vehicle 
was heading under, not away, from the ice.  Also, the 
risk of losing the vehicle is increased in open water 
because the difficult recovery could be further 
complicated by incoming weather, fog, etc. 
   3 3 3 3  
395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped 
around the propulsion motor and jammed. 
0.001 0.003 0.6 0.8  
   3 3 3 3  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches.     
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
        
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
396 4 Current estimation did not work, because 
minimum time between fixes for current 
to be estimated had been set to 15min; leg 
time was only 10min. Mission stopped 
and restarted with configurable time set to 
5min. 
0.001 0.001 0.1 0.2 Does the navigation accuracy depend on current 
estimation? 
   2 2 2 2  
397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, could 
have jammed motor. 
0.001 0.003 0.6 0.8 I assume this is the same as #395. 
   3 3 3 3  
398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, 
they believed the AUV was missing 
waypoints. In fact, a couple of waypoints 
had been positioned incorrectly. 
0.001 0.01 0.2 0.3 Presumably the operators wouldn't terminate the 
mission with the AUV under the ice.  But if the 
waypoints were wrong, the vehicle might get trapped in 
a canyon, or in ice keels. 
   3 3 1 1  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
401 7.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up configured 
as down- looking ADCP causing navigation 
problems through tracking sea surface as 
reference. This data was very noisy and put 
vehicle navigation out by a factor of 1.5. 
0.001 0.005 0.5 0.7 The sea ice case depends on wheather you were launching from 
a lead in the ice, or the ice edge, and if the edge, how well-
defined it was. 
   3 3 2 2  
  Damaged on recovery, “moderately serious” 
to sternplane, shaft bent. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Once you've got a line on the vehicle, the risk of loss seems 
small. 
   3 3 3 3  
402 274 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 
2d 20h into mission. Stern plane actuator had 
flooded.  
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7 I presume autosub is statically buoyant. 
   3 3 2 2  
  Abort due to network failure. Abort release 
could not communicate with depth control 
node for 403s. Possibly side-effect of actuator 
or motor problems. 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7 This appears similar to the above case.  I'm assuming the 
vehicle's position is known at the time of the abort. 
   3 3 2 2  
  Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm to 
case. Propeller speed dropping off gradually 
during a dive 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7 The risk in many of these situations depends on whether the 
operators can use the acoustic communications to recall the 
vehicle before the problem worsens.   I'm always estimating the 
risk to be higher near shelf ice than in sea ice because I'm 
assuming there is probably pieces, if not a brash like cover of ice 
in addition to the shelf.  The risk near shelf ice may actually be 
lower than that of sea ice, if the shelf terminates in open water 
and forms a distinct surface. 
   3 3 2 2  
  Only one position fix from tail mounted 
ARGOS transmitter. 
0.001 0.003 0.1 0.1 I'm guessing this implies that the AUV is operating normally, 
but ARGOS has dropped out.  I assume that acoustic 
communications are working.  Again, if you have a radio 
modem, or Iridium, the risk is lower. 
   3 3 2 2  
  GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic     
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
        
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
403 140 Recovery light line was wrapped around 
the propeller on surface. Flaps covering 
the main recovery lines (and where the 
light line was towed) were open.  
0.001 0.003 0.6 0.8 Similar to #395 & #397.  
   3 3 3 3  
  Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final 
waypoint. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
   2 2 2 2  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as 
m402. Subsequent testing of motor with 
Megger showed resistance of a few kohm 
between windings. 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7  
   3 3 2 2  
404 75 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be 
loaded successfully due to distorted 
keeper. “If not spotted, could have 
dropped out during mission”, considered 
low probability of distortion and not 
checked.  
0 0 0 0 The comment is a little confusing.  How could it not be 
spotted or checked if you have to load a weight into the 
keeper?  Also, wouldn't a distorted keeper tend to jam the 
weight in, not make it drop out? 
   1 1 1 1  
  Pre-launch, potential short circuit in 
motor controller that could stop motor. 
0 0 0 0 Wasn't it detected during the pre-launch?  Then there is no 
risk of loss due to this. 
   1 1 1 1  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as 
on m402 and 403. 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7  
   3 3 2 2  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
404 75 CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-
outs noted in previous missions). 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01 If you have a variable-buoyancy system which relies on 
CTD data in real time, than the risk is worse.  Also, it 
depends on if the PHINS is using the CTD data to process 
the Dvl data. 
   3 3 1 1  
  M404 recovery was complicated when 
lifting lines and streaming line became 
trapped on the rudder (probably stuck 
on the Bolen where the two were 
attached).  Recovery from the situation 
required the trapped lifting lines 
grappled astern of the ship, attached to 
the gantry lines, and the caught end cut. 
0.001 0.001 0.05 0.05  
   3 3 2 2  
  The forward sternplane was lost due to 
lifting line trapping between the fin and 
its flap on recovery. 
0.001 0.001 0.05 0.05  
   3 3 2 2  
  The acoustic telemetry nose transducer 
was damaged due to collision with the 
ship. 
0.001 0.001 0.05 0.05 This situation and the above two seem similar and low risk 
in that the vehicle is on the surface next to the ship 
   3 3 2 2  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
        
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
405 2.5 Fault found pre-launch, LXT 
tracking transducer had leaked water 
– replaced. 
0.001 0.003 0.1 0.1 But you found the problem pre-launch, so there was no risk!  I'll 
assume that you didn't find it 
   1 1 1 1  
  Fault found pre-launch, starboard 
lower rudder and sternplane loose. 
0.003 0.006 0.1 0.1 Suppose it was not found in the pre-launch check 
   1 1 1 1  
406 104 AUV ran slower than expected and 
speed dropped off during mission, 
due to motor problem. 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7 Same as #402 & 3 
   3 3 2 2  
  Current spikes of 3A and voltage 
drops in first part of mission. 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7 Something is about to short out? 
   2 2 1 1  
  Propulsion motor failed 500V 
Megger on recovery on windings to 
case. 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7  
   3 3 2 2  
  One battery pack out of four showed 
intermittent connection. 
0.001 0.003 0.1 0.2  
   2 2 2 2  
  Acosutci telemetry unit gave no 
replies. 
0.005 0.01 0.5 0.7  
   2 2 2 2  
  On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km out.    Out from where?  From the ship?  Or was there a 1.2 km error in 
GPS position?  Or was GPS correct, but the AUV was 1.2 km 
from the final waypoint? 
        
  Spikes in indicated motor rpm 0.001 0.003 0.3 0.5  
   2 2 1 1  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
        
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
407 204 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies at all – 
no tracking or telemetry. 
0.005 0.01 0.3 0.5 Same as 406 e)?  I assumed there that you meant no replies at all. 
   2 2 1 1  
  Noise spikes on both channels of turbulence 
probe data. 
0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 I assume that there wasn't similar noise on other instruments. 
   3 3 2 2  
408 302.5 Propulsion motor felt rough when turned by 
hand – bearings replaced before deployment. 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7  
   3 3 2 2  
  Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as no depth 
mode commanded. Unless compounded by 
another problem, 
0.001 0.003 0.1 0.1  
  this would show itself immediately on first 
dive. 
3 3 1 1  
  No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry unit. 0.005 0.01 0.3 0.5  
   2 2 1 1  
  Difficulty stopping Autosub on surface via 
radio command. Separate problems with the 
two WiFi access points. 
0.001 0.003 0.3 0.3  
   2 2 2 2  
  Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 
0.001 0.003 0.3 0.5  
   2 2 1 1  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
409 1.5 No acoustic  telemetry or transponding. LXT 
ship side USBL receiver had leaked during 
mission giving poor bearings to sub, replaced 
with spare. 
0.005 0.01 0.3 0.5  
   2 2 1 1  
410 9 No acoustic  telemetry or transponding. 0.005 0.01 0.3 0.5 Same situation as previous a-comms losses 
        
411 128 No GPS fix at the end of the mission. GPS 
antenna bulkhead had water inside and had 
flooded. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Same as #391 
   4 2 2 2  
412 270 No GPS fix at end of mission. After next 
mission, GPS fixes started coming in after 
vehicle power up/power down; perhaps 
problem was due to initialisation with receiver 
– and not this time the antenna. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 For open water this depends on if you're relying on itermediate 
surfacing for GPS position fixes.  Presumably the AUV can't 
surface in the ice except at the launch/recovery location.  Also I 
assume that the GPS was working upon launch, and that the INS 
was correctly initialized. 
   4 2 2 2  
  Problem at start for holding pattern. Holding 
pattern timed out due to programming 
mistake. 
0.001 0.003 0.3 0.3  
   3 3 2 2  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
415 6 Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque on 
rudder actuator. Actuator replaced with new one - 
first use for this new design of actuator motor and 
gearbox. However, AUV spent most of mission 
“stuck” going around in circles at depth due to 
rudder actuator fault. The new actuator 
overheated, melting wires internally, the motor 
seized, and internal to the main pressure case, the 
power filter overheated. Some of the damage may 
have been caused by an excessive current limit 
(3A); correct setting was 0.3A. But this does not 
explain high motor current. Possible damage 
during testing when motor stalled on end stop? 
Compounded by wiring to motor held tightly to 
case with cable ties, and worse, covered with tape 
(acting as an insulator). Wires were not high 
temperature rated. 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7 I assume the operator can kill the mission with the 
acoustic communication.  I don't know if you can 
recall it to the launch point. 
   4 4 2 2  
  Three harness connectors failed due to leakage, 
affecting payload systems: EM2000 tube, 
ADCP_down, and Seabird CTD. Despite 
connector problems the system worked without 
glitches and failed only when the power pins had 
burned completely through on the connector 
feeding power to the abort system 
0.05 0.05 0.5 0.8 I don't know what the abort system is.  Do you mean 
the drop weight?  Also, I would guess loss of the EM 
and Seabird don't risk the vehicle much, but certainly 
losing the downward Dvl/Adcp does.  
   3 3 2 2  
  Although it worked properly at the start of the 
mission at a range of 1200m, the acoustic 
telemetry stopped working at the end of mission. 
Hence could not stop the mission acoustically 
when needed. 
0.001 0.003 0.3 0.3  
   3 3 1 1  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
        
No. Distance Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  (km)       
416 18 Not possible to communicate with vehicle at 
1180m depth; holding pattern caused a timeout, 
and AUV surfaced. Acoustic telemetry max 
range was 500m for digital data. 
0.001 0.003 0.5 0.7 Were communications re-estabilished near the 
surface?  Did the AUV come up under power, or 
was the prop off? 
   3 3 1 1  
 
       
418 15 When homing was stopped deliberately after 10 
min, the AUV did not go into a “stay here” 
mode. Rather it continued on the same heading; 
stopped by acoustic command 500m from shore. 
Cause was incorrect configuration of mission 
exception for homing. Default in campaign 
configuration script was not set due to 
inexperience with new configuration tools. 
0.001 0.05 0.5 0.5  
   3 3 2 2  
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
384 1.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due 
to network failure. (Much) later 
tests showed general problem 
with the harnesses (bad crimp 
joints).  
0.01 0.03 0.1 1 Under ice shelf: If the abort decision (operation) does not include an attempt 
to return to the mother ship or shelf edge, then P(loss) is 1.0. If the required 
mission length is less than the time taken for the fault to emerge then P(loss) 
could be reduced to 0.7; confidence is 4.  
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery through the 
sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed 
together by tide, water currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3.  
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time on the 
surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; 
confidence is 3. 
Open water: For a loss due to an inability to locate the AUV, the observed 
fault would need to be compounded by the failure to function of one or more 
of the following devices on the AUV: (a) acoustic pinger, (b) emergency 
release for drop weight, (c) ARGOS transmitter. P(loss) is 0.01, confidence is 
4.  Note: We assume longer missions only. 
   4 3 3 4  
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
  Loop of recovery line came out 
from storage slot, long enough 
to tangle propeller. 
0.02 0.05 0.1 0.8 Under ice shelf: If this event occurs under the ice shelf, and the AUV ends up 
far under the ice shelf, no recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; 
confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the edge of the 
ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8; 
confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: If this event occurs under sea ice, the AUV location may be 
known and recovery through the sea ice may be possible depending on how 
drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, 
as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a functioning 
propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: If this event occurs in coastal waters, P(loss) is assessed higher than 
open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional 
hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: If this event occurs in open water, the recovery should be 
straight-forward, as long as the procedure to recover the AUV doe 
   4 3 3 4  
385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an 
uncontrolled way, due to a side 
effect of the removal of the 
upwards-looking ADCP. 
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 Under ice shelf: If this event occurs under the ice shelf, and the AUV ends up 
far under the ice shelf, no recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; 
confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the edge of the 
ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8; 
confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: If this event occurs under sea ice, the AUV location may be 
known and recovery through the sea ice may be possible depending on how 
drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, 
as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a functioning 
propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: If this event occurs in coastal waters, P(loss) is assessed higher than 
open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional 
hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: If this event occurs in open water, the recovery should be 
straight-forward, as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not 
require a functioning propulsion system on the AUV, unless the recovery is 
complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.02; 
confidence is 4. 
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Note: It is not absolutely certain that the line will tangle. 
   4 3 3 3  
 
Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of 
mission. 
0.01 0.03 0.1  Assume that the alternate devices (acoustic pinger, strobe light, ARGOS 
transmitter) function correctly, or, that the AUV can be located visually.  
Under ice shelf: not applicable 
Under sea ice: The AUV is near the ship but GPS antenna was damaged by 
sea ice. Recovery through sea ice may be possible depending on how 
drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. 
P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: The AUV is near the ship but P(loss) is assessed higher than open 
water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional 
hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The AUV is near the ship hence the recovery should be straight-
forward unless complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence 
P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
 
   4 3 3   
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387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle 
headed off in an uncontrolled 
direction. Mission was 
stopped by acoustic command. 
Problem was due to (a) the 
uncalibrated receiver array, 
and (b) a network message 
(“homing lost”) being lost on 
the network.  
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 Under ice shelf: If the AUV ends up far under the ice shelf, no recovery is 
possible, P(loss) is 1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 
300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, 
hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: If the ship can get to the location of the AUV then recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically the ice 
floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, 
confidence is 3. 
Coastal: If the ship can get to the location of the AUV then P(loss) is assessed 
higher than open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to 
additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: If the ship can get to the location of the AUV then the recovery 
should be straight-forward unless complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal 
currents, hence P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
Note: The vehicle is no where near the ice shelf when homing. 
   4 3 3 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
388 0.5 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, due to 
network failure. Logger data showed long gaps, 
up to 60s, across all data from all nodes, 
suggesting logger problem. 
0.01 0.03 0.1  Under ice shelf: There is a low probability that the AUV 
would reach the edge of the ice shelf within 4 minutes of 
travel time, so this case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: Assuming that the signal from the acoustic 
pinger can be detected through the ice, and, that the ship can 
get to the location of the AUV, then recovery through the sea 
ice may be possible depending on how drastically the ice floes 
are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. P(loss) is 
0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: Assuming that the AUV can be located via the 
acoustic pinger, strobe light or ARGOS position, and, that the 
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ship can get to the location of the AUV, then P(loss) is 
assessed higher than open water case as extra time on the 
surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) 
is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: Assuming that the AUV can be located via the 
acoustic pinger, strobe light or ARGOS position, and, that the 
ship can get to the location of the AUV, then the recovery 
should be straight-forward unless complicated by waves, fog 
or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
   4 3 3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
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  Depth control showed instability. +/- 
1m oscillation due to incorrect 
configuration gain setting. 
0.01 0.03 0.1  Under ice shelf: There is a low probability that the AUV would reach 
the edge of the ice shelf within 7 to 8 minutes of travel time, so this 
case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: Assuming that the signal from the acoustic pinger can 
be detected through the ice, and, that the ship can get to the location of 
the AUV, then recovery through the sea ice may be possible depending 
on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water 
currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: Assuming that the AUV can be located via the acoustic 
pinger, strobe light or ARGOS position, and, that the ship can get to 
the location of the AUV, then P(loss) is assessed higher than open 
water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional 
hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: Assuming that the AUV can be located via the acoustic 
pinger, strobe light or ARGOS position, and, that the ship can get to 
the location of the AUV, then the recovery should be straight-forward 
unless complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence 
P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
   4 3 3   
389 3 Vehicle went into homing mode, just 
before dive and headed north. 
Vehicle mission stopped by acoustic 
command.  It was fortunate that the 
ship-side acoustics configuration 
allowed the ship to steam at 9kt 
(faster rather than 6kt with the 
towfish) and catch the AUV. 
0.01 0.03 0.1  Under ice shelf: not applicable since the ship caught the AUV. 
Under sea ice: Recovery through the sea ice may be possible 
depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, 
water currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: Here P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward unless 
complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 
0.01; confidence is 4. 
 
   4 3 3   
 
 
Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
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389 3 Separately, homing mode not 
exited after 2 minutes, as 
expected. It will continue on 
last-determined heading 
indefinitely – a Mission 
Control configuration error. 
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 Assume the AUV continues travelling until either (a) battery is depleted, or, 
(b) mission time is exceeded and the abort-to-surface command is executed, 
at which time the AUV comes to rest and the location of the AUV is known. 
Under ice shelf: If the AUV ends up far under the ice shelf, no recovery is 
possible, P(loss) is 1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 
300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, 
hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery through the 
sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed 
together by tide, water currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time on the 
surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; 
confidence is 3. 
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward unless complicated by 
waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
Note: The general direction is correct. 
   4 3 3 3  
  Problem with deck side of 
acoustic telemetry receiver 
front end, unrelated to vehicle 
systems. 
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 Assuming that the ship-based acoustic telemetry unit can be repaired, then the 
process to recover the AUV can begin. 
Under ice shelf: If the AUV ends up far under the ice shelf, no recovery is 
possible, P(loss) is 1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 
300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, 
hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: Assuming that the signal from the acoustic pinger can be 
detected through the ice, and, that the ship can get to the location of the AUV, 
then recovery through the sea ice may be possible depending on how 
drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. 
P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: Assuming that the AUV can be located via the acoustic pinger, 
strobe light or ARGOS position, and, that the ship can get to the location of 
the AUV, then P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time 
on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; 
confidence is 3. 
Note: This does not influence the navigation of the system. 
   4 3 3 3  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.1       ADCP down range limited to 360m, 
reduced accuracy of navigation. 
3       
This fault should not affect the ability of the AUV to "come 
home" provided that the AUV can receive that acoustic 
command, or, that the eventual mission time-out invokes a "come 
home" action. Figure 6a of [1] shows that the probability of 
survival from a voyage of length 30 km without a high impact 
fault is about 0.9, thus P(loss) is 0.1 and confidence is 3.  
GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end 
point of mission. 
0.01 0.03 0.1   
  4 3 3   
Under ice shelf: The mission was completed so this case is not 
applicable. 
Under sea ice: The AUV is near the ship but GPS antenna was 
damaged. Recovery through sea ice may be possible depending 
on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water 
currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: The AUV is near the ship but P(loss) is assessed higher 
than open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the 
AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The AUV is near the ship hence the recovery should 
be straight-forward unless complicated by waves, fog or strong 
tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
        
391 31 
EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging 
during mission. 
        
Although this fault will affect the scientific value of the mission, 
this fault should not affect the ability of the AUV to "come home" 
provided that the AUV can receive that acoustic command, or, 
that the eventual mission time-out invokes a "come home" action. 
Figure 6a of [1] shows that the probability of survival from a 
voyage of length 30 km without a high impact fault is about 0.9, 
thus P(loss) is 0.1 and confidence is 3.  
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No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.01 0.03 0.1   392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on 
M391, AUV ended up 700m N and 
250m E of expected end position. 
4 3 3   
This fault should not affect the ability of the ship's crew to 
recover the AUV. Assume that the alternate devices (acoustic 
pinger, strobe light, ARGOS transmitter) function correctly, or, 
that the AUV can be located visually.  
Under ice shelf: The mission was completed so this case is not 
applicable. 
Under sea ice: The AUV is near the ship but GPS antenna was 
damaged by sea ice. Recovery through sea ice may be possible 
depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by 
tide, water currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: The AUV is near the ship but P(loss) is assessed higher 
than open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the 
AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The AUV is near the ship hence the recovery should 
be straight-forward unless complicated by waves, fog or strong 
tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges 
and no acoustic telemetry. 
4 3 3 3 
Note that the faults with the acoustic telemetry system may make 
it difficult to locate the AUV.  
Under ice shelf: If the AUV ends up far under the ice shelf, no 
recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If 
the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, 
recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8; 
confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. 
P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward unless it is 
complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) 
is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
Note: No influence on the vehicle. 
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.02 0.05 0.1 1 394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came 
out, wrapping its line around the 
propeller, jamming it, and stopping 
the mission. Caused severe problems 
in recovery, some damage to upper 
rudder frame, sub-frame and GPS 
antenna. Required boat to be 
launched. 
4 3 3 5 
If this incident occurred late in the mission, it may to be difficult 
or impossible to recover the AUV. Since the tangle is severe 
enough to prevent the propeller from turning, no attempt to return 
to the mother ship or shelf edge will be possible.  
Under ice shelf: If the AUV ends up far under the ice shelf, no 
recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If 
the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, 
recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8; 
confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, 
as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a 
functioning propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.1, 
confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as 
the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a functioning 
propulsion system on the AUV, unless the recovery is 
complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) 
is 0.02; confidence is 4. 
Note: The jamming happened. 
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
0.02 0.05 0.1 1 395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, 
wrapped around the propulsion motor 
and jammed. 
4 3 3 5 
If this incident occurred late in the mission, it may to be difficult 
or impossible to recover the AUV. Since the tangle is severe 
enough to prevent the propeller from turning, no attempt to return 
to the mother ship or shelf edge will be possible.  
Under ice shelf: If the AUV ends up far under the ice shelf, no 
recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If 
the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, 
recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8; 
confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, 
as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a 
functioning propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.1, 
confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as 
the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a functioning 
propulsion system on the AUV, unless the recovery is 
complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) 
is 0.02; confidence is 4. 
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No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
396 4 Current estimation did not work, because 
minimum time between fixes for current to 
be estimated had been set to 15min; leg 
time was only 10min. Mission stopped and 
restarted with configurable time set to 5min. 
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 This fault may affect whether the AUV can actually attain the 
desired waypoints but it should not affect the ability of the AUV 
to "come home". This P(loss) should be low.  
Under ice shelf: If the AUV can get itself out beyond the edge of 
the ice shelf then the usual procedures for recovery in "sea ice" 
conditions apply. If the AUV can get itself to within say 300 m of 
the edge of the ice shelf, then recovery by ROV may be possible, 
hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. 
P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward unless it is 
complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) 
is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
Note: The jamming happened. 
   4 3 3 3  
397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, could have 
jammed motor. 
0.02 0.05   Under ice shelf: Incident occurred when AUV is at the surface so 
this case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: Incident occurred when AUV is at the surface so 
this case is not applicable. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as 
the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a functioning 
propulsion system on the AUV, unless the recovery is complicated 
by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.02; 
confidence is 4. 
 
   4 3    
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, they 
believed the AUV was missing waypoints. 
In fact, a couple of waypoints had been 
positioned incorrectly. 
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 Operators ended mission prematurely, they believed the AUV was 
missing waypoints. In fact, a couple of waypoints had been 
positioned incorrectly. Distance travelled was 8 km.  
Here the location of the AUV (at the instant at which the mission 
was ended) is the determining factor. 
Under ice shelf: If the AUV can get itself out beyond the edge of 
the ice shelf then the usual procedures for recovery in "sea ice" 
conditions apply. If the AUV can get itself to within say 300 m of 
the edge of the ice shelf, then recovery by ROV may be possible, 
hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. 
P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward 
   4 3 3 3  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
401 7.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up configured 
as down- looking ADCP causing navigation 
problems through tracking sea surface as 
reference. This data was very noisy and put 
vehicle navigation out by a factor of 1.5. 
0.01 0.03 0.1  Here the main problem is to locate the AUV based on its most-
recent ded-reckoning position. This mistake should not affect the 
ability of the AUV to "come home" nor the ability of the ship's 
crew to recover the AUV once it has been located. Assume that 
the alternate devices (acoustic pinger, strobe light, ARGOS 
transmitter) function correctly, or, that the AUV can be located 
visually.  
Under ice shelf: The AUV can get itself out from under the ice 
shelf so this case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: If the ship can locate the AUV and get near to it, 
recovery through sea ice may be possible depending on how 
drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents 
or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: If the ship can locate the AUV and get near to it, P(loss) 
is assessed higher than for the open water case as extra time on the 
surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 
0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: If the ship can locate the AUV and get near to it, the 
recovery should be straight-forward unless it is complicated by 
waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.01; 
confidence is 4. 
   4 3 3   
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
  Damaged on recovery, “moderately serious” 
to sternplane, shaft bent. 
0.05 0.1 0.2  The issue here is whether an inoperable sternplane affects the 
recovery procedure, therefore increase P(loss) during recovery; 
from 0.01 to 0.05 and 0.03 to 0.10 and 0.10 to 0.20. 
Under ice shelf: The damage occurred near the ship so this case is 
not applicable. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, 
as long as the procedure to recover the AUV is not significantly 
impaired by an inoperable sternplane. P(loss) is 0.20, confidence 
is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.10; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as 
the procedure to recover the AUV is not significantly impaired by 
an inoperable sternplane, unless the recovery is complicated by 
waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.05; 
confidence is 4. 
   4 3 3   
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 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
402 274 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 
2d 20h into mission. Stern plane actuator had 
flooded.   
0.05 0.1 0.2 1 Due to the sternplane jam, the AUV will either (a) rise to the 
undersurface of the ice, or, (b) descend toward the seabed. Assume 
that the "max depth" detection and subsequent dropping of the 
emergency weight works correctly, no loss will occur due to 
exceeding the "crush depth". Assume that the ship can 
communicate acoustically with the AUV and that the "come 
home" command is issued from the ship. Then the success of the 
"come home" procedure will depend on the ability of the altimeter, 
depth sensor, upward-looking sonar, forward-looking sonar and 
obstacle-avoidance software to work in conjunction with the 
remaining five control surfaces to "come home" along a constant 
depth trajectory. The issue here is whether an inoperable 
sternplane affects the recovery procedure, therefore increase 
P(loss) during recovery; from 0.01 to 0.05 and 0.03 to 0.10 and 
0.10 to 0.20. 
Under ice shelf: If the AUV cannot extricate itself from under the 
ice shelf and ends up a long distance from the edge, no recovery is 
possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV 
ends up within say 300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery 
using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.9; confidence is 
3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, 
as long as the procedure to recover the AUV is not significantly 
impaired by a jammed sternplane. P(loss) is 0.2, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.1; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as 
the procedure to recover the AUV is not significantly impaired by 
a jammed sternplane, unless the recovery is complicated by waves, 
fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 4. 
Note: complete loss of control. 
   4 3 3 5  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
402 274 Abort due to network failure. Abort release 
could not communicate with depth control 
node for 403s. Possibly side-effect of actuator 
or motor problems. 
0.05 0.1 0.2 1 If the release of the emergency drop weight is the issue, then the 
AUV may have difficulty coming to the surface. Assume that the 
control surfaces have sufficient control authority so that with some 
low forward speed the AUV can come to the surface, then the 
usual recovery procedures can be used. The success of the "come 
home" procedure while under the ice shelf will depend on the 
ability of the altimeter, depth sensor, upward-looking sonar, 
forward-looking sonar and obstacle-avoidance software to work in 
conjunction with the control surfaces to "come home" along a 
constant depth trajectory. Increase the usual value of P(loss) due to 
increased complexity of the recovery process due to the need for 
some forward speed during recovery. 
Under ice shelf: If the AUV tries to "come home" but ends up far 
under the ice shelf, no recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; 
confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the 
edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, 
hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, 
and, how difficult it is to recover a slowly-moving AUV. P(loss) is 
0.2, confidence is 3.  
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.1; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The recovery procedure will be affected by the need 
to recover a slowly-moving AUV; additional complications will 
be due to waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.05; 
confidence is 4. 
Note: Complete loss of control. 
   4 3 3 5  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distanc
e 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
402 274 Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm to 
case. Propeller speed dropping off gradually 
during a dive 
0.02 0.05 0.2 0.8 Only one position fix from tail mounted ARGOS transmitter. 
Distance travelled was 274 km. 
Assume that the alternate devices (acoustic pinger, strobe light) 
function correctly, or, that the AUV can be located visually. This 
fault should not affect the usual recovery procedures.  
Under ice shelf: Failure occurred when AUV is at the surface so 
this case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: The AUV is probably near the ship but the AUV 
has drifted since its last reported position. Once the AUV has been 
located, recovery through sea ice may be possible depending on 
how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water 
currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: Here P(loss) is assessed to be higher than for the open 
water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to 
additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The AUV is probably near the ship but the AUV has 
drifted since its last reported position. Once the AUV has been 
located, the recovery should be straight-forward unless 
complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) 
is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
   4 3 3  3  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
402 274 Only one position fix from tail 
mounted ARGOS transmitter. 
0.01 0.03 0.1  Assume that the alternate devices (acoustic pinger, strobe light, ARGOS 
transmitter) function correctly, or, that the AUV can be located visually. 
This damage should have no effect on the recovery procedures. 
Under ice shelf: Damage occurred when AUV is at the surface so this 
case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: Damage occurred when AUV is at the surface so this case 
is not applicable. 
Coastal: The AUV is near the ship but P(loss) is assessed higher than the 
open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to 
additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The AUV is near the ship hence the recovery should be 
straight-forward unless complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal 
currents, hence P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
   4 3 3   
  GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 0.01 0.03   Assume that the alternate devices (acoustic pinger, strobe light, ARGOS 
transmitter) function correctly, or, that the AUV can be located visually. 
This damage should have no effect on the recovery procedures. 
Under ice shelf: Damage occurred when AUV is at the surface so this 
case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: Damage occurred when AUV is at the surface so this case 
is not applicable. 
Coastal: The AUV is near the ship but P(loss) is assessed higher than the 
open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to 
additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The AUV is near the ship hence the recovery should be 
straight-forward unless complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal 
currents, hence P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
 
   4 3    
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
403 140 Recovery light line was wrapped around the 
propeller on surface. Flaps covering the main 
recovery lines (and where the light line was 
towed) were open.  
0.02 0.05   Assume that this incident occurs only at the end of a successful 
voyage hence the only effect is on the recovery process. 
Under ice shelf: Incident occurred when AUV is at the surface so 
this case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: Incident occurred when AUV is at the surface so 
this case is not applicable. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as 
the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a functioning 
propulsion system on the AUV, unless the recovery is complicated 
by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.02; 
confidence is 4. 
 
   4 3    
  Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final 
waypoint. 
0.05 0.15   The issue here is potential damage to the AUV during 1-hour 
drifting on the surface at the final waypoint. Assume that the 
alternate devices (acoustic pinger, strobe light, ARGOS 
transmitter) function correctly, or, that the AUV can be located 
visually. This fault should have no effect on the recovery 
procedures once they commence. Increase the P-values by a factor 
of five, use 0.15 and 0.05. 
   4 3    
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
403 140 Propeller speed showed same problem as 
m402. Subsequent testing of motor with 
Megger showed resistance of a few kohm 
between windings. 
0.02 0.05 0.15 0.8 Assume that this measurement was made at the end of the mission 
after a successful recovery. Suppose that this fault was not 
detected prior to the start of the next mission. The issue then 
becomes how long will the propeller keep turning sufficiently to 
provide forward propulsion to "come home" once the fault has 
been detected by some self-diagnostic test which is routinely 
executed within the AUV. 
Under ice shelf: If the propeller keeps turning until (a) the AUV 
gets out beyond the shelf edge then recover as usual, P(loss) is 0.6 
and confidence is 3; (b) the AUV gets to within say 300 m of the 
edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, 
hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3; (c) if the propeller stops and 
the AUV drifts beyond the reach of an ROV, P(loss) is 1.0, 
confidence is 5. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, 
as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a 
fully-functioning propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.15, 
confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra 
time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as 
the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a fully-
functioning propulsion system on the AUV, unless the recovery is 
complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) 
is 0.02; confidence is 4. 
Note: All scenarios equally likely. 
   4 3 3 3  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
404 75 Pre-launch, abort weight could not 
be loaded successfully due to 
distorted keeper. “If not spotted, 
could have dropped out during 
mission”, considered low 
probability of distortion and not 
checked.  
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the start of the next 
mission. If the weight falls out during the mission, the AUV would 
tend to rise toward the undersurface of the ice shelf. Assume that the 
control surfaces have sufficient control authority so that with some 
low forward speed the AUV can maintain a constant depth 
trajectory. The success of the "come home" procedure while under 
the ice shelf will then depend on the ability of the altimeter, depth 
sensor, upward-looking sonar, forward-looking sonar and obstacle-
avoidance software to work in conjunction with the control surfaces 
to "come home" along a constant depth trajectory. Increase the usual 
value of P(loss) due to increased complexity of the recovery process 
due to the need for some forward speed during recovery. 
Under ice shelf: If the AUV tries to "come home" but ends up far 
under the ice shelf, no recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; 
confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the 
edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence 
P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery 
through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, 
and, how difficult it is to recover a slowly-moving AUV. P(loss) is 
0.2, confidence is 3.  
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time 
on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) 
is 0.1; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The recovery procedure will be affected by the need to 
recover a slowly-moving AUV; additional complications will be due 
to waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.05; 
confidence is 4. 
Note: Failure spotted pre-launch. 
   4 3 3 3  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
  Pre-launch, potential short circuit 
in motor controller that could stop 
motor. 
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the start of the next 
mission. Assume that the short circuit stops the motor, thus no 
attempt to "come home" will be possible. Under ice shelf: If this 
event occurs under the ice shelf, and the AUV ends up far under the 
ice shelf, no recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; confidence is 
4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the edge of the ice 
shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8; 
confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: If this event occurs under sea ice, the AUV location 
may be known and recovery through the sea ice may be possible 
depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by 
tide, water currents or wind, as long as the procedure to recover the 
AUV does not require a functioning propulsion system on the AUV. 
P(loss) is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: If this event occurs in coastal waters, P(loss) is assessed 
higher than open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the 
AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3.  
Open water: If this event occurs in open water, the recovery should 
be straight-forward, as long as the procedure to recover the AUV 
does not require a functioning propulsion system on the AUV, unless 
the recovery is complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, 
hence P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
Note: It was spotted pre-launch. 
   4 3 3 3  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
404 75 Propeller speed showed same 
problem as on m402 and 403. 
0.02 0.05 0.15 0.8 Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the start of the next mission. The issue 
then becomes how long will the propeller keep turning sufficiently to provide forward 
propulsion to "come home" once the fault has been detected by some diagnostic test 
which is executed within the AUV on a regular basis. 
Under ice shelf: If the propeller keeps turning until (a) the AUV gets out beyond the 
shelf edge then recover as usual, P(loss) is 0.6 and confidence is 3; (b) the AUV gets to 
within say 300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, 
hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3; (c) if the propeller stops and the AUV drifts 
beyond the reach of an ROV, P(loss) is 1.0, confidence is 5. 
Under sea ice: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the shelf 
edge then recover as usual. The AUV location may be known and recovery through the 
sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together 
by tide, water currents or wind, as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not 
require a fully-functioning propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.15, confidence 
is 3. 
Coastal: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge 
into coastal waters, then recover as usual. P(loss) is assessed higher than open water 
case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) 
is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the shelf 
edge into open water then recover as usual. The recovery should be straight-forward, 
as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a fully-functioning 
propulsion system on the AUV, unless the recovery is complicated by waves, fog or 
strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.02; confidence is 4. 
Note: All scenarios equally likely. 
   4 3 3  3  
  CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-outs noted 
in previous missions). 
  Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the start of the next mission. 
Assuming that the AUV is equipped with an additional depth sensor which is used 
when operating in the constant-depth control mode, this fault has no effect on the 
behaviour of the AUV. When the fault is detected either (a) continue the mission to 
gather a reduced data-set, or, (b) "come home". Figure 6a of [1] shows that the 
probability of survival from a voyage of length 75 km without the occurrence of a high 
impact fault is about 0.79, thus P(loss) is 0.21 and confidence is 3.  Note: Is not 
addressing the fault. 
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
404 75 M404 recovery was 
complicated when lifting lines 
and streaming line became 
trapped on the rudder 
(probably stuck on the Bolen 
where the two were attached).  
Recovery from the situation 
required the trapped lifting 
lines grappled astern of the 
ship, attached to the gantry 
lines, and the caught end cut. 
This incident occurred in open water, at the end of the mission, during recovery. What is P(loss) during recovery after this 
incident occurred? It is no different that a normal open-water recovery, hence P(loss) is 0.01, confidence is 4. 
        
  The forward sternplane was 
lost due to lifting line trapping 
between the fin and its flap on 
recovery. 
 This incident occurred in open water, at the end of the mission, during 
recovery, after the lifting lines were attached. What is P(loss) during 
recovery after this incident occurred? Since the lifting lines are now 
attached, there is a high probability that the recovery will be completed 
successfully, hence P(loss) is 0.005, confidence is 5. 
        
  The acoustic telemetry nose 
transducer was damaged due 
to collision with the ship. 
0.01    This incident occurred in open water, at the end of the mission, during 
recovery. What is P(loss) during recovery after this incident occurred? It is 
no different that a normal open-water recovery, hence P(loss) is 0.01, 
confidence is 4. Ensure that the transducer is checked, and, repaired or 
replaced and tested prior to the next deployment. 
   4     
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident 
description 
Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
405 2.5 Fault found pre-
launch, LXT 
tracking transducer 
had leaked water – 
replaced.  
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.8 Is this the only range-to-ship measurement device, or, is there another independent range-to-ship 
measurement device? If it is the only such device, and, if this fault was not detected prior to the next 
deployment, then once the fault is detected, issue a "come home" command via the acoustic modem. 
Note that a fault with the acoustic tracking system may make it difficult to locate the AUV.  
Under ice shelf: If the AUV ends up far under the ice shelf, no recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 
1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery 
using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery through the sea ice may be possible 
depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. P(loss) 
is 0.1, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV 
to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward unless it is complicated by waves, fog or strong 
tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.01; confidence is 4. 
Note: Not essential for vehicle control. 
   4 3 3 3  
  Fault found pre-
launch, starboard 
lower rudder and 
sternplane loose.  
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.9 If this fault was not detected prior to starting the mission, then once the fault is detected, issue a "come 
home" command via the acoustic modem. Then the success of the "come home" procedure will 
depend on the ability of the altimeter, depth sensor, upward-looking sonar, forward-looking sonar and 
obstacle-avoidance software to work in conjunction with the six control surfaces to "come home" 
along a constant depth trajectory.  
Under ice shelf: If the AUV cannot extricate itself from under the ice shelf and ends up a long distance 
in from the edge, no recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends 
up within say 300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence 
P(loss) is 0.9; confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery through the sea ice may be possible 
depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, as long 
as the procedure to recover the AUV is not significantly impaired by an these two loose control 
surfaces. P(loss) is 0.2, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV 
to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.1; confidence is 3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as the procedure to recover the AUV is 
not significantly impaired by an these two loose control surfaces, unless the recovery is complicated 
by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 4. 
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Note: Caught pre-launch. 
   4 3 3 3  
Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident 
description 
Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
406 104 AUV ran 
slower than 
expected and 
speed dropped 
off during 
mission, due 
to motor 
problem. 
0.02 0.05 0.2 0.8 Assume that this measurement was made at the end of the mission after a successful recovery. Suppose 
that this fault was not detected prior to the start of the next mission. The issue then becomes how long will 
the propeller keep turning sufficiently to provide forward propulsion to "come home" once the fault has 
been detected by some diagnostic test which is executed within the AUV on a regular basis. 
Under ice shelf: If the propeller keeps turning until (a) the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge then 
recover as usual, P(loss) is 0.6 and confidence is 3; (b) the AUV gets to within say 300 m of the edge of 
the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8; confidence is 3; (c) if the 
propeller stops and the AUV drifts beyond the reach of an ROV, P(loss) is 1.0, confidence is 5. 
Under sea ice: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge then recover as 
usual. The AUV location may be known and recovery through the sea ice may be possible depending on 
how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, as long as the procedure 
to recover the AUV does not require a fully-functioning propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.20, 
confidence is 3. 
Coastal: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge and into coastal waters 
then recover as usual. P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time on the surface exposes 
the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge and into open 
water then recover as usual. The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as the procedure to recover 
the AUV does not require a fully-functioning propulsion system on the AUV, unless the recovery is 
complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.02; confidence is 4. 
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Note: All scenarios equally likely. 
   4 3 3 3  
  Current spikes of 3A 
and voltage drops in 
first part of mission. 
   Apparently this was not severe enough to abort a 104 km mission, or, it was detected after a voyage of 52 
km and the "come home" command was issued then. Or, these irregularities were observed "in the first part 
of the mission" and disappeared later? Suppose that these irregularities were not detected (by some self-
diagnostic test which is routinely executed within the AUV) until part way through a mission, then the 
appropriate action would be to halt the mission and issue the "come home" command. Figure 6a of [1] 
shows that the probability of survival from a voyage of length 100 km without the occurrence of a high 
impact fault is about 0.74, thus P(loss) is about 0.26 and confidence is probably 3. Given that the above 
fault was not severe enough to cause an abort of a 104 km mission, perhaps the values of P(loss) should be 
increased by 10% from those that would be predicted for any other length of voyage by Figure 6a. 
        
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the 
grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
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406 104 Propulsion motor failed 500V 
Megger on recovery on 
windings to case. 
0.02 0.05 0.2 0.8 Assume that this measurement was made at the end of the mission after a 
successful recovery. Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the next 
deployment. The issue then becomes how long will the propeller keep turning 
sufficiently to provide forward propulsion to "come home" once the fault has 
been detected by some self-diagnostic test which is routinely executed within 
the AUV. 
Under ice shelf: If the propeller keeps turning until (a) the AUV gets to 
within say 300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be 
possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8 and confidence is 3; otherwise (b) if the 
propeller stops and the AUV drifts beyond the reach of an ROV, P(loss) is 
1.0, confidence is 5. 
Under sea ice: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond 
the shelf edge then recover as usual. The AUV location may be known and 
recovery through the sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically 
the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind, as long as 
the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a fully-functioning 
propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.20, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the 
shelf edge and into coastal waters then recover as usual. P(loss) is assessed 
higher than open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to 
additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.05; confidence is 3.  
Open water: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the 
shelf edge and into open water then recover as usual. The recovery should be 
straight-forward, as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not 
require a fully-functioning propulsion system on the AUV, or unless the 
recovery is complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) 
is 0.02; confidence is 4. 
Note: Failed test on recovery. 
   4 3 3 3  
 
 
Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey 
boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident 
description 
Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
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406 104 One battery pack out of 
four showed 
intermittent connection. 
0.02 0.05 0.2 0.8 Given that the above fault was not severe enough to cause an abort of a 104 km mission, it is 
highly probable that the AUV can "limp home" using only three battery packs over that 
distance. However, if the voyage is too long, three battery packs will contain insufficient energy 
to enable the AUV to "limp home" even with all non-navigation and non-collision-avoidance 
sensors turned off; this is a straight-forward energy calculation that does not require any 
statistical assumptions. 
Under ice shelf: If the voyage length is such that the AUV can "limp" out to the edge of the ice 
shelf while using only three battery packs, then recover as usual. If while running on three 
battery packs the AUV gets to within say 300 m of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an 
ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8 and confidence is 3. If the battery energy is 
completely consumed and the AUV comes to rest and then drifts beyond the reach of an ROV, 
P(loss) is 1.0, confidence is 5. 
Under sea ice: If while running on three battery packs the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge, 
then recover as usual. The AUV location may be known and recovery through the sea ice may 
be possible depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, water 
currents or wind, as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a functioning 
propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.20, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: If while running on three battery packs the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge and 
into coastal waters then recover as usual. P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as 
extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.05; 
confidence is 3.  
Open water: If while running on three battery packs the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge 
and into open water then recover as usual. The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as 
the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a functioning propulsion system on the 
AUV, or unless the recovery is complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence 
P(loss) is 0.02; confidence is 4. 
Note:May have suffient energy. 
   4 3 3 3  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey 
boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident 
description 
Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
406 104 Acoustic telemetry unit 
gave no replies. 
0.26    Again, the above fault was not severe enough to cause an abort of a 104 km mission, when the 
AUV operated in its completely-autonomous mode. Suppose that this fault is not detected prior 
to the next deployment. If this fault is detected before the AUV submerges, presumably a 
"come home" command can be issued via the RF link. If not, at some point the ship will 
discover that it cannot communicate with the AUV once it is submerged, so it will then be 
useless to issue a "come home" command; it will be therefore necessary to allow the AUV to 
complete its intended mission, autonomously. Using Figure 6a of [1] as a basis for prediction of 
successful completion during the completely-autonomous mode, a subsequent voyage of length 
100 km without the occurrence of a high impact fault is about 0.74, thus P(loss) is about 0.26 
and confidence is probably 3. 
   3     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the 
grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
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406 104 On surfacing first GPS fix was 
1.2km out. 
0.02 0.06 0.2  Here the AUV completed the voyage but the GPS gave a position 1.2 km 
from where the ship found the AUV. Thus the main problem is to locate the 
AUV based on its most-recent ded-reckoning position. This GPS "glitch" 
should not affect the ability of the AUV to "come home" nor the ability of the 
ship's crew to recover the AUV once it has been located. Assume that the 
alternate devices (acoustic pinger, strobe light, ARGOS transmitter) function 
correctly, or, that the AUV can be located visually. So P(loss) will be 
somewhat higher than usual if the usual method of location the AUV is to use 
the most-recent GPS fix. 
Under ice shelf: The AUV does not use the GPS unit to get itself out from 
under the ice shelf so this case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: If the ship can locate the AUV and get near to it, recovery 
through sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically the ice floes 
are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.2, confidence 
is 3. 
Coastal: If the ship can locate the AUV and get near to it, P(loss) is assessed 
higher than for the open water case as extra time on the surface exposes the 
AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.06; confidence is 3. 
Open water: If the ship can locate the AUV and get near to it, the recovery 
should be straight-forward unless it is complicated by waves, fog or strong 
tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 0.02; confidence is 4. 
   4 3 3   
  Spikes in indicated motor rpm 0.36    Again this was not a critical fault since the voyage was completed 
successfully. Suppose that these spikes were not detected (by some self-
diagnostic test which is routinely executed within the AUV) until part way 
through a mission, then the appropriate action would be to halt the mission 
and issue the "come home" command. Figure 6a of [1] shows that the 
probability of survival from a voyage of length 100 km without the 
occurrence of a high impact fault is about 0.74, thus P(loss) is about 0.26 and 
confidence is probably 3. Given that the above fault was not severe enough to 
cause an abort of a 104 km mission, perhaps for this type of fault the values 
of P(loss) should be increased by say 10% from those that would be predicted 
for any other length of voyage by Figure 6a. 
   3     
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the 
grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
407 204 Acoustic telemetry unit gave 
no replies at all – no tracking 
or telemetry. 
0.4    Here is another case where the above fault was not severe enough to cause an 
abort of a 204 km mission, when the AUV operated in its completely-
autonomous mode. Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the next 
deployment. If this fault is detected before the AUV submerges, presumably a 
"come home" command can be issued via the RF link. If not, at some point 
the ship will discover that it cannot communicate with the AUV once it is 
submerged, so it will then be useless to issue a "come home" command; it 
will be therefore necessary to allow the AUV to complete its intended 
mission, autonomously. Using Figure 6a of [1] as a basis for prediction of 
successful completion during the completely-autonomous mode, a subsequent 
voyage of length 200 km without the occurrence of a high impact fault is 
about 0.60, thus P(loss) is about 0.40 and confidence is probably 3. 
   3     
  Noise spikes on both channels 
of turbulence probe data. 
0.4    Although this fault will affect the scientific value of the mission, this fault 
should not affect the ability of the AUV to "come home" provided that the 
AUV can receive that acoustic command, or, that the eventual mission time-
out invokes a "come home" action. Figure 6a of [1] shows that the probability 
of survival from a voyage of length 200 km without the occurrence of a high 
impact fault is about 0.60, thus P(loss) is about 0.40 and confidence is 
probably 3. 
   3     
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the grey 
boxes. 
   ----------------------------------------   ANNEX A – EXPERTS RESPONSES ---------------------------------------- 
A87 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident 
description 
Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
408 302.5 Propulsion motor felt 
rough when turned by 
hand – bearings replaced 
before deployment. 
0.02 0.05 0.2 0.8 Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the next deployment. The issue then 
becomes how long will the propeller keep turning sufficiently to provide forward 
propulsion to "come home" once the fault has been detected by some self-diagnostic test 
which is routinely executed within the AUV. 
Under ice shelf: If the propeller keeps turning until (a) the AUV gets to within say 300 m 
of the edge of the ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.8 
and confidence is 3; otherwise (b) if the propeller stops and the AUV drifts beyond the 
reach of an ROV, P(loss) is 1.0, confidence is 5. 
Under sea ice: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge 
then recover as usual. The AUV location may be known and recovery through the sea ice 
may be possible depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by tide, 
water currents or wind, as long as the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a 
fully-functioning propulsion system on the AUV. P(loss) is 0.20, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge and 
into coastal waters then recover as usual. P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as 
extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.05; 
confidence is 3.  
Open water: If the propeller keeps turning until the AUV gets out beyond the shelf edge 
and into open water then recover as usual. The recovery should be straight-forward, as long 
as the procedure to recover the AUV does not require a fully-functioning propulsion 
system on the AUV, or unless the recovery is complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal 
currents, hence P(loss) is 0.02; confidence is 4. 
Note: Motor was not siezed. 
   4 3 3 3  
  0.01    Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the next deployment. As long as the AUV 
does a dive check-out manoeuvre prior to the start of the mission, it is highly probable that 
this fault will be detected in open water and near the ship. Provided the AUV returns to the 
surface in open water, and is located, and that the ship can get to the AUV, the normal 
probability of loss in open water will apply, thus P(loss) is 0.01 and confidence is 4. 
  
Aborted at 50m due to 
overdepth as no depth 
mode commanded. 
Unless compounded by 
another problem,  
this would show itself 
immediately on first dive. 
4     
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   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the 
grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
408 302.5 No telemetry from Acoustic 
telemetry unit. 
    Again, the above fault was not severe enough to cause an abort of a 300 km 
mission, when the AUV operated in its completely-autonomous mode. Suppose 
that this fault is not detected prior to the next deployment. If this fault is 
detected before the AUV submerges, presumably a "come home" command can 
be issued via the RF link. If not, at some point the ship will discover that it 
cannot communicate with the AUV once it is submerged, so it will then be 
useless to issue a "come home" command; it will be therefore necessary to 
allow the AUV to complete its intended mission, autonomously. Using Figure 
6a of [1] as a basis for prediction of successful completion during the 
completely-autonomous mode, a subsequent voyage of length 300 km without 
the occurrence of a high impact fault is about 0.50, thus P(loss) is about 0.50 
and confidence is probably 3. Note: Did not answer the question. 
        
  Difficulty stopping Autosub 
on surface via radio 
command. Separate problems 
with the two WiFi access 
points. 
0.015    These problems could present difficulties during recovery; it is not stated 
whether or not in this situation the AUV would accept a "halt" command via the 
acoustic modem link. Supposing that the AUV could eventually be stopped in 
open water, and located, and that the ship can get to the AUV, then the usual 
probability for loss during recovery in open water could be increased by say 
50% for this situation, thus P(loss) is 0.015 and confidence is 3. 
   3     
  Still spikes on motor rpm that 
need investigating. 
    Again this was not a critical fault since a 300 km voyage was completed 
successfully. Suppose that these spikes were not detected (by some self-
diagnostic test which is routinely executed within the AUV) until part way 
through a mission, then the appropriate action would be to halt the mission and 
issue the "come home" command. Figure 6a of [1] shows that the probability of 
survival from a voyage of length 300 km without the occurrence of a high 
impact fault is about 0.50, thus P(loss) is about 0.50 and confidence is probably 
3. Given that the above fault was not severe enough to cause an abort of a 300 
km mission, perhaps for this type of fault the values of P(loss) should be 
increased by say 10% from those that would be predicted for any other length of 
voyage by Figure 6a. Note: Question not answered. 
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the 
grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
409 1.5 No acoustic  telemetry or 
transponding. LXT ship side 
USBL receiver had leaked 
during mission giving poor 
bearings to sub, replaced with 
spare. 
Here is another case where the above fault was not severe enough to interfere with a "come home" command which was 
presumably issued via the RF link, and, the safe return of the AUV to near the ship when the AUV operated in its completely-
autonomous mode. Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the next deployment. If this fault is detected before the 
AUV submerges, presumably a "come home" command can be issued via the RF link. If not, at some point the ship will 
discover that it cannot communicate with the AUV once it is submerged, so it will then be useless to issue a "come home" 
command; it will be therefore necessary to allow the AUV to complete its intended mission, autonomously. Figure 6a of [1] 
can then be used as a basis for prediction of successful completion of any mission which operates using the completely-
autonomous mode. For example, for any voyages of length 10 km or less, the probability of success without the occurrence of a 
high impact fault is at least 0.95, thus P(loss) is less than 0.05 and confidence is probably 3.  Note: Question not answered. 
        
410 9 No acoustic  telemetry or 
transponding. 
    Essentially the same as situations #44, 47, 51 and 54. 
        
411 128 No GPS fix at the end of the 
mission. GPS antenna 
bulkhead had water inside and 
had flooded. 
0.01 0.03 0.1  Assume that the alternate devices (acoustic pinger, strobe light, ARGOS 
transmitter) function correctly, or, that the AUV can be located visually.  
Under ice shelf: The mission was completed so this case is not applicable. 
Under sea ice: The AUV is near the ship but GPS antenna was damaged. 
Recovery through sea ice may be possible depending on how drastically the ice 
floes are pressed together by tide, water currents or wind. P(loss) is 0.1, 
confidence is 3. 
Coastal: The AUV is near the ship but P(loss) is assessed higher than open water 
case as extra time on the surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence 
P(loss) is 0.03; confidence is 3. 
Open water: The AUV is near the ship hence the recovery should be straight-
forward unless complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 
0.01; confidence is 4. 
 
   4 3 3   
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the 
grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
412 270 No GPS fix at end of mission. 
After next mission, GPS fixes 
started coming in after vehicle 
power up/power down; 
perhaps problem was due to 
initialisation with receiver – 
and not this time the antenna. 
0.01 0.03 0.1  Essentially the same as situation #56 (this is 57). 
   4 3 3   
  Problem at start for holding 
pattern. Holding pattern timed 
out due to programming 
mistake. 
0.01    Supposing that the AUV could eventually be stopped in open water, and located, 
and that the ship can get to the AUV, then the usual probability for loss during 
recovery in open water should apply, thus P(loss) is about 0.01 and confidence is 
probably 4. 
   4     
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the 
grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
415 6 Prior to dive, checks showed 
reduced torque on rudder 
actuator. Actuator replaced 
with new one - first use for 
this new design of actuator 
motor and gearbox. However, 
AUV spent most of mission 
“stuck” going around in 
circles at depth due to rudder 
actuator fault. The new 
actuator overheated, melting 
wires internally, the motor 
seized, and internal to the 
main pressure case, the power 
filter overheated. Some of the 
damage may have been caused 
by an excessive current limit 
(3A); correct setting was 
0.3A. But this does not 
explain high motor current. 
Possible damage during 
testing when motor stalled on 
end stop? Compounded by 
wiring to motor held tightly to 
case with cable ties, and 
worse, covered with tape 
(acting as an insulator). Wires 
were not high temperature 
rated. 
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.9 If this fault was not detected prior to starting the mission, then once the fault is 
detected, issue a "come home" command via the acoustic modem. Then the 
success of the "come home" procedure will depend on the ability of the altimeter, 
depth sensor, upward-looking sonar, forward-looking sonar and obstacle-
avoidance software to work in conjunction with the five remaining control 
surfaces to "come home" along a constant depth trajectory.  
Under ice shelf: If the AUV cannot extricate itself from under the ice shelf and 
ends up a long distance in from the edge, no recovery is possible, hence P(loss) is 
1.0; confidence is 4 or 5. If the AUV ends up within say 300 m of the edge of the 
ice shelf, recovery using an ROV may be possible, hence P(loss) is 0.9; 
confidence is 3. 
Under sea ice: The AUV location may be known and recovery through the sea ice 
may be possible depending on how drastically the ice floes are pressed together by 
tide, water currents or wind, as long as the procedure to recover the AUV is not 
significantly impaired by the rudder actuator fault. P(loss) is 0.2, confidence is 3. 
Coastal: P(loss) is assessed higher than open water case as extra time on the 
surface exposes the AUV to additional hazards, hence P(loss) is 0.1; confidence is 
3.  
Open water: The recovery should be straight-forward, as long as the procedure to 
recover the AUV is not significantly impaired by the rudder actuator fault, unless 
the recovery is complicated by waves, fog or strong tidal currents, hence P(loss) is 
0.05; confidence is 4. 
Note: Serious fault in actuator. 
   4 3 3 3  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the 
grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
415 6 Three harness connectors 
failed due to leakage, 
affecting payload systems: 
EM2000 tube, ADCP_down, 
and Seabird CTD. Despite 
connector problems the 
system worked without 
glitches and failed only when 
the power pins had burned 
completely through on the 
connector feeding power to 
the abort system 
    One would expect that the simultaneous (or consecutive) failures of 
three harness connectors within the same mission would be a highly 
unlikely event. If the release of the emergency drop weight is in fact 
the issue, then the AUV may have difficulty coming to the surface. 
Assume that the control surfaces have sufficient control authority so 
that with some low forward speed the AUV can come to the surface, 
then the usual recovery procedures can be used. The success of the 
"come home" procedure while under the ice shelf will depend on the 
ability of the altimeter, depth sensor, upward-looking sonar, forward-
looking sonar and obstacle-avoidance software to work in conjunction 
with the control surfaces in order to "come home" along a constant 
depth trajectory. Increase the usual value of P(loss) due to increased 
complexity of the recovery process due to the need for some forward 
speed during recovery. See the details in situations #24 and 31. 
        
  Although it worked properly 
at the start of the mission at a 
range of 1200m, the acoustic 
telemetry stopped working at 
the end of mission. Hence 
could not stop the mission 
acoustically when needed. 
    Here is another case where the above fault was not severe enough to 
interfere with a "come home" command which was presumably issued 
via the RF link, and, the safe return of the AUV to near the ship. 
Suppose that this fault was not detected prior to the next deployment; 
see the details in situation #54. 
        
416 18 Not possible to communicate 
with vehicle at 1180m depth; 
holding pattern caused a 
timeout, and AUV surfaced. 
Acoustic telemetry max range 
was 500m for digital data. 
    Here the positive outcome was dependent on the fact that a timeout 
situation occurred and the "come to the surface" behaviour executed 
correctly. Otherwise one would have to wait for some other timeout to 
occur, or, battery depletion condition; for the details see situation #3. 
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in the 
grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
418 15 When homing was stopped 
deliberately after 10 min, the 
AUV did not go into a “stay 
here” mode. Rather it 
continued on the same 
heading; stopped by acoustic 
command 500m from shore. 
Cause was incorrect 
configuration of mission 
exception for homing. Default 
in campaign configuration 
script was not set due to 
inexperience with new 
configuration tools. 
0.5    Cause was incorrect configuration of mission exception for homing. 
Default in campaign configuration script was not set due to 
inexperience with new configuration tools. Distance travelled was 15 
km. 
Here P(loss) in open water and coastal waters is increased due to 
possibility of collision with the shore, submerged obstacles etc. if the 
obstacle detection and avoidance system does not function perfectly in 
shallow waters. It may be necessary to retrieve the AUV with the ROV 
if the ship and usual recovery equipment cannot operate near shore. 
This fault was, fortunately, not fatal to the mission. Perhaps P(loss) is 
as high as 0.5 for this situation and confidence is probably 2 out of 5. 
 
   2     
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
384 1.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due to 
network failure. (Much) later tests 
showed general problem with the 
harnesses (bad crimp joints). 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.7 At the surface, at a range of 1.5 km, the vehicle is likely to be located 
and recovered. Recovery under shelf ice is formidable, but at 1.5 km is 
within range of an ROV. 
   4 4 4 4  
  Loop of recovery line came out 
from storage slot, long enough to 
tangle propeller. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.7 Assuming the vehicle was ballasted positive at zero thrust, if the 
propeller was fouled it would come to the surface. At 1.5 km, it is 
likely to be located and recovered. Recovery under shelf ice is 
formidable, but at 1.5 km is within range of an ROV 
   4 4 4 4  
385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an 
uncontrolled way, due to a side 
effect of the removal of the 
upwards-looking ADCP. 
0.8 0.7 0.8 0.95 If it's out of control 15 km out, the chances of loss are pretty high 
unless it is still being tracked somehow. If the vehicle remains water 
tight (no seal leaks, collisions, …), the chances of ultimate recovery 
are slightly higher in coastal regions due to the likelihood of its being 
found on a beach . 
   2 2 2 2  
386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of 
mission. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Assuming other locating devices (pinger, RF, strobe) were operational, 
and the mission was executed close to its programmed waypoints. 
   4 4 4 4  
387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle 
headed off in an uncontrolled 
direction. Mission was stopped by 
acoustic command. Problem was 
due to (a) the uncalibrated receiver 
array, and (b) a network message 
(“homing lost”) being lost on the 
network. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.8 Since vehicle was within range of acoustic communication and the 
mission was stopped, vehicle recovery is likely if locating devices 
(e.g., pinger) are working. 
   2 2 2 2  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
388 0.5 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, 
due to network failure. Logger data 
showed long gaps, up to 60s, 
across all data from all nodes, 
suggesting logger problem. 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.01 Assuming abort default is to surface. 
   4 4 4 4  
  Depth control showed instability. 
+/- 1m oscillation due to incorrect 
configuration gain setting. 
0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.01 This amplitude oscillation is low risk for loss unless operating near the 
surface, especially if the surface is ice covered. 
   4 4 4 4  
389 3 Vehicle went into homing mode, 
just before dive and headed north. 
Vehicle mission stopped by 
acoustic command.  It was 
fortunate that the ship-side 
acoustics configuration allowed the 
ship to steam at 9kt (faster rather 
than 6kt with the towfish) and 
catch the AUV. 
0.001 0.001 0.05 0.05 Not clear what is happening here. "Mission stopped" implies some default 
behavior which is known. At 3 km before diving , plotting an intercept should 
be straight forward. 
   4 4 3 3  
  Separately, homing mode not 
exited after 2 minutes, as expected. 
It will continue on last-determined 
heading indefinitely – a Mission 
Control configuration error. 
0.001 0.001 0.5 0.7 See note above. If vehicle is at depth (not clear from description) then the risk 
of loss in ice covered conditions is high as indicated. If the vehcile is at the 
surface then these probablilities should be reduced by at least an order of 
magnitude. 
   3 3 2 2  
  Problem with deck side of acoustic 
telemetry receiver front end, 
unrelated to vehicle systems. 
0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 Assuming RF systems working. 3 km is line of sight. 
   4 4 3 3  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
391 31 ADCP down range limited to 
360m, reduced accuracy of 
navigation. 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 By itself  and within limits, this should not be a problem. Risk goes up, 
however, if combined with the next fault. 
   3 3 3 3  
  GPS antenna flooded. No fix at 
end point of mission. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02  
    3 3 3 3  
  EM2000 swath sonar stopped 
logging during mission. 
0 0 0 0 Unless there is adaptive control slaved to this sensor, this should not affect 
risk of loss. 
   4 4 4 4  
392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on 
M391, AUV ended up 700m N and 
250m E of expected end position. 
0.001 0.001 0.005 0.01 Pinger should still be audible, and wireless should connect at these ranges. 
   4 4 4 4  
393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor 
ranges and no acoustic telemetry. 
0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 Assuming pre-programmed mission is being executed as planned, and 
acoustic telemetry not being used to contol the vehicle in real time. 
   4 4 3 3  
394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float 
came out, wrapping its line around 
the propeller, jamming it, and 
stopping the mission. Caused 
severe problems in recovery, some 
damage to upper rudder frame, 
sub-frame and GPS antenna. 
Required boat to be launched. 
0.005 0.005 0.4 0.8 Probabilities of loss go up with sea state. These estimates are for sea state 2 
and below. For ice covered conditions, the assumption is that the mission 
abort resulted in the vehicle surfacing under the ice. 
   3 3 4 4  
395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, 
wrapped around the propulsion 
motor and jammed. 
0.01 0.01 0.8 1 Same as above, only at greater range. 
   3 3 4 4  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
396 4 Current estimation did not work, 
because minimum time between 
fixes for current to be estimated 
had been set to 15min; leg time 
was only 10min. Mission stopped 
and restarted with configurable 
time set to 5min. 
0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 Probabilities of loss go up with the magnitude of the currents, of course. 
Therefore, coastal slightly higher, under-ice slightly lower. 
   4 4 4 4  
397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, 
could have jammed motor. 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
   4 4 4 4  
398 8 Operators ended mission 
prematurely, they believed the 
AUV was missing waypoints. In 
fact, a couple of waypoints had 
been positioned incorrectly. 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 Probabilities of loss go up with the magnitude of the error in incorrect 
positions. Description implies that the errors were not egregious. 
   4 4 4 4  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
401 7.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up 
configured as down- looking ADCP 
causing navigation problems through 
tracking sea surface as reference. 
This data was very noisy and put 
vehicle navigation out by a factor of 
1.5. 
0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 If recovery transmissions working properly, the increased risk here lies 
mostly in the chance of "grounding" on the bottom or under the ice due to 
inaccurate navigation. Under the ice, the ADCP up should work well (not 
be noisy) even though mis-configured. 
   3 3 4 4  
  Damaged on recovery, “moderately 
serious” to sternplane, shaft bent. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 There is always a risk of loss on recovery. This incident is not unusual. 
   4 4 4 4  
402 274 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt 
to dive, 2d 20h into mission. Stern 
plane actuator had flooded.  
0.05 0.05 0.9 1 Assuming vehicle stuck on surface with locating devices working. 
   3 3 4 4  
  Abort due to network failure. Abort 
release could not communicate with 
depth control node for 403s. Possibly 
side-effect of actuator or motor 
problems. 
0.05 0.05 0.9 1 Same as above. 
   3 3 4 4  
  Motor windings had resistance of 
330 ohm to case. Propeller speed 
dropping off gradually during a dive 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.3 Indication is motor seal compromised under pressure. 
   2 2 2 2  
  Only one position fix from tail 
mounted ARGOS transmitter. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Risk depends on the distance between the position fix and the recovery 
vessel at the time of the fix. Also the operational status of other locating 
devices (GPS, pinger, …) 
   2 2 2 2  
  GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 0 0 0 0  
   5 5 5 5  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
403 140 Recovery light line was wrapped 
around the propeller on surface. 
Flaps covering the main recovery 
lines (and where the light line was 
towed) were open.  
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Assuming "on surface" does not mean on surface under ice. Sea state 
comments above apply. 
   4 4 4 4  
  Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at 
final waypoint. 
0 0.001 0 0  
   4 4 4 4  
  Propeller speed showed same 
problem as m402. Subsequent testing 
of motor with Megger showed 
resistance of a few kohm between 
windings. 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.3  
   2 2 2 2  
404 75 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be 
loaded successfully due to distorted 
keeper. “If not spotted, could have 
dropped out during mission”, 
considered low probability of 
distortion and not checked.  
0.001 0.001 0.1 0.1 Risk here is that vehicle surfaces pre-maturely. Problem under ice. 
   3 3 3 3  
  Pre-launch, potential short circuit in 
motor controller that could stop 
motor. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01 "Potential" = ? 
   2 2 2 2  
  Propeller speed showed same 
problem as on m402 and 403. 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.3  
   2 2 2 2  
  CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter 
drop-outs noted in previous 
missions). 
0 0 0 0  
   4 4 4 4  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
404 75 M404 recovery was complicated 
when lifting lines and streaming line 
became trapped on the rudder 
(probably stuck on the Bolen where 
the two were attached).  Recovery 
from the situation required the 
trapped lifting lines grappled astern 
of the ship, attached to the gantry 
lines, and the caught end cut. 
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04  
   3 3 3 3  
  The forward sternplane was lost due 
to lifting line trapping between the 
fin and its flap on recovery. 
0 0 0 0  
   4 4 4 4  
  The acoustic telemetry nose 
transducer was damaged due to 
collision with the ship. 
0 0 0 0  
   4 4 4 4  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
405 2.5 Fault found pre-launch, LXT 
tracking transducer had leaked water 
– replaced. 
0 0 0 0 Since fault found pre-launch and fixed, risk is negligible. If fault not found 
or repair unreliable, the risk is higher. 
   5 5 5 5  
  Fault found pre-launch, starboard 
lower rudder and sternplane loose. 
0 0 0 0 Since fault found pre-launch and fixed, risk is negligible. If fault not found 
or repair unreliable, the risk is higher. 
   5 5 5 5  
406 104 AUV ran slower than expected and 
speed dropped off during mission, 
due to motor problem. 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.3  
   2 2 2 2  
  Current spikes of 3A and voltage 
drops in first part of mission. 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.3  
   2 2 2 2  
  Propulsion motor failed 500V 
Megger on recovery on windings to 
case. 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.3  
   2 2 2 2  
  One battery pack out of four showed 
intermittent connection. 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.3  
   2 2 2 2  
  Acosutci telemetry unit gave no 
replies. 
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.01  
   2 2 2 2  
  On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km 
out. 
0 0 0 0  
   5 5 5 5  
  Spikes in indicated motor rpm 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.3  
   2 2 2 2  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
 Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
407 204 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no 
replies at all – no tracking or 
telemetry. 
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.01  
   2 2 2 2  
  Noise spikes on both channels of 
turbulence probe data. 
0 0 0 0  
   5 5 5 5  
408 302.5 Propulsion motor felt rough when 
turned by hand – bearings replaced 
before deployment. 
0 0 0 0 Since fault found pre-launch and fixed, risk is negligible. If fault 
not found or repair unreliable, the risk is higher. 
   5 5 5 5  
  Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as 
no depth mode commanded. Unless 
compounded by another problem, 
this would show itself immediately 
on first dive. 
    Not sure how to interpret this. 
        
  No telemetry from Acoustic 
telemetry unit. 
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.01  
   2 2 2 2  
  Difficulty stopping Autosub on 
surface via radio command. Separate 
problems with the two WiFi access 
points. 
0 0.001 0 0  
   5 5 5 5  
  Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.3  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
409 1.5 No acoustic  telemetry or 
transponding. LXT ship side USBL 
receiver had leaked during mission 
giving poor bearings to sub, replaced 
with spare. 
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.01  
   2 2 2 2  
410 9 No acoustic  telemetry or 
transponding. 
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.01  
   2 2 2 2  
411 128 No GPS fix at the end of the mission. 
GPS antenna bulkhead had water 
inside and had flooded. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02  
   3 3 3 3  
412 270 No GPS fix at end of mission. After 
next mission, GPS fixes started 
coming in after vehicle power 
up/power down; perhaps problem 
was due to initialisation with receiver 
– and not this time the antenna. 
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02  
   3 3 3 3  
  Problem at start for holding pattern. 
Holding pattern timed out due to 
programming mistake. 
0 0 0 0  
   4 4 4 4  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) 
for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
415 6 Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque on rudder 
actuator. Actuator replaced with new one - first use for 
this new design of actuator motor and gearbox. However, 
AUV spent most of mission “stuck” going around in 
circles at depth due to rudder actuator fault. The new 
actuator overheated, melting wires internally, the motor 
seized, and internal to the main pressure case, the power 
filter overheated. Some of the damage may have been 
caused by an excessive current limit (3A); correct setting 
was 0.3A. But this does not explain high motor current. 
Possible damage during testing when motor stalled on 
end stop? Compounded by wiring to motor held tightly to 
case with cable ties, and worse, covered with tape (acting 
as an insulator). Wires were not high temperature rated. 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9  
   3 3 3 3  
415 6 Three harness connectors failed due to leakage, affecting 
payload systems: EM2000 tube, ADCP_down, and 
Seabird CTD. Despite connector problems the system 
worked without glitches and failed only when the power 
pins had burned completely through on the connector 
feeding power to the abort system 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.2  
   3 3 3 3  
  Although it worked properly at the start of the mission at 
a range of 1200m, the acoustic telemetry stopped 
working at the end of mission. Hence could not stop the 
mission acoustically when needed. 
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.01  
   2 2 2 2  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
416 18 Not possible to communicate 
with vehicle at 1180m depth; 
holding pattern caused a timeout, 
and AUV surfaced. Acoustic 
telemetry max range was 500m 
for digital data. 
0.01 0.01 0.8 0.9  
   3 3 3 3  
418 15 When homing was stopped 
deliberately after 10 min, the 
AUV did not go into a “stay here” 
mode. Rather it continued on the 
same heading; stopped by 
acoustic command 500m from 
shore. Cause was incorrect 
configuration of mission 
exception for homing. Default in 
campaign configuration script 
was not set due to inexperience 
with new configuration tools. 
0.01 0.1 0.01 0.01  
   2 2 2 2  
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Dana Yoerger 
Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
384 1.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due 
to network failure. (Much) later 
tests showed general problem 
with the harnesses (bad crimp 
joints).  
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 I have least confidence in my estimates for sea ice, as that type of 
environment can vary significantly. for example, leads might be more or 
less prevalent. Likewise underice currents can tend to push a floating 
vehicle along the underside of the ice until a lead is reached. This 
explains several "miraculous" recoveries with Singh and Bellingham's 
vehicles in the ice               0.1 The response to this type of problem is 
pretty routine, proper surface localization  aids are critical, however. 
Strobes, RF beacons, GPS/Iridium systems help avoid loss                    
0.2 similar to the open case, but coastal setting could have higher surface 
currents and more difficult destinations for a drifting vehicle. Timely 
recovery could be necessary.                                      0.5 This could be 
big trouble, but open areas could provide access, and drifting vehicle 
often find such openings                                                       1.0 big 
trouble, abort to the surface probably means the vehicle will not be 
recoverable. 
   5 5 3 5  
  Loop of recovery line came out 
from storage slot, long enough to 
tangle propeller. 
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 0.1 provided the vehicle is positively buoyant (drop weight?), then in 
open water this problem should not prevent recovery                                       
0.2 same analysis as for the previous problem         0.5  the tangled 
propellor does not make any more problems than for the previous abort 
scenario                                                                           1.0 same as above        
   5 5 3 1  
385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an 
uncontrolled way, due to a side 
effect of the removal of the 
upwards-looking ADCP. 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.3 If this problem cannot be diagnosed by the autonomous system or 
from topside monitoring, the vehicle could travel a very long distance in 
an unknown direction. Long range surface location aids (gps/iridium or 
similar) would be critical           0.4 more potential problem scenarios 
near the coast, the vehicle could end up running aground which could 
make the vehicle harder to find and complicate the recovery considerable                        
0.5 Sea ice would complicate localizing the vehicle provided it ascended 
due to positive buoyancy                                                                       0.8 
Murphy's law would say the uncontrolled motion would take the vehicle 
to a place where it could not be recovered.                                            
   5 5 3 5  
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate in 
the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of 
mission. 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 usually, GPS failure at the end will not increase probability of loss as the 
vehicle will home and be recovered normally. This failure creates problems 
only when the vehicle can't home.                              0.1 this means short 
range RF beacon and strobe are the only recovery aids, they have a max range 
of a few km                                                                      0.2 again loss of GPS 
to satellite comms system means only local recovery aids are available           
0.2 Reliance on local surface localization aids is more difficult here                                      
   4 4 4 4  
387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle 
headed off in an uncontrolled 
direction. Mission was stopped 
by acoustic command. Problem 
was due to (a) the uncalibrated 
receiver array, and (b) a network 
message (“homing lost”) being 
lost on the network.  
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 vehicle is already near the vessel, simple localization aids (rf beacon, 
strobe) are sufficient   0.1 My logic is the same as for the open water case                                                                                 
0.5 An uncontrolled ascent in sea ice means that recovery requires some good 
fortune.                       0.5 I assume the vehicle is out from under the shelf, so 
the probablity is similar to the open ice scenario                                        
   5 5 4 4  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each estimate 
in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
388 0.5 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, 
due to network failure. Logger data 
showed long gaps, up to 60s, across 
all data from all nodes, suggesting 
logger problem. 
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 I am assuming that the surface localization aids are independent of the logger, 
so this failure has the same implication as 384, first failure.                   0.1 I rate 
this the same as the previous example (387, first failure)                                                           
0.2 (see 384, first failure)                                             0.5 (see 384, first failure)                                              
1.0 (see 384, first failure)                                                                                                                                                       
   5 5 4 4  
  Depth control showed instability. +/- 
1m oscillation due to incorrect 
configuration gain setting. 
0.1 0.3 0.5 1 same as above, depth instability would not effect the function of the surface 
localization aids            0.1 (see previous)                                                         0.3 
(see previous)                                                         0.5 (see previous)                                                         
1.0 (see previous)                                                                                                        
   5 5 4 4  
389 3 Vehicle went into homing mode, just 
before dive and headed north. 
Vehicle mission stopped by acoustic 
command.  It was fortunate that the 
ship-side acoustics configuration 
allowed the ship to steam at 9kt 
(faster rather than 6kt with the 
towfish) and catch the AUV. 
0.3 0.5 0.7 1 The prospect of the vehicle driving at high speed in an improper direction can 
significantly increase the likelihood of loss, depending on the type of surface 
localization aids available. Strobes and RF beacons have a range on he order of 
a few km, depending on weather. A gps/iridium combination significantly 
reduces the likelihood of loss in this circumstances. Likewise, a timeout in the 
homing process would also reduce the likelihood of loss in this scenario.                                                              
0.3 (see comment about timeout) 
   5 5 4 4  
  Separately, homing mode not exited 
after 2 minutes, as expected. It will 
continue on last-determined heading 
indefinitely – a Mission Control 
configuration error. 
0.3 0.5 0.7 1 Again, a high-speed drive-off is very scary for a vehicle with the speed and 
endurance of Autosub. Does the homing mode have a timeout? If so, the 
consequences of this failure would be less severe.                                                                
0.3 (see comment about timeout)   
   3 3 4 4  
  Problem with deck side of acoustic 
telemetry receiver front end, 
unrelated to vehicle systems. 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 A high-speed driveoff coupled with a loss of acoustic comms could result in 
high likelihood of loss, depending on any other failures. For this evaluation, I 
have assumed no other failures. 
   3 3 3 3  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
391 31 ADCP down range limited to 360m, 
reduced accuracy of navigation. 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 reduced navigational accuracy increases the possibility that the vehicle 
will not be able to home at the end of the mission, but this is not very 
likely 
   3 3 3 3  
  GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point 
of mission. 
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.2 I am assuming the vehicle has  a gps/RF or satellite combination. The 
loss of GPS increases the likelihood that the vehicle will not be located 
on the surface, which is more serious for the under ice missions. 
    3 3 3 3  
  EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging 
during mission. 
0 0 0 0 EM2000 is not used in real-time (I think), so its loss would not increase 
likelihood of loss 
   4 4 4 4  
392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on M391, 
AUV ended up 700m N and 250m E of 
expected end position. 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0 same as 391, failure 2 a 
   3 3 3   
393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges and 
no acoustic telemetry. 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 same as 389, failure 3 
   3 3 3 3  
394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came out, 
wrapping its line around the propeller, 
jamming it, and stopping the mission. 
Caused severe problems in recovery, some 
damage to upper rudder frame, sub-frame 
and GPS antenna. Required boat to be 
launched. 
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 such a failure could cause the vehicle to stop whenever the float came out 
(i.e. some random point in the mission). If the vehicle is not under ice, 
then this failure simply causes a random abort, in which case the 
reliability of the long-range surface localization aids determines the risk. 
Under ice (sea or shelf), this results in very significant likelihood of loss. 
   4 4 4 4  
395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped 
around the propulsion motor and jammed. 
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 same as 394 
   4 4 4   
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
396 4 Current estimation did not work, because 
minimum time between fixes for current to 
be estimated had been set to 15min; leg 
time was only 10min. Mission stopped and 
restarted with configurable time set to 
5min. 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 reduced navigational accuracy, similar to ADCP problem, 391 #1 
   3 3 3 3  
397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, could have 
jammed motor. 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 I am assuming the motor that could jam is the main propulsion motor. 
The likelihood of loss is the same as for any other random abort.                      
0.5. Probability of loss is the same as the probability of jamming the 
motor (propulsion motor?) 
   4 4 4 4  
398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, they 
believed the AUV was missing waypoints. 
In fact, a couple of waypoints had been 
positioned incorrectly. 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 the real risk is not very big, the problem was more in the operator's 
perception than in the actual vehicle function. 
   4 4 4 4  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
401 7.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up 
configured as down- looking ADCP causing 
navigation problems through tracking sea 
surface as reference. This data was very 
noisy and put vehicle navigation out by a 
factor of 1.5. 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 inaccurate vehicle localization does not create large likelihood of loss in 
open or coast cases, provided the long range surface localization aids 
work properly. Under sea or shelf ice, bad nav could mean that the 
vehicle does not home properly, at great risk to the vehicle. 
   4 4 4 4  
  Damaged on recovery, “moderately serious” 
to sternplane, shaft bent. 
0 0 0 0 not increase in probability of loss, although possibly no more dives for 
the cruise 
   5 5 5 5  
402 274 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 
2d 20h into mission. Stern plane actuator 
had flooded.   
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 This is equivalent to a random stop in the mission. In open or coast 
scenarios, this does not create great risk if the surface localization aids 
work. Under sea or shelf ice, this creates much larger risk, as the vehicle 
will not home to the ship. 
   4 4 4 4  
  Abort due to network failure. Abort release 
could not communicate with depth control 
node for 403s. Possibly side-effect of 
actuator or motor problems. 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 same as 402, failure 1 
   5 5 5 5  
  Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm 
to case. Propeller speed dropping off 
gradually during a dive 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 another failure at a random time during the mission. 
   5 5 5 5  
  Only one position fix from tail mounted 
ARGOS transmitter. 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 reduced reliability of the long range surface localization increases risk for 
all missions, especially in ice when other surface localization methods 
may not work. 
   4 4 4 4  
  GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 0 0 0 0 no increased risk for the dive in question, some increased risk for the 
next dive as the GPS antenna will be replaced and won't be as thoroughly 
tested. 
   5 5 5 5  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) 
for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
403 140 Recovery light line was wrapped around the propeller on 
surface. Flaps covering the main recovery lines (and 
where the light line was towed) were open.  
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 any departure from normal recovery procedure increases 
likelihood of loss, especially if the weather is bad. 
   3 3 3 3  
  Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final waypoint.      
   4 4 4 4  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as m402. 
Subsequent testing of motor with Megger showed 
resistance of a few kohm between windings. 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 failure at a random time in the mission (see 402, first 
failure) 
   4 4 4 4  
404 75 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be loaded 
successfully due to distorted keeper. “If not spotted, 
could have dropped out during mission”, considered low 
probability of distortion and not checked.  
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 if not found and if the abort weight was actually lost, this 
is equivalent to a mission failure at a random time (see 
403, first failure) 
   4 4 4 4  
  Pre-launch, potential short circuit in motor controller 
that could stop motor. 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 If this happened during the mission, it would constitute a 
random mission failure, I've assumed it happened subsea 
   4 4 4 4  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as on m402 and 
403. 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 failure at a random time in the mission (see 402, first 
failure) 
   4 4 4   
  CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-outs noted in 
previous missions). 
0 0 0 0 does not threaten vehicle, but could have serious 
consequences for the science program 
   5 5 5 5  
  M404 recovery was complicated when lifting lines and 
streaming line became trapped on the rudder (probably 
stuck on the Bolen where the two were attached).  
Recovery from the situation required the trapped lifting 
lines grappled astern of the ship, attached to the gantry 
lines, and the caught end cut. 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 same as 403, failure 1 
   3 3 3 3  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
404 75 The forward sternplane was lost due to 
lifting line trapping between the fin and its 
flap on recovery. 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 the loss of the sternplane doesn't increase the risk of losing the vehicle, 
but the trapped lift line counts as a departure from the nominal recovery 
procedure, see 403, failure 1 
   3 3 3 3  
  The acoustic telemetry nose transducer was 
damaged due to collision with the ship. 
0 0 0 0 does not threaten vehicle, but could have serious consequences for the 
next dive if proper repairs not made.  
   4 4 4 4  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
405 2.5 Fault found pre-launch, LXT tracking 
transducer had leaked water – replaced.  
0 0 0 0 problem found before launch, so vehicle safety not effected.  
   5 5 5 5  
  Fault found pre-launch, starboard lower 
rudder and sternplane loose.  
0 0 0 0 problem found before launch, so vehicle safety not effected.  
   5 5 5 5  
406 104 AUV ran slower than expected and speed 
dropped off during mission, due to motor 
problem. 
0.05 0.05 0.4 0.6 this could result in a random failure at some point during the 
mission. 
   3 3 3 3  
  Current spikes of 3A and voltage drops in 
first part of mission. 
  sorry, I can't judge how this could put the vehicle in jeopardy 
   1 1 1 1  
  Propulsion motor failed 500V Megger on 
recovery on windings to case. 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 this condition could result in a random mission failure, much more 
significant under ice. 
   4 4 4 4  
  One battery pack out of four showed 
intermittent connection. 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 this could result in a mission being aborted early, nearly the same as 
a random mission failure 
   4 4 4 4  
  Acosutci telemetry unit gave no replies. 0 0 0 0 I'm not sure how the loss of the acoustic telemetry uplink could put 
the vehicle at risk 
   1 1 1 1  
  On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km out. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 at worst, this could result in the vehicle reporting its position 
improperly, but other surface localization aids should allow vehicle 
to be located. 
   4 4 4 4  
  Spikes in indicated motor rpm 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 I don't understand how the vehicle would handle spikes in rpm 
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf Ice Reasons 
407 204 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies at 
all – no tracking or telemetry. 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 I'm not sure how the loss of the acoustic telemetry uplink 
could put the vehicle at risk, if the vehicle can't be 
tracked, many other failures could be more significant. 
   1 1 1 1  
  Noise spikes on both channels of 
turbulence probe data. 
0 0 0 0 no impact on probability of vehicle loss. Loss of science 
data significant in terms of mission goals, but not safety. 
   4 4 4 4  
408 302.5 Propulsion motor felt rough when turned 
by hand – bearings replaced before 
deployment. 
0 0 0 0 This problem was diagnosed so it did not put the vehicle 
at risk. However, this could mean that the bearing could 
wear prematurely, which could result in a problem during 
a long mission. 
   3 3 3 3  
  Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as no 
depth mode commanded. Unless 
compounded by another problem,  
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 this problem will not put the vehicle at risk because the 
dive would abort soon after launch 
  this would show itself immediately on 
first dive. 
3 3 3 3  
  No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry 
unit. 
0 0 0 0 same as 406 error 5 
   1 1 1 1  
  Difficulty stopping Autosub on surface 
via radio command. Separate problems 
with the two WiFi access points. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 loss of control on the surface could make vehicle recovery 
more risky. Damage more likely than loss, however 
   3 3 3 3  
  Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 
0 0 0 0 same as 407, error 2 
   4 4 4 4  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) 
for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
409 1.5 No acoustic  telemetry or transponding. LXT ship side 
USBL receiver had leaked during mission giving poor 
bearings to sub, replaced with spare. 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 same as 407, error 1 
   1 1 1 1  
410 9 No acoustic  telemetry or transponding. 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 same as 407, error 1 
   1 1 1 1  
411 128 No GPS fix at the end of the mission. GPS antenna 
bulkhead had water inside and had flooded. 
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.2 same as 391, error 2 
   3 3 3 3  
412 270 No GPS fix at end of mission. After next mission, GPS 
fixes started coming in after vehicle power up/power 
down; perhaps problem was due to initialisation with 
receiver – and not this time the antenna. 
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.2 same as 391, error 2 
   3 3 3 3  
  Problem at start for holding pattern. Holding pattern 
timed out due to programming mistake. 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 same as 408, error 2 
   3 3 3 3  
415 6 Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque on rudder 
actuator. Actuator replaced with new one - first use for 
this new design of actuator motor and gearbox. However, 
AUV spent most of mission “stuck” going around in 
circles at depth due to rudder actuator fault. The new 
actuator overheated, melting wires internally, the motor 
seized, and internal to the main pressure case, the power 
filter overheated. Some of the damage may have been 
caused by an excessive current limit (3A); correct setting 
was 0.3A. But this does not explain high motor current. 
Possible damage during testing when motor stalled on 
end stop? Compounded by wiring to motor held tightly to 
case with cable ties, and worse, covered with tape (acting 
as an insulator). Wires were not high temperature rated. 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 the consequences of this failure depend on how long into 
the mission it occurs. If it happened immediately, then its 
an early failure like 408 #2. If it could happen at any time 
(I've assumed that here), then it's a random failure like  
   4 4 4 4  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
   Estimated probability of leading to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) 
for each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
415 6 Three harness connectors failed due to leakage, 
affecting payload systems: EM2000 tube, 
ADCP_down, and Seabird CTD. Despite connector 
problems the system worked without glitches and 
failed only when the power pins had burned 
completely through on the connector feeding power to 
the abort system 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9 I'm uncertain about the consequences of losing the power 
connector to the abort system. Does it have a redundant 
battery? Would the abort system work without external 
power? I have considered this to be a random failure 
   4 4 4 4  
  Although it worked properly at the start of the mission 
at a range of 1200m, the acoustic telemetry stopped 
working at the end of mission. Hence could not stop 
the mission acoustically when needed. 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.4 if the mission went as planned with no need to abort, then 
this problem would have no effect. But if an abort was 
required beyond 1200m,  this would be a big problem. I 
rate this as 1/2 as likely to result in vehicle loss as a 
random failure. 
   3 3 3 3  
416 18 Not possible to communicate with vehicle at 1180m 
depth; holding pattern caused a timeout, and AUV 
surfaced. Acoustic telemetry max range was 500m for 
digital data. 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.4 similar to problem in 415 
   3 3 3 3  
 
       
418 15 When homing was stopped deliberately after 10 min, 
the AUV did not go into a “stay here” mode. Rather it 
continued on the same heading; stopped by acoustic 
command 500m from shore. Cause was incorrect 
configuration of mission exception for homing. 
Default in campaign configuration script was not set 
due to inexperience with new configuration tools. 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 this failure could make the vehicle recovery depart from 
the expected process, which would increase the likelihood 
of vehicle loss equally for all cases. I'm assuming an 
acoustic abort would work normally. 
   3 3 3 3  
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
384 1.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due to network 
failure. (Much) later tests showed general 
problem with the harnesses (bad crimp joints).  
S S S L Shelf ice: relatively quick occurrence of the failure increases chance of 
recovery. What's the default behavior after aborting mission when 
under ice cover? Any attempts to return? 
   0.95 0.95 0.6 0.6  
  Loop of recovery line came out from storage 
slot, long enough to tangle propeller. 
S S L L How likely is the entanglement given the sub's geometry and range of 
manouevres? Once immobilized under ice, very slim chances of 
recovery. In other environments, much depends on how the software 
handles stuckness. 
   0.75 0.75 0.55 0.95  
385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled way, 
due to a side effect of the removal of the 
upwards-looking ADCP. 
S S L L Insufficient information to make prognoses: what sort of side-effect? 
Are the failsafe mechanisms (abort radius, timeouts) still in operation? 
Assuming abort by acoustic command is possible. 
   0.85 0.9 0.75 0.99  
386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of mission. S S S S Assuming it's a problem of tracking and recovery of the sub which 
already surfaced after the mission, and acoustic tracking is available. 
   0.95 0.85 0.8 0.7  
387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle headed off in 
an uncontrolled direction. Mission was 
stopped by acoustic command. Problem was 
due to (a) the uncalibrated receiver array, and 
(b) a network message (“homing lost”) being 
lost on the network.  
S S L L Timely abort of mission increases chance of recovery, even from under 
ice. 
   0.95 0.95 0.5 0.75  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
388 0.5 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, due to 
network failure. Logger data showed long 
gaps, up to 60s, across all data from all nodes, 
suggesting logger problem. 
S S S L Assumed comms reestablished after the abort. Coastal area more 
dangerous for retrieval than open sea. 
   0.99 0.95 0.65 0.75  
  Depth control showed instability. +/- 1m 
oscillation due to incorrect configuration gain 
setting. 
S S S S Attitude and inclination variations may affect dead reckoning quality. 
Is an undersea tracking system utilized (reduced confidence)? In case 
of a close-to-bottom tracking mission segment increased risk of getting 
stuck or collision. 
   0.9 0.75 0.9 0.6  
389 3 Vehicle went into homing mode, just before 
dive and headed north. Vehicle mission 
stopped by acoustic command.  It was 
fortunate that the ship-side acoustics 
configuration allowed the ship to steam at 9kt 
(faster rather than 6kt with the towfish) and 
catch the AUV. 
S S S L Shelf ice – loss near certain if AUV gets  trapped under ice. 
   0.9 0.9 0.6 0.85  
  Separately, homing mode not exited after 2 
minutes, as expected. It will continue on last-
determined heading indefinitely – a Mission 
Control configuration error. 
S S L L The homing mode is surface or underwater? The surface behavior will 
most likely continue until battery reserves are depleted or an obstacle 
is encountered. Shore acts as safety net to some degree. Successful 
recovery greatly depends on rapid pursuit and radio communication 
range and robustness.  In Sea Ice environ increased potential for 
damage. 
   0.9 0.6 0.55 0.95  
  Problem with deck side of acoustic telemetry 
receiver front end, unrelated to vehicle 
systems. 
S S S L Provided positive buoyancy and mission abort function are present, 
   0.85 0.85 0.5 0.95  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
391 31 ADCP down range limited to 360m, reduced 
accuracy of navigation. 
S S S S  
   0.98 0.98 0.8 0.65  
  GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point of 
mission. 
S S S S Assuming all else went well and sub is on surface. 
    0.95 0.99 0.85 0.8  
  EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging during 
mission. 
S S S S Unless the sonar output is integrated into the navigational solution, or 
used for an adaptive  explicitly used for those purposes, sowill not 
affect navigation/recovery, unless sonar malfunction triggers an 
undetected software bug  (memory leak, unhandled timeout) leading to 
a crash. 
   1 1 0.98 0.98  
392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on M391, 
AUV ended up 700m N and 250m E of 
expected end position. 
S S S L Not a showstopper in all environments except shelf ice. 
   1 1 0.85 0.55  
393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges and no 
acoustic telemetry. 
S S S L Icy cover may cut out radio. 
   0.85 0.8 0.5 0.7  
394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came out, 
wrapping its line around the propeller, 
jamming it, and stopping the mission. Caused 
severe problems in recovery, some damage to 
upper rudder frame, sub-frame and GPS 
antenna. Required boat to be launched. 
S S L L Immobilized and damaged sub, much harder recovery. Insufficient 
information about exception handling: would a chain of software 
failures occur resulting in loss of command/telemetry also? 
   0.85 0.85 0.75 1  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped 
around the propulsion motor and jammed. 
S S L L Immobilized sub. 
   0.75 0.75 0.75 0.99  
396 4 Current estimation did not work, because 
minimum time between fixes for current to be 
estimated had been set to 15min; leg time was 
only 10min. Mission stopped and restarted 
with configurable time set to 5min. 
S S S S Shouldn't be a showstopper if the failure was noticed and corrected. 
   0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97  
397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, could have 
jammed motor. 
S S L L Likelihood of jamming motor the deciding factor (manouevres, 
currents and wave action) 
   0.85 0.85 0.55 0.6  
398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, they 
believed the AUV was missing waypoints. In 
fact, a couple of waypoints had been 
positioned incorrectly. 
S S S S Assuming operators aborted in a location allowing for easy retrieval 
   0.99 0.99 0.95 0.9  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
401 7.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up configured 
as down- looking ADCP causing navigation 
problems through tracking sea surface as 
reference. This data was very noisy and put 
vehicle navigation out by a factor of 1.5. 
S S S L  
   0.999 0.999 0.99 0.55  
  Damaged on recovery, “moderately serious” 
to sternplane, shaft bent. 
S S S S  
   0.99 0.99 0.95 0.95  
402 274 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 
2d 20h into mission. Stern plane actuator had 
flooded.   
S S S L  
   0.96 0.96 0.7 0.7  
  Abort due to network failure. Abort release 
could not communicate with depth control 
node for 403s. Possibly side-effect of actuator 
or motor problems. 
S S S L  
  ` 0.97 0.97 0.8 0.55  
  Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm to 
case. Propeller speed dropping off gradually 
during a dive 
S S S S  
   0.97 0.97 0.85 0.65  
  Only one position fix from tail mounted 
ARGOS transmitter. 
S S S S  
   0.99 0.99 0.89 0.85  
  GPS antenna damaged on recovery. S S S S  
   0.999 0.999 0.95 0.95  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
403 140 Recovery light line was wrapped around the 
propeller on surface. Flaps covering the main 
recovery lines (and where the light line was 
towed) were open.  
S S S S  
   0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98  
  Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final 
waypoint. 
S S S S  
   0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as 
m402. Subsequent testing of motor with 
Megger showed resistance of a few kohm 
between windings. 
S S S S  
   0.9 0.9 0.75 0.5  
404 75 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be loaded 
successfully due to distorted keeper. “If not 
spotted, could have dropped out during 
mission”, considered low probability of 
distortion and not checked.  
S S S L  
   0.97 0.97 0.65 0.7  
  Pre-launch, potential short circuit in motor 
controller that could stop motor. 
S S S S  
   0.95 0.95 0.9 0.85  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as on 
m402 and 403. 
S S S S  
 
   0.9 0.9 0.75 0.5  
  CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-outs 
noted in previous missions). 
S S S S  
   0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
404 75 M404 recovery was complicated when lifting 
lines and streaming line became trapped on 
the rudder (probably stuck on the Bolen where 
the two were attached).  Recovery from the 
situation required the trapped lifting lines 
grappled astern of the ship, attached to the 
gantry lines, and the caught end cut. 
S S S S  
   0.95 0.95 0.92 0.92  
  The forward sternplane was lost due to lifting 
line trapping between the fin and its flap on 
recovery. 
S S S S  
   0.93 0.93 0.9 0.9  
  The acoustic telemetry nose transducer was 
damaged due to collision with the ship. 
S S S S  
   0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
405 2.5 Fault found pre-launch, LXT tracking 
transducer had leaked water – replaced.  
S S S S  
   0.999 0.999 0.99 0.98  
  Fault found pre-launch, starboard lower 
rudder and sternplane loose.  
S S S S  
   0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96  
406 104 AUV ran slower than expected and speed 
dropped off during mission, due to motor 
problem. 
S S S S  
   0.98 0.98 0.92 0.85  
  Current spikes of 3A and voltage drops in first 
part of mission. 
S S S S  
   0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97  
  Propulsion motor failed 500V Megger on 
recovery on windings to case. 
S S S S  
   0.95 0.95 0.93 0.92  
  One battery pack out of four showed 
intermittent connection. 
S S S S  
   0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97  
  Acosutci telemetry unit gave no replies. S S S S  
   0.8 0.8 0.8 0.65  
  On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km out. S S S S  
   0.99 0.99 0.95 0.9  
  Spikes in indicated motor rpm S S S S  
   0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
407 204 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies at all – 
no tracking or telemetry. 
S S S S  
   0.8 0.8 0.8 0.65  
  Noise spikes on both channels of turbulence 
probe data. 
S S S S  
   0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999  
408 302.5 Propulsion motor felt rough when turned by 
hand – bearings replaced before deployment. 
S S S S  
   0.99 0.99 0.95 0.85  
  Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as no depth 
mode commanded. Unless compounded by 
another problem,  
S S S L  
  this would show itself immediately on first 
dive. 
0.95 0.95 0.75 0.65  
  No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry unit. S S S L  
   0.8 0.8 0.8 0.65  
  Difficulty stopping Autosub on surface via 
radio command. Separate problems with the 
two WiFi access points. 
S S S S  
   0.9 0.9 0.85 0.55  
  Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 
S S S S  
   0.98 0.98 0.98 0.9  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
409 1.5 No acoustic  telemetry or transponding. LXT 
ship side USBL receiver had leaked during 
mission giving poor bearings to sub, replaced 
with spare. 
     
        
410 9 No acoustic  telemetry or transponding.      
        
411 128 No GPS fix at the end of the mission. GPS 
antenna bulkhead had water inside and had 
flooded. 
     
        
412 270 No GPS fix at end of mission. After next 
mission, GPS fixes started coming in after 
vehicle power up/power down; perhaps 
problem was due to initialisation with receiver 
– and not this time the antenna. 
     
        
  Problem at start for holding pattern. Holding 
pattern timed out due to programming 
mistake. 
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
415 6 Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque 
on rudder actuator. Actuator replaced with 
new one - first use for this new design of 
actuator motor and gearbox. However, AUV 
spent most of mission “stuck” going around in 
circles at depth due to rudder actuator fault. 
The new actuator overheated, melting wires 
internally, the motor seized, and internal to the 
main pressure case, the power filter 
overheated. Some of the damage may have 
been caused by an excessive current limit 
(3A); correct setting was 0.3A. But this does 
not explain high motor current. Possible 
damage during testing when motor stalled on 
end stop? Compounded by wiring to motor 
held tightly to case with cable ties, and worse, 
covered with tape (acting as an insulator). 
Wires were not high temperature rated. 
     
        
415 6 Three harness connectors failed due to 
leakage, affecting payload systems: EM2000 
tube, ADCP_down, and Seabird CTD. Despite 
connector problems the system worked 
without glitches and failed only when the 
power pins had burned completely through on 
the connector feeding power to the abort 
system 
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
415 6 Although it worked properly at the start of the 
mission at a range of 1200m, the acoustic 
telemetry stopped working at the end of 
mission. Hence could not stop the mission 
acoustically when needed. 
     
        
416 18 Not possible to communicate with vehicle at 
1180m depth; holding pattern caused a 
timeout, and AUV surfaced. Acoustic 
telemetry max range was 500m for digital 
data. 
     
        
 
       
418 15 When homing was stopped deliberately after 
10 min, the AUV did not go into a “stay here” 
mode. Rather it continued on the same 
heading; stopped by acoustic command 500m 
from shore. Cause was incorrect configuration 
of mission exception for homing. Default in 
campaign configuration script was not set due 
to inexperience with new configuration tools. 
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
   Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
384 1.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due to network 
failure. (Much) later tests showed general 
problem with the harnesses (bad crimp joints).  
S S L L Surface abort normal for open water missions so survival expected. 
Under shelf ice would result in loss. Under sea ice vehicle may have 
a chance of recovery.  
   1 1 0.75 1  
  Loop of recovery line came out from storage 
slot, long enough to tangle propeller. 
S S L L As above 
   1 1 0.75 1  
385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled way, 
due to a side effect of the removal of the 
upwards-looking ADCP. 
S S L L Survival or loss depends on "what happens next" in mission plan, so 
loss or survival would not be 100% sure. 
   0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9  
386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of mission. S S S S Vehicle should be where it is expected at the end of the mission. 
Surface homing can be used to locate it. 
   0.999 0.999 0.999 0.9  
387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle headed off in 
an uncontrolled direction. Mission was 
stopped by acoustic command. Problem was 
due to (a) the uncalibrated receiver array, and 
(b) a network message (“homing lost”) being 
lost on the network.  
S S L S Homing assumes an "end of mission" in open water or under sea ice, 
but not under shelf ice. Under sea ice, homing failure may cause an 
abort under the ice and survival is doubtful. Under shelf ice, vehicle 
would be in open water at the end of the mission and survival is 
likely. 
   0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW 
Approaches. 
Note I have answered this and others as though there could be shelf ice here; not 
possible in this era at this location!! 
   Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
   Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
388 0.5 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, due to 
network failure. Logger data showed long 
gaps, up to 60s, across all data from all nodes, 
suggesting logger problem. 
S S S S  Survival expected since within 4 minutes of dive vehicle is likely to 
surface in open water and be recovered. In sea ice, if the vehicle 
dives from a lead it may be under ice. However mission length is 
only 500m so loss may occur if vehicle starts mission very close to 
the ice edge. 
   1 1 0.5 0.5  
  Depth control showed instability. +/- 1m 
oscillation due to incorrect configuration gain 
setting. 
S S S  S  The level of instability, +/- 1m is unlikely to affect survival or loss 
of vehicle since vehicle is unlikely to operate within this depth range 
of an obstacle. Faults should be set to abort mission if proximity to 
bottom or ice falls below a certain value. 
   1 1 1 1  
389 3 Vehicle went into homing mode, just before 
dive and headed north. Vehicle mission 
stopped by acoustic command.  It was 
fortunate that the ship-side acoustics 
configuration allowed the ship to steam at 9kt 
(faster rather than 6kt with the towfish) and 
catch the AUV. 
S S L L Survival expected in open water or coastal (recovery might be 
difficult in some coastal loactions). Loss is likely in under ice 
operation since it may be difficult in sea ice and impossible under 
shelf ice for the ship to follow. Some element of survival is likely 
depending on which direction the vehicle homes in to - if towards 
open water survival may be possible. 
   1 0.9 0.75 0.9  
  Separately, homing mode not exited after 2 
minutes, as expected. It will continue on last-
determined heading indefinitely – a Mission 
Control configuration error. 
L L L L Loss expected, but in open water or coastal the mission might be 
aborted by acoustic command if within range (mission length is 3km 
only so eroor may be noticed while vehicle is nearby). Same may 
result under sea ice, but vehicle is unlikely to be recovered under 
shelf ice. 
   0.75 0.5 0.85 0.999  
  Problem with deck side of acoustic telemetry 
receiver front end, unrelated to vehicle 
systems. 
S S S  S  Not sure I understand this one, but if problem is with ship side of the 
acoustic telemetry receiver then vehicle mission should proceed as 
planned and recovery be made even if it cannot be monitored 
acoustically during the mision - at least unless something else goes 
wrong. 
   0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW 
Approaches. 
Note I have answered this and others as though there could be shelf ice here; not 
possible in this era at this location!! 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
391 31 ADCP down range limited to 360m, reduced 
accuracy of navigation. 
S S S S ADCP range of 360m is maximum expected in any case? Result 
depends on depth of water of mission. In open water AUV should 
end mission, get a GPS fix and report position by radio telemetry, so 
survival likely. In a coastal area reduced accuracy of navigation may 
mean the vehicle aborts its mission prematurely and it may be in a 
difficult to recover position. Under ice or under shelf ice there is 
reduced likelihood that vehicle will suvive over this length of 
mission. 
   0.9 0.75 0.6 0.5  
  GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point of 
mission. 
S S S S Survival likely, but it may be difficult to find the vehicle. After a 31 
km mission the vehicle may be some distance from where it is 
expected.  Survival depends on effectiveness of radio direction 
finding survival beacon system. 
    0.99 0.99 0.9 0.9  
  EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging during 
mission. 
S S S S Should not affect survival of vehicle. The mission will produce no 
data, but it should complete its mission and be recovered. 
   1 1 1 1  
392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on M391, 
AUV ended up 700m N and 250m E of 
expected end position. 
S S S S After a mission of this length mission should be designed to end in a 
region of open water that is at least of this extent, although the 
navigable waters may be limited in coastal regions and leads may 
move in sea ice area - hence the choice of probabilities. Vehicle 
should be located by RDF beacon system. 
   0.99 0.9 0.75 0.9  
393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges and no 
acoustic telemetry. 
S S S S This affects monitoring of vehicle position during the mission and 
the ability to acoustically abort or change the mission, but if mission 
executes according to plan, survival is likely. 
   0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW 
Approaches. 
Note I have answered this and others as though there could be shelf ice here; not 
possible in this era at this location!! 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came out, 
wrapping its line around the propeller, 
jamming it, and stopping the mission. Caused 
severe problems in recovery, some damage to 
upper rudder frame, sub-frame and GPS 
antenna. Required boat to be launched. 
S S L L Loss is likely under shelf ice and may occur under sea ice as vehicle 
may abort its mission in an area where it cannot be recovered. The 
vehicle is likely to be recovered in open water or coastal although 
there is an element of risk depending on where the vehicle is (say 
relative to the coast). The mission length of 3km means that it should 
be nearby to the recovery vessel. 
   0.95 0.95 0.9 1  
395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped 
around the propulsion motor and jammed. 
S S L L Similar to above but mission length longer affecting probabilities. 
   0.9 0.9 0.99 1  
396 4 Current estimation did not work, because 
minimum time between fixes for current to be 
estimated had been set to 15min; leg time was 
only 10min. Mission stopped and restarted 
with configurable time set to 5min. 
S S L L In open water vehicle can surface and be reprogrammed. In coastal 
areas significant unexpected drift may result in the vehicle being in a 
position that makes recovery difficult. In sea ice it may not be 
possible to stop the mission in a location wher there is an open water 
lead; same under shelf ice, but more severe. 
   1 0.9 0.5 0.8  
397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, could have 
jammed motor. 
S S L L Survival likely in open water although vehicle may be disabled; in 
coastal areas again this may occur in a location where recovery is 
difficult. Under sea ice the vehicle could end up under a pressure 
ridge where recovery is unlikely; under shelf ice the vehicle is most 
likely to be lost unless by a chance the rope does not snag the prop. 
   1 0.95 0.99 0.999  
398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, they 
believed the AUV was missing waypoints. In 
fact, a couple of waypoints had been 
positioned incorrectly. 
S S L L Difficult! Operators are unlikely to abort the mission unless recovery 
is likely. However, if vehicle is under ice in a location where it was 
not expected to be then the mission may be aborted in a location 
where recovery is impossible - more likely operators would "give the 
mission the benefit of the doubt" and there is a chance that the later 
waypoints are correct and that the vehicle is able to make its way to 
the correct final location without coming to grief on the way. 
   1 0.99 0.5 0.5  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
401 7.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up configured as 
down- looking ADCP causing navigation 
problems through tracking sea surface as 
reference. This data was very noisy and put 
vehicle navigation out by a factor of 1.5. 
S S S  S  Survival in open water or coastal depends on whether the RDF 
beacon system can work over the range at the end of the mission 
(7.5km x 1.5 error). Under ice the upward looking ADCP might 
track drift relatively accurately, but perhaps less so for the sea ice. 
   0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9  
  Damaged on recovery, “moderately serious” to 
sternplane, shaft bent. 
S S S S Vehicle survives but has to be repaired. Could be a serious repair. 
   1 1 1 1  
402 274 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 2d 
20h into mission. Stern plane actuator had 
flooded.   
L L L L This is a very long mission and fault occurs well into the mission. 
On such a long mission, an Iridium type interogation system may be 
required to ensure that the vehicle can be found and can report its 
lat/long to the operators after an abort. Survival then would be likely 
in open water or even coastal. If reliance is on RDF beacons location 
may be difficult. Loss would be expected under shelf ice, but no one 
has dared a mission of this length under shelf ice yet; this would be 
an extremely risky mission also under sea ice. 
   0.8 0.9 0.95 1  
  Abort due to network failure. Abort release 
could not communicate with depth control 
node for 403s. Possibly side-effect of actuator 
or motor problems. 
L L L L As above. Again survival possible if satellite communications are 
fitted. In coastal areas a complicated coastal mission is likely to lead 
to increased chance of loss.  
   0.8 0.9 0.95 1  
  Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm to 
case. Propeller speed dropping off gradually 
during a dive 
L L L L As above. Perhaps slightly lower probability of loss, but it depends 
what abort/fault sequence might be programmed following this 
event. 
   0.75 0.85 0.9 0.99  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
402 274 Only one position fix from tail mounted 
ARGOS transmitter. 
S S S S This depends on context and I am unsure of result. I have been 
assuming the vehicle has no satellite positioning system, but of 
course this shows it has Argos so the vehicle can be found from a 
distance. If the mission completes as planned and the vehicle is 
where it is expected to be then it will found say using RDF beacons. 
But for a mission of this length satellite positioning is likely to be 
necessary due to the error in positioning at the end of the mission. 
Effectively since the ARGOS is not working, then the vehicle is 
operating as if it doesn't have satellite positioning. 
   0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  
  GPS antenna damaged on recovery. S S S S Survival likely since damage occurs on recovery.  Antenna can be 
replaced prior to next mission. 
   1 1 1 1  
403 140 Recovery light line was wrapped around the 
propeller on surface. Flaps covering the main 
recovery lines (and where the light line was 
towed) were open.  
S S L L Under shelf ice this would lead to loss. In open water it is most 
likely the vehicle would be recovered since it could be located using 
ARGOS. In a coastal area if a mission of this length could be done 
then again survival is likely. Under sea ice it depends if the vehicle 
surfaces under ice or in a lead. 
   0.95 0.8 0.95 1  
  Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final 
waypoint. 
S S S S The vehicle should be positioned using the ARGOS even if it is 
unable to report its GPS coordinates. 
   0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as 
m402. Subsequent testing of motor with 
Megger showed resistance of a few kohm 
between windings. 
S S S S Results would be the same as in 402 if the fault had not been 
noticed. Here the vehicle is being tested so it is onboard and "safe". 
   1 1 1 1  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
404 75 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be loaded 
successfully due to distorted keeper. “If not 
spotted, could have dropped out during 
mission”, considered low probability of 
distortion and not checked.  
S S L L Survival likely in open water and coastal. Under ice there is a high 
chance of loss with premature surfacing of vehicle.  
   0.99 0.95 0.95 1  
  Pre-launch, potential short circuit in motor 
controller that could stop motor. 
L L L L Results would be the same as in 402. I have left the same 
probabilities, but they might be less as mission length is shorter. 
   0.75 0.85 0.9 0.99  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as on 
m402 and 403. 
L L L L Results would be the same as in 402. 
   0.75 0.85 0.9 0.99  
  CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-outs 
noted in previous missions). 
S S S S Does not affect vehicle survival/loss. Data will be lost. 
   1 1 1 1  
  M404 recovery was complicated when lifting 
lines and streaming line became trapped on the 
rudder (probably stuck on the Bolen where the 
two were attached).  Recovery from the 
situation required the trapped lifting lines 
grappled astern of the ship, attached to the 
gantry lines, and the caught end cut. 
S S S S Survival likely and the same in all cases since vehicle is located and 
close to ship. But loss is possible should the situation cause damage 
to occur to the vehicle from collision with the ship and/or its 
propellers. 
   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9  
  The forward sternplane was lost due to lifting 
line trapping between the fin and its flap on 
recovery. 
S S S S As above. 
   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9  
  The acoustic telemetry nose transducer was 
damaged due to collision with the ship. 
S S S S Assumed occurred on recovery. Does not significantly affect 
survival but has to be replaced prior to redeployment. 
   1 1 1 1  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
   Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
   Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
405 2.5 Fault found pre-launch, LXT tracking 
transducer had leaked water – replaced.  
S S S  S  As fault found pre launch, survival would result. Survival also likely if deployed 
since the transducer is a tracking device and if no response is found after launch, 
mission could have been aborted. In this case with a mission of only 2.5km, mission 
could be completed without incident even if the transducer was not operable. 
   1 1 1 1  
  Fault found pre-launch, starboard lower 
rudder and sternplane loose.  
S S S  S Again fault found prelaunch and fixed. If this occurred after launch, erratic course 
and depth keeping could result. Under ice this might result in loss so in that case the 
response would be modified. 
   1 1 1 1  
406 104 AUV ran slower than expected and 
speed dropped off during mission, due 
to motor problem. 
S S L L Survival expected in open water and coastal, but loss is likely under ice since on a 
mission of this length, the vehicle may not be able to complete its mission and may 
have to abort prematurely; under ice that could/would result in loss. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.95  
  Current spikes of 3A and voltage drops 
in first part of mission. 
S S L L Survival expected in open water and coastal, but loss expecetd under shelf ice and 
possible loss under sea ice. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.99  
  Propulsion motor failed 500V Megger 
on recovery on windings to case. 
S S L L If occurring during the mission this would likely lead to loss under shelf ice and 
possible loss under sea ice. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.99  
  One battery pack out of four showed 
intermittent connection. 
S S S S Vehicle can still operate but if insufficient energy for mission, this may cause loss 
under ice. 
   0.999 0.999 0.5 0.5  
  Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies. S S S S Depends on need to communicate during mission. If mission exceutes correctly, the 
vehicle should complete its mission correctly.  If something goes wrong, or a 
modification is needed, survival may be affected. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.7  
  On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km 
out. 
S S S S Even if GPS is out, vehicle should be located using RDF beacons and ARGOS. 
Problems may occur in sea ice due to size of the lead in which vehicle surfaces. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.99  
  Spikes in indicated motor rpm S S L L Vehicle may be lost under ice on a mission of this length depending on the reasons 
for this and its effect on continued operation. 
   0.999 0.999 0.8 0.9  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
407 204 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies at all – 
no tracking or telemetry. 
S S S S Depends on need to communicate during mission. If mission 
exceutes correctly, the vehicle should complete its mission correctly.  
If something goes wrong, or a modification is needed, survival may 
be affected. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.7  
  Noise spikes on both channels of turbulence 
probe data. 
S S S S Mission collects poor data, but survival of vehicle expected. 
   1 1 1 1  
408 302.5 Propulsion motor felt rough when turned by 
hand – bearings replaced before deployment. 
S S S S Found as expected during prelaunch inspection. This is a long 
mission and if not found problems and even loss might result, but 
attention to pre launch checks should catch this. 
   1 1 1 1  
  Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as no depth 
mode commanded. Unless compounded by 
another problem,  
S S S S As explained this would be expected to show on first dive before 
mission got fully underway and so survival is likley. Lower 
probabilities given under ice as vehicle may already be under sea ice 
if lead is small when fault is found. Under shelf ice, compounded 
with another problem loss may occur. 
  this would show itself immediately on first 
dive. 
0.99 0.99 0.8 0.6  
  No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry unit. S S S S Depends on need to communicate during mission. If mission 
exceutes correctly, the vehicle should complete its mission correctly.  
If something goes wrong, or a modification is needed, survival may 
be affected. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.7  
  Difficulty stopping Autosub on surface via 
radio command. Separate problems with the 
two WiFi access points. 
S S L S On surface implies not under ice. Suvival in one piece may be 
affected since it may be necessary to chase the vehicle with RIB and 
abort mission say by imparting extreme motion (e.g. roll) - doing 
this may result in damage. 
   0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6  
  Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 
S S L L Vehicle may be lost under ice on a mission of this length depending 
on the reasons for this and its effect on continued operation. 
   0.999 0.999 0.8 0.9  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
409 1.5 No acoustic  telemetry or transponding. LXT 
ship side USBL receiver had leaked during 
mission giving poor bearings to sub, replaced 
with spare. 
S S S S Depends on need to communicate during mission. If mission 
exceutes correctly, the vehicle should complete its mission correctly.  
If something goes wrong, or a modification is needed, survival may 
be affected. But mission is v short. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.9  
410 9 No acoustic  telemetry or transponding. S S S S Depends on need to communicate during mission. If mission 
exceutes correctly, the vehicle should complete its mission correctly.  
If something goes wrong, or a modification is needed, survival may 
be affected. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.7  
411 128 No GPS fix at the end of the mission. GPS 
antenna bulkhead had water inside and had 
flooded. 
S S S S Even if GPS is not working, vehicle should be located using 
ARGOS. Problems may occur in sea ice due to size of the lead in 
which vehicle surfaces. The mission is long so the vehicle may be 
some distance from where expected. 
   0.9 0.9 0.6 0.75  
412 270 No GPS fix at end of mission. After next 
mission, GPS fixes started coming in after 
vehicle power up/power down; perhaps 
problem was due to initialisation with receiver 
– and not this time the antenna. 
S S S S Even if GPS is not working, vehicle should be located using 
ARGOS. Problems may occur in sea ice due to size of the lead in 
which vehicle surfaces. The mission is long so the vehicle may be 
some distance from where expected. 
   0.9 0.9 0.6 0.75  
  Problem at start for holding pattern. Holding 
pattern timed out due to programming mistake. 
S S S S Occurs at start of mission and so survival likely. 
   0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
415 6 Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque on 
rudder actuator. Actuator replaced with new 
one - first use for this new design of actuator 
motor and gearbox. However, AUV spent most 
of mission “stuck” going around in circles at 
depth due to rudder actuator fault. The new 
actuator overheated, melting wires internally, 
the motor seized, and internal to the main 
pressure case, the power filter overheated. 
Some of the damage may have been caused by 
an excessive current limit (3A); correct setting 
was 0.3A. But this does not explain high motor 
current. Possible damage during testing when 
motor stalled on end stop? Compounded by 
wiring to motor held tightly to case with cable 
ties, and worse, covered with tape (acting as an 
insulator). Wires were not high temperature 
rated. 
S S L L Survival expected in open water and coatsal, but loss likely if this 
occurs into an under ice mission. 
   0.99 0.99 0.95 0.99  
415 6 Three harness connectors failed due to leakage, 
affecting payload systems: EM2000 tube, 
ADCP_down, and Seabird CTD. Despite 
connector problems the system worked without 
glitches and failed only when the power pins 
had burned completely through on the 
connector feeding power to the abort system 
S S S S ADCP down may affect navigation and could affect survival on an 
under ice mission. In open water of coastal reduced nav accuracy 
should still not affect survival.  
   0.99 0.99 0.9 0.8  
  Although it worked properly at the start of the 
mission at a range of 1200m, the acoustic 
telemetry stopped working at the end of 
mission. Hence could not stop the mission 
acoustically when needed. 
S S S S Depends on need to communicate during mission. If mission 
exceutes correctly, the vehicle should complete its mission correctly.  
If something goes wrong, or a modification is needed, survival may 
be affected. 
   0.999 0.999 0.9 0.7  
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Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
416 18 Not possible to communicate with vehicle at 
1180m depth; holding pattern caused a timeout, 
and AUV surfaced. Acoustic telemetry max 
range was 500m for digital data. 
S S L L Loss expected if occurs under shelf ice; loss likely under sea ice. 
Survival likely in non-iced water, although mission would abort. 
   0.99 0.99 0.95 1  
 
       
418 15 When homing was stopped deliberately after 
10 min, the AUV did not go into a “stay here” 
mode. Rather it continued on the same 
heading; stopped by acoustic command 500m 
from shore. Cause was incorrect configuration 
of mission exception for homing. Default in 
campaign configuration script was not set due 
to inexperience with new configuration tools. 
S S L S Survival expeceted at the end of the mission when vehicle would be 
in relatively open water.  But in sea ice vehicle may collide with ice, 
or run under the ice.  Near to shore the vehicle may collide with the 
shore; total loss not expected, but damage could occur. 
   0.99 0.8 0.8 0.99  
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Table 1  Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
   Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
384 1.5 Mission aborted (to surface) due to network 
failure. (Much) later tests showed general 
problem with the harnesses (bad crimp joints).  
S S  S  L  Unplanned surfacing introduces potential for entrapment under shelf 
ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the shoreline. 
   0.9 0.85 0.6 0.7  
  Loop of recovery line came out from storage 
slot, long enough to tangle propeller. 
S S  S  L  Lack of viable propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline.  
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.9  
385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled way, due 
to a side effect of the removal of the upwards-
looking ADCP. 
S S S  S  Lack of directional control introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the 
shoreline. 
   0.99 0.85 0.7 0.6  
386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of mission. S S  S  S  Loss of GPS within visual range of the support vehicle would 
introduce very little threat of loss. 
   1 0.9 0.8 0.8  
387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle headed off in an 
uncontrolled direction. Mission was stopped by 
acoustic command. Problem was due to (a) the 
uncalibrated receiver array, and (b) a network 
message (“homing lost”) being lost on the 
network.  
S S S S  Lack of directional control introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the 
shoreline. 
   0.99 0.85 0.7 0.6  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
   Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
388 0.5 Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, due to 
network failure. Logger data showed long gaps, 
up to 60s, across all data from all nodes, 
suggesting logger problem. 
S S  S L  Unplanned surfacing introduces potential for entrapment under shelf 
ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the shoreline. 
   0.9 0.85 0.6 0.7  
  Depth control showed instability. +/- 1m 
oscillation due to incorrect configuration gain 
setting. 
S S  S  S There is no risk of loss unless hazards lie within  the amplitude of 
depth oscillation. 
   1 0.95 0.95 0.9  
389 3 Vehicle went into homing mode, just before dive 
and headed north. Vehicle mission stopped by 
acoustic command.  It was fortunate that the 
ship-side acoustics configuration allowed the 
ship to steam at 9kt (faster rather than 6kt with 
the towfish) and catch the AUV. 
S S  S  S Lack of directional control introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the 
shoreline. 
   0.99 0.85 0.7 0.6  
  Separately, homing mode not exited after 2 
minutes, as expected. It will continue on last-
determined heading indefinitely – a Mission 
Control configuration error. 
S S  S  S Lack of directional control introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the 
shoreline. 
   0.99 0.85 0.7 0.6  
  Problem with deck side of acoustic telemetry 
receiver front end, unrelated to vehicle systems. 
S S  S  S The only risk introduced is the inability to communicate with the 
vehicle given a second fault. Probability of a double fault that can 
only be rectified by acoustic communication is low 
   1 0.99 0.99 0.9  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
   Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
391 31 ADCP down range limited to 360m, reduced 
accuracy of navigation. 
S S  S  S Reduced navigational accuracy introduced the potential for 
unanticipated collision with ice, vessel traffic, or the shoreline. 
   0.95 0.9 0.8 0.7  
  GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point of 
mission. 
S S  S  S Loss of GPS within visual range of the support vehicle would 
introduce very little threat of loss. 
    1 0.9 0.8 0.8  
  EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging during 
mission. 
S S  S  S Loss of payload should not impact vessel safety unless swath is 
employed in obstacle avoidance or adaptive mission planning. 
   1 1 1 1  
392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on M391, AUV 
ended up 700m N and 250m E of expected end 
position. 
S S  S  S Lack of navigational control introduces potential for entrapment 
under shelf ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the 
shoreline. 
   0.99 0.85 0.7 0.6  
393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges and no 
acoustic telemetry. 
S S  S  S The only risk introduced is the inability to communicate with the 
vehicle given a second fault. Probability of a double fault that can 
only be rectified by acoustic communication is low 
   1 0.99 0.99 0.9  
394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came out, 
wrapping its line around the propeller, jamming 
it, and stopping the mission. Caused severe 
problems in recovery, some damage to upper 
rudder frame, sub-frame and GPS antenna. 
Required boat to be launched. 
S S  S  L Lack of viable propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline.  
Potential loss of GPS and associated location information increases 
lost risk as it may not be possible to locate AUV. Finally, launch of 
rescue boat introduces risk for collision 
   0.9 0.8 0.7 0.9  
395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped around 
the propulsion motor and jammed. 
S S S L Lack of viable propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline. 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.9  
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Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
   Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
   Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
396 4 Current estimation did not work, because 
minimum time between fixes for current to be 
estimated had been set to 15min; leg time was 
only 10min. Mission stopped and restarted with 
configurable time set to 5min. 
S S S S Risk arises from lack of current information in navigation algorithm. 
If unable to correct for currents, navigation is compromised and 
vehicle risk collision with ice, vessel traffic, or the shoreline. 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.5  
397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, could have 
jammed motor. 
S S S L Lack of viable propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline. 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.9  
398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, they 
believed the AUV was missing waypoints. In 
fact, a couple of waypoints had been positioned 
incorrectly. 
S S S S Unplanned surfacing introduces potential for entrapment under shelf 
ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the shoreline. 
However, operators in control of mission could have foreseen and 
mitigated any hazards. 
   1 0.9 0.8 0.7  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
401 7.5 Configuration mistake; ADCP up configured as 
down- looking ADCP causing navigation 
problems through tracking sea surface as 
reference. This data was very noisy and put 
vehicle navigation out by a factor of 1.5. 
S S S S Lack of navigational control introduces potential for entrapment 
under shelf ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the 
shoreline. 
   0.99 0.85 0.7 0.6  
  Damaged on recovery, “moderately serious” to 
sternplane, shaft bent. 
S S S S If damage occurred after AUV was positively attached to the ship 
there is no risk of loss unless line breaks. If occurs before 
connection, rish high because of compromised propulsion and 
possibly compromised watertight housing 
   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9  
402 274 Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 2d 20h into mission. Stern plane actuator had 
flooded.   
Not enough information to determine risk. 
        
  Abort due to network failure. Abort release 
could not communicate with depth control node 
for 403s. Possibly side-effect of actuator or 
motor problems. 
S S S S Unplanned surfacing introduces potential for entrapment under shelf 
ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the shoreline. 
Inability to communicate with depth control introduces potential risk 
for sea floor collision 
   1 0.7 0.8 0.7  
  Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm to 
case. Propeller speed dropping off gradually 
during a dive 
S S S S Compromised propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline. 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.7  
  Only one position fix from tail mounted ARGOS transmitter.  Not enough information to determine risk 
        
  GPS antenna damaged on recovery. S S S S If damage occurred after AUV was positively attached to the ship 
there is no risk of loss unless line breaks. If occurs before connection 
risk is low since AUV is in visual range 
   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
403 140 Recovery light line was wrapped around the 
propeller on surface. Flaps covering the main 
recovery lines (and where the light line was 
towed) were open.  
S S S L Lack of viable propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline. 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.9  
  Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final 
waypoint. 
S S S S Lack of navigational control introduces potential for entrapment 
under shelf ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the 
shoreline. 
   0.99 0.85 0.7 0.6  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as m402. 
Subsequent testing of motor with Megger 
showed resistance of a few kohm between 
windings. 
S S S S Compromised propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline. 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.7  
404 75 Pre-launch, abort weight could not be loaded 
successfully due to distorted keeper. “If not 
spotted, could have dropped out during 
mission”, considered low probability of 
distortion and not checked.  
S S S S Unplanned surfacing introduces potential for entrapment under shelf 
ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the shoreline. 
Inability to communicate with depth control introduces potential risk 
for sea floor collision 
   1 0.7 0.8 0.7  
  Pre-launch, potential short circuit in motor 
controller that could stop motor. 
S S S L Lack of viable propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline. 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.9  
  Propeller speed showed same problem as on 
m402 and 403. 
S S S S Compromised propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline. 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.7  
  CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-outs noted 
in previous missions). 
S S S S Loss of payload instrument should not impact vessel safety unless 
CTD is employed in adaptive mission planning. 
   1 1 1 1  
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Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
404 75 M404 recovery was complicated when lifting 
lines and streaming line became trapped on the 
rudder (probably stuck on the Bolen where the 
two were attached).  Recovery from the situation 
required the trapped lifting lines grappled astern 
of the ship, attached to the gantry lines, and the 
caught end cut. 
S S S S No risk of loss unless line failure is compounded by a secondary 
failure 
   1 1 1 1  
  The forward sternplane was lost due to lifting line trapping between the fin and its flap on 
recovery. 
Not enough information to determine risk 
        
  The acoustic telemetry nose transducer was 
damaged due to collision with the ship. 
S S S S As long as pressure vessel is sound and AUV is within visual range 
of ship, there is no risk 
   1 1 1 1  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment?  
Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
405 2.5 Fault found pre-launch, LXT tracking transducer had leaked water – replaced.  Not enough information to determine risk 
        
  Fault found pre-launch, starboard lower rudder 
and sternplane loose.  
S S S S If fault was found prior to launch there is no risk of loss 
   1 1 1 1  
406 104 AUV ran slower than expected and speed 
dropped off during mission, due to motor 
problem. 
S S S S As long as velocity is sufficient to remain submerged and motor 
does not stop, the risk of loss is very low 
   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9  
  Current spikes of 3A and voltage drops in first part of mission.  Not enough information to determine risk 
        
  Propulsion motor failed 500V Megger on 
recovery on windings to case. 
S S S L Lack of viable propulsion introduces potential for entrapment under 
shelf ice (which can not be corrected remotely) as well as inability to 
avoid hazards such as sea ice, vessel traffic, and the shoreline. 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.9  
  One battery pack out of four showed intermittent 
connection. 
S S S L Unexpected loss of power could result in unexpected surfacing 
which introduces risk of entrapment under ice or collision with ice, 
vessel traffic, or the shoreline 
   0.99 0.9 0.8 0.6  
  Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies.   Not enough information to determine risk 
        
  On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km out. S S S S Reduced navigational accuracy introduced the potential for 
unanticipated collision with ice, vessel traffic, or the shoreline. 
   1 0.9 0.8 0.8  
  Spikes in indicated motor rpm S S S S As long as motor does not fail, spike in velocity should not 
compromise DVL or inertial navigation, resulting in low risk of loss 
   0.99 0.9 0.9 0.9  
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Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
 Is Survival (S) or Loss (L) the most likely outcome after each fault or incident in each environment? 
 Mark how confident you are in each grey box (on a scale 0.5 to 1). 
No. Distance 
(km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea Ice Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
407 204 Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies at all – 
no tracking or telemetry. 
S S S S Inability to track vehicle is not a risk of loss in itself but could be if 
combined with a secondary failure 
   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8  
  Noise spikes on both channels of turbulence 
probe data. 
S S S S No risk unless turbulence sensor is incorporated into navigation 
solution or adaptive mission planning 
   1 1 1 1  
408 302.5 Propulsion motor felt rough when turned by 
hand – bearings replaced before deployment. 
S S S S Problem addressed before deployment so there is no risk of loss 
   1 1 1 1  
  Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as no depth 
mode commanded. Unless compounded by 
another problem,  
S S S S Unplanned surfacing introduces potential for entrapment under shelf 
ice as well as collision with sea ice, vessel traffic, or the shoreline. 
Inability to communicate with depth control introduces potential risk 
for sea floor collision 
  this would show itself immediately on first dive. 1 0.7 0.8 0.7  
  No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry unit.   Not enough information to determine risk 
        
  Difficulty stopping Autosub on surface via radio 
command. Separate problems with the two WiFi 
access points. 
S S S S Inability to manually control AUV on surface may prevent obstacle 
avoidance. If on surface loss under shelf ice is not an issue 
   1 0.9 0.9 1  
  Still spikes on motor rpm that need 
investigating. 
S S S S As long as motor does not fail, spike in velocity should not 
compromise DVL or inertial navigation, resulting in low risk of loss 
   0.99 0.9 0.9 0.9  
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ANNEX E  - AGGREGATED JUDGMENTS 
Failur
e 
Open water Coastal Sea ice Ice shelf 
 
Mean Linear Log Mean Linear Log Mean Linear Log Mean Linear Log 
             
384_1_2 0.0178
8 
0.02069 0.0060
4 
0.03325 0.03797 0.0077
7 
0.17125 0.15731 0.0619
4 
0.7000
0 
0.70385 0.57645 
384_2_2 0.0185
0 
0.02163 0.0063
1 
0.03575 0.04016 0.0086
7 
0.16500 0.15154 0.0571
8 
0.6425
0 
0.59542 0.32407 
385_1_1 0.1446
3 
0.11093 0.0 41
2 
0.14887 0.12417 0.0216
1 
0.29500 0.26042 0.1083
5 
0.7375
0 
0.75200 0.72748 
386_1_1 0.0192
5 
0.01953 0.0052
0 
0.03450 0.03381 0.0064
8 
0.05788 0.05893 0.0121
7 
0.0661
4 
0.06318 0.00990 
387_1_1 0.0178
8 
0.02097 0.0 64
9 
0.04525 0.05193 0.0156
4 
0.13000 0.14696 0.0645
8 
0.4887
5 
0.47810 0.24245 
388_1_2 0.0147
6 
0.01732 0.0000
0 
0.03014 0.03438 0.0000
0 
0.09039 0.10605 0.0100
9 
0.2631
4 
0.32660 0.06477 
388_2_2 0.0140
1 
0.01772 0.0 00
0 
0.04151 0.05159 0.0 00
0 
0.09525 0.11304 0.0000
0 
0.2615
7 
0.30976 0.00000 
389_1_3 0.0461
3 
0.05516 0.0 00
0 
0.08150 0.09716 0.0168
1 
0.23250 0.21923 0.0937
4 
0.4800
0 
0.43810 0.14540 
389_2_3 0.0480
0 
0.04252 0.0 86
2 
0.12013 0.11761 0.0370
7 
0.34500 0.38042 0.2064
7 
0.6 12
5 
0.62409 0.36470 
389_3_3 0.0268
9 
0.02517 0.0000
0 
0.03064 0.02855 0.0000
0 
0.07888 0.08622 0.0304
0 
0.3151
2 
0.30776 0.05891 
391_1_3 0.0303
8 
0.02624 0.0 00
0 
0.03300 0.03308 0.0171
3 
0.10586 0.09495 0.0329
9 
0.3144
3 
0.27967 0.06277 
391_2_3 0.0267
5 
0.03114 0.0 78
1 
0.04175 0.04300 0.0084
4 
0.07329 0.07905 0.0138
4 
0.1205
0 
0.14822 0.01585 
391_3_3 0.0017
1 
0.00148 0.0000
0 
0.00171 0.00148 0.0000
0 
0.02171 0.01828 0.0000
0 
0.0145
7 
0.01228 0.00000 
392_1_1 0.0 72
5 
0.01460 0.0 43
3 
0.06313 0.05937 0.0 98
7 
0.15688 0.13280 0.0758
6 
0.2183
3 
0.16706 0.09681 
393_1_1 0.0306
3 
0.02614 0.0047
8 
0.04025 0.03474 0.0096
9 
0.11063 0.10659 0.0525
8 
0.3506
3 
0.32452 0.13143 
394_1_1 0.0273
8 
0.02747 0.0108
3 
0.04900 0.05026 0.0176
0 
0.24125 0.23643 0.1194
5 
0.5737
5 
0.60533 0.26443 
395_1_1 0.0266
3 
0.02745 0.0083
6 
0.04850 0.04968 0.0156
3 
0.31875 0.34615 0.2 94
0 
0.8157
1 
0.87682 0.81767 
396_1_1 0.0150
0 
0.01223 0.0000
0 
0.01763 0.01443 0.0000
0 
0.06413 0.05511 0.0 99
2 
0.1828
8 
0.15530 0.01322 
397_1_1 0.0180
0 
0.01828 0.0 49
4 
0.03988 0.03981 0.0 90
6 
0.17300 0.17058 0.0461
6 
0.4458
6 
0.40148 0.07735 
398_1_1 0.0 90
1 
0.00845 0.0000
0 
0.01459 0.01312 0.0033
5 
0.05746 0.03503 0.0054
3 
0.1789
3 
0.12738 0.00897 
401_1_2 0.0205
0 
0.02177 0.0 00
0 
0.02713 0.02807 0.0112
4 
0.13626 0.12402 0.0291
3 
0.2857
3 
0.23335 0.04546 
401_2_2 0.0 91
3 
0.00859 0.0 00
0 
0.01538 0.01188 0.0000
0 
0.02788 0.02163 0.0000
0 
0.0045
7 
0.00441 0.00000 
402_1_5 0.0 28
8 
0.03261 0.0105
2 
0.03938 0.03723 0.0119
5 
0.35637 0.36681 0.1459
0 
0.7001
2 
0.72255 0.31559 
402_2_5 0.0444
3 
0.04654 0.0 79
2 
0.05186 0.05219 0.0333
4 
0.37143 0.40455 0.3102
3 
0.6571
4 
0.75417 0.66694 
402_3_5 0.0217
1 
0.02642 0.0093
2 
0.02629 0.03052 0.0115
1 
0.22286 0.23818 0.1285
3 
0.5500
0 
0.62381 0.49391 
402_4_5 0.0240
0 
0.02523 0.0098
4 
0.02675 0.02803 0.0 23
5 
0.07138 0.07362 0.0297
2 
0.2 28
6 
0.23522 0.07478 
402_5_5 0.0 28
7 
0.00263 0.0000
0 
0.00537 0.00418 0.0000
0 
0.00757 0.00559 0.0000
0 
0.0075
7 
0.00559 0.00000 
403_1_3 0.0141
2 
0.01294 0.0 00
0 
0.01850 0.01581 0.0 00
0 
0.10729 0.09670 0.0187
2 
0.2430
0 
0.16018 0.02111 
403_2_3 0.0088
6 
0.00882 0.0 00
0 
0.02329 0.01856 0.0 00
0 
0.01183 0.01105 0.0000
0 
0.0118
3 
0.01105 0.00000 
403_3_3 0.0217
1 
0.02348 0.0 84
8 
0.02629 0.02763 0.0105
2 
0.21571 0.21857 0.1156
3 
0.5 57
1 
0.59500 0.45103 
404_1_7 0.0 42
5 
0.01621 0.0000
0 
0.01913 0.02111 0.0000
0 
0.10150 0.12613 0.0000
0 
0.3 90
0 
0.37204 0.00000 
404_2_7 0.0142
5 
0.01621 0.0 00
0 
0.01800 0.02052 0.0 00
0 
0.08913 0.10924 0.0 00
0 
0.2766
2 
0.32124 0.00000 
404_3_7 0.0217
1 
0.02442 0.0 92
6 
0.02629 0.02878 0.0116
5 
0.21571 0.24053 0.1496
1 
0.4750
0 
0.54000 0.39604 
404_4_7 0.0017
1 
0.00160 0.0000
0 
0.00171 0.00160 0.0000
0 
0.00443 0.00327 0.0000
0 
0.0 44
3 
0.00327 0.00000 
404_5_7 0.0 78
3 
0.01471 0.0 58
4 
0.01783 0.01471 0.0 58
4 
0.02600 0.02000 0.0 88
2 
0.0260
0 
0.02000 0.00882 
404_6_7 0.0097
1 
0.00817 0.0000
0 
0.00971 0.00817 0.0000
0 
0.01671 0.01200 0.0000
0 
0.0167
1 
0.01200 0.00000 
404_7_7 0.0048
7 
0.00542 0.0 00
0 
0.00529 0.00577 0.0 00
0 
0.01229 0.00885 0.0 00
0 
0.0822
9 
0.02840 0.00000 
405_1_2 0.0035
0 
0.00368 0.0 00
0 
0.00625 0.00536 0.0 00
0 
0.02713 0.01481 0.0 00
0 
0.1146
3 
0.08044 0.00000 
405_2_2 0.0 93
8 
0.00918 0.0 00
0 
0.01600 0.01258 0.0 00
0 
0.04025 0.02497 0.0 00
0 
0.1277
5 
0.09059 0.00000 
406_1_7 0.0116
2 
0.01039 0.0 00
0 
0.01575 0.01374 0.0 00
0 
0.17188 0.17000 0.0877
3 
0.3450
0 
0.36550 0.22359 
406_2_7 0.0045
7 
0.00382 0.0 00
0 
0.00543 0.00476 0.0 00
0 
0.10929 0.08786 0.0000
0 
0.1721
4 
0.14654 0.00000 
406_3_7 0.0217
1 
0.02404 0.0 84
2 
0.02629 0.02839 0.0105
4 
0.16586 0.14971 0.0398
4 
0.3515
7 
0.33067 0.06354 
406_4_7 0.0228
8 
0.02246 0.0000
0 
0.02988 0.03019 0.0129
7 
0.13938 0.17000 0.0828
2 
0.3256
3 
0.40262 0.21985 
406_5_7 0.0347
5 
0.03215 0.0 00
0 
0.00729 0.00833 0.0000
0 
0.09786 0.08167 0.0000
0 
0.2192
9 
0.16225 0.00000 
406_6_7 0.0060
0 
0.00576 0.0 00
0 
0.01171 0.00924 0.0 00
0 
0.05014 0.04922 0.0 00
0 
0.0301
7 
0.03163 0.00000 
406_7_7 0.0491
3 
0.04500 0.0 00
0 
0.00500 0.00409 0.0 00
0 
0.08157 0.05600 0.0180
5 
0.1401
4 
0.08916 0.02323 
407_1_2 0.0585
0 
0.05023 0.0 00
0 
0.01443 0.01042 0.0 62
5 
0.07643 0.05325 0.0185
7 
0.1978
6 
0.12605 0.03362 
407_2_2 0.0515
0 
0.03961 0.0 00
0 
0.00171 0.00100 0.0000
0 
0.02229 0.01981 0.0000
0 
0.0222
9 
0.01981 0.00000 
408_1_5 0.0 40
0 
0.00388 0.0 00
0 
0.00800 0.00638 0.0 00
0 
0.10263 0.07121 0.0 00
0 
0.2038
8 
0.14810 0.00000 
408_2_5 0.0 47
1 
0.00462 0.0 00
0 
0.00467 0.00430 0.0 00
0 
0.04833 0.04500 0.0286
0 
0.0533
3 
0.05067 0.03635 
408_3_5 0.0025
7 
0.00243 0.0 00
0 
0.00443 0.00417 0.0 00
0 
0.06214 0.04075 0.0 00
0 
0.1621
4 
0.08132 0.00000 
408_4_5 0.0121
2 
0.01194 0.0 00
0 
0.01357 0.01366 0.0 58
5 
0.07586 0.05823 0.0 00
0 
0.0987
1 
0.08285 0.00000 
408_5_5 0.0021
7 
0.00143 0.0 00
0 
0.00250 0.00162 0.0000
0 
0.07683 0.04633 0.0 00
0 
0.1 18
3 
0.05911 0.00000 
409_1_1 0.0111
4 
0.00678 0.0 40
2 
0.01300 0.00833 0.0 54
1 
0.05643 0.02750 0.0117
7 
0.1564
3 
0.09583 0.02267 
410_1_1 0.0121
7 
0.00695 0.0039
4 
0.01350 0.00818 0.0051
1 
0.01583 0.01147 0.0097
3 
0.0991
7 
0.07206 0.01890 
411_1_1 0.0105
0 
0.00952 0.0038
4 
0.02050 0.01876 0.0052
7 
0.05788 0.05956 0.0144
5 
0.0604
3 
0.06752 0.01485 
412_1_2 0.0105
0 
0.00952 0.0038
4 
0.02050 0.01876 0.0052
7 
0.05788 0.05956 0.0144
5 
0.0604
3 
0.06752 0.01485 
412_1_2 0.0 60
0 
0.00585 0.0000
0 
0.00733 0.00757 0.0000
0 
0.07833 0.06100 0.0000
0 
0.0883
3 
0.07300 0.00000 
415_1_3 0.0466
3 
0.04524 0.0123
3 
0.06050 0.05803 0.0235
7 
0.24750 0.25083 0.1322
2 
0.5 12
5 
0.53043 0.32318 
415_2_3 0.0460
0 
0.04604 0.0155
9 
0.04886 0.04961 0.0161
0 
0.18886 0.18577 0.0370
5 
0.3215
7 
0.33119 0.07368 
415_3_3 0.0182
9 
0.01952 0.0092
2 
0.02114 0.02246 0.0150
0 
0.10571 0.09412 0.0 27
9 
0.2228
6 
0.21294 0.13814 
416_1_1 0.0121
7 
0.01143 0.0042
0 
0.01417 0.01350 0.0 53
6 
0.27533 0.24153 0.0388
3 
0.5501
7 
0.51900 0.13004 
418_1_1 0.0 27
5 
0.04656 0.0 00
0 
0.042857
14 
0.0372 0.0285
10987 
0.11857 0.109473
686 
0.0586
50447 
0.2442
9 
0.24316 0.12416 
-------   F1   ------- 
 
ANNEX F  - OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC RISK MODEL FOR FOUR 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Experts  Open water 
 
Coastal 
 
Sea ice 
 
Ice shelf 
Failure Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
384_1_2 0.0043 0.0446 0.0037 0.0682 0.0173 0.2600 0.4000 0.8389 
384_2_2 0.0038 0.0477 0.0030 0.0729 0.0173 0.2500 0.3600 0.7131 
385_1_1 0.0981 0.1277 0.1127 0.1329 0.1944 0.3000 0.6500 0.7842 
386_1_1 0.0071 0.0377 0.0014 0.0663 0.0010 0.0988 0.0010 0.1062 
387_1_1 0.0045 0.0421 0.0055 0.0847 0.0189 0.2293 0.2733 0.5600 
388_1_2 0.0006 0.0431 0.0015 0.0653 0.0023 0.1821 0.0150 0.5343 
388_2_2 0.0003 0.0418 0.0004 0.0938 0.0008 0.1953 0.0050 0.5383 
389_1_3 0.0013 0.1338 0.0046 0.1788 0.0300 0.3375 0.0250 0.6923 
389_2_3 0.0052 0.1036 0.0216 0.2136 0.1614 0.4706 0.2860 0.7235 
389_3_3 0.0007 0.0643 0.0038 0.0533 0.0066 0.1287 0.0055 0.4287 
391_1_3 0.0022 0.0720 0.0195 0.0491 0.0182 0.1640 0.0134 0.4491 
391_2_3 0.0285 0.0355 0.0010 0.0850 0.0037 0.1418 0.0081 0.2603 
391_3_3 0.0019 0.0004 0.0003 0.0033 0.0003 0.0348 0.0005 0.0178 
392_1_1 0.0031 0.0345 0.0601 0.0585 0.0700 0.1821 0.1050 0.2222 
393_1_1 0.0043 0.0618 0.0106 0.0608 0.0119 0.1607 0.0275 0.4433 
394_1_1 0.0059 0.0633 0.0052 0.0925 0.1433 0.3063 0.4100 0.6764 
395_1_1 0.0048 0.0633 0.0040 0.0925 0.4100 0.3063 0.9786 0.8293 
396_1_1 0.0010 0.0327 0.0015 0.0273 0.0010 0.1020 0.0010 0.2324 
397_1_1 0.0032 0.0433 0.0021 0.0775 0.0144 0.2821 0.0055 0.6127 
398_1_1 0.0005 0.0188 0.0029 0.0203 0.0006 0.0532 0.0008 0.1944 
401_1_2 0.0007 0.0533 0.0073 0.0463 0.0112 0.1875 0.0215 0.3393 
401_2_2 0.0025 0.0185 0.0032 0.0200 0.0038 0.0338 0.0050 0.0041 
402_1_5 0.0111 0.0667 0.0119 0.0594 0.3549 0.3750 0.8929 0.6684 
402_2_5 0.0269 0.0692 0.0359 0.0618 0.6667 0.3063 0.7333 0.7611 
402_3_5 0.0055 0.0508 0.0037 0.0456 0.0400 0.3125 0.3000 0.7250 
402_4_5 0.0154 0.0400 0.0179 0.0363 0.0424 0.0931 0.0367 0.3053 
402_5_5 0.0005 0.0062 0.0007 0.0076 0.0006 0.0102 0.0005 0.0083 
403_1_3 0.0025 0.0318 0.0044 0.0280 0.0144 0.1600 0.0055 0.2486 
403_2_3 0.0004 0.0200 0.0010 0.0306 0.0050 0.0148 0.0050 0.0148 
403_3_3 0.0055 0.0464 0.0037 0.0420 0.0400 0.2900 0.2400 0.7133 
404_1_7 0.0006 0.0370 0.0039 0.0340 0.0360 0.1802 0.0434 0.5158 
404_2_7 0.0006 0.0370 0.0009 0.0340 0.0028 0.1802 0.0040 0.4214 
404_3_7 0.0058 0.0464 0.0040 0.0420 0.0550 0.2900 0.2500 0.6455 
404_4_7 0.0004 0.0044 0.0005 0.0029 0.0004 0.0062 0.0006 0.0047 
404_5_7 0.0111 0.0219 0.0116 0.0173 0.0156 0.0225 0.0156 0.0225 
404_6_7 0.0030 0.0219 0.0008 0.0173 0.0007 0.0225 0.0006 0.0177 
404_7_7 0.0057 0.0050 0.0030 0.0089 0.0023 0.0137 0.0006 0.0441 
405_1_2 0.0030 0.0046 0.0008 0.0092 0.0006 0.0258 0.0005 0.1168 
405_2_2 0.0031 0.0179 0.0010 0.0222 0.0006 0.0439 0.0005 0.1315 
406_1_7 0.0017 0.0260 0.0032 0.0236 0.0386 0.2357 0.2400 0.4073 
406_2_7 0.0032 0.0067 0.0068 0.0025 0.0383 0.1250 0.1750 0.1339 
406_3_7 0.0055 0.0500 0.0037 0.0443 0.0340 0.1960 0.1007 0.4227 
406_4_7 0.0068 0.0433 0.0114 0.0431 0.0343 0.2333 0.1500 0.4816 
406_5_7 0.0018 0.0894 0.0058 0.0114 0.0100 0.1354 0.0171 0.2404 
406_6_7 0.0004 0.0133 0.0006 0.0162 0.0032 0.0846 0.0075 0.0492 
406_7_7 0.0018 0.1267 0.0028 0.0055 0.0260 0.0830 0.1320 0.0739 
407_1_2 0.0018 0.1417 0.0058 0.0159 0.0100 0.0886 0.0171 0.1896 
407_2_2 0.0004 0.1356 0.0005 0.0018 0.0004 0.0425 0.0005 0.0319 
408_1_5 0.0004 0.0109 0.0008 0.0127 0.0004 0.1373 0.0005 0.2258 
408_2_5 0.0007 0.0100 0.0026 0.0058 0.0260 0.0536 0.0200 0.0583 
408_3_5 0.0018 0.0042 0.0058 0.0023 0.0100 0.0659 0.0171 0.1188 
408_4_5 0.0122 0.0114 0.0135 0.0138 0.0157 0.1008 0.0004 0.1265 
408_5_5 0.0007 0.0033 0.0014 0.0018 0.0049 0.0727 0.0200 0.0669 
409_1_1 0.0048 0.0125 0.0058 0.0114 0.0100 0.0450 0.0171 0.1459 
410_1_1 0.0047 0.0125 0.0050 0.0114 0.0100 0.0131 0.0171 0.1105 
411_1_1 0.0032 0.0209 0.0010 0.0353 0.0037 0.0968 0.0081 0.1041 
412_1_2 0.0032 0.0209 0.0010 0.0353 0.0037 0.0968 0.0081 0.1041 
412_1_2 0.0034 0.0100 0.0012 0.0145 0.0050 0.0983 0.0100 0.1150 
415_1_3 0.0387 0.0567 0.0298 0.0862 0.1822 0.2920 0.4143 0.5812 
415_2_3 0.0405 0.0600 0.0206 0.0831 0.0307 0.3150 0.0756 0.4885 
415_3_3 0.0062 0.0500 0.0074 0.0375 0.0143 0.1500 0.0640 0.2750 
416_1_1 0.0050 0.0500 0.0034 0.0313 0.2673 0.2125 0.3863 0.6222 
418_1_1 0.0037 0.1322 0.0454 0.0283 0.0257 0.1583 0.0640 0.3071 
G1 
ANNEX G  - KAPLAN-MEIER STATISTICS 
Table G.1   Probability of loss for the proposed Jenkins Scenarios using the optimistic (left) and the 
pessimistic (right) Kaplan Meier statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 1 Optimistic  Scenario 1 Pessimistic 
Mission no distance (km) Environment P survival P loss  Mission no distance (km) Environment P survival P loss 
501 60 Open water 0.994 0.006  501 60 Open water 0.969 0.031 
502 60 Open water 0.994 0.006  502 60 Open water 0.969 0.031 
503 60 Open water 0.994 0.006  503 60 Open water     0.969 0.031 
504 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  504 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
505 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  505 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
506 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  506 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
   Overall 0.255022     Overall 0.56322
6 Scenario 2  Optimistic     Scenario 2  Pessimistic    
Mission no distance (km) Environment P survival P loss  Mission no distance (km) Environment P survival P loss 
501 120 Sea ice 0.955 0.045  501 120 Sea ice 0.836 0.164 
502 120 Sea ice 0.955 0.045  502 120 Sea ice 0.836 0.164 
503 120 Sea ice 0.955 0.045  503 120 Sea ice 0.836 0.164 
504 60 Sea ice 0.966 0.034  504 60 Sea ice 0.898 0.102 
504a 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  504a 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
505 60 Sea ice 0.966 0.034  505 60 Sea ice 0.899 0.101 
505a 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  505a 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
506 60 Sea ice 0.966 0.034  506 60 Sea ice 0.898 0.102 
506a 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  506a 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
   Overall 0.404439     Overall 0.79666
3 Scenario 3 Optimistic     Scenario 3 Pessimistic    
Mission no distance (km) Environment P survival P loss  Mission no distance (km) Environment P survival P loss 
501 60 Open water 0.994 0.056  501 60 Open water 0.969 0.031 
502 60 Open water 0.994 0.006  502 60 Open water 0.969 0.031 
503 60 Open water 0.994 0.006  503 60 Open water 0.969 0.031 
504 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  504 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
505 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  505 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
506 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  506 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
507 120 Ice shelf 0.871 0.129  507 120 Ice shelf 0.686 0.314 
508 120 Ice shelf 0.871 0.129  508 120 Ice shelf 0.686 0.314 
509 120 Ice shelf 0.871 0.129  509 120 Ice shelf 0.686 0.314 
   Overall 0.532498     Overall 0.85899
7 Scenario 4 Optimistic     Scenario 4 Pessimistic    
Mission no distance (km) Environment P survival P loss  Mission no distance (km) Environment P survival P loss 
501 120 Sea ice 0.955 0.045  501 120 Sea ice 0.836 0.164 
502 120 Sea ice 0.955 0.045  502 120 Sea ice 0.836 0.164 
503 120 Sea ice 0.955 0.045  503 120 Sea ice 0.836 0.164 
504 60 Sea ice 0.966 0.034  504 60 Sea ice 0.898 0.102 
504a 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  504a 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
505 60 Sea ice 0.966 0.034  505 60 Sea ice 0.898 0.102 
505a 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  505a 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
506 60 Sea ice 0.966 0.034  506 60 Sea ice 0.898 0.102 
506a 60 Ice shelf 0.912 0.088  506a 60 Ice shelf 0.783 0.217 
507 60 Sea ice 0.966 0.034  507 60 Sea ice 0.898 0.102 
507a 120 Ice shelf 0.871 0.129  507a 120 Ice shelf 0.686 0.314 
508 60 Sea ice 0.966 0.034  508 60 Sea ice 0.898 0.102 
508a 120 Ice shelf 0.871 0.129  508a 120 Ice shelf 0.686 0.314 
509 60 Sea ice 0.966 0.034  509 60 Sea ice 0.898 0.102 
509a 120 Ice shelf 0.871 0.129  509a 120 Ice shelf 0.686 0.314 
   Overall 0.645259     Overall 0.95251
7 
-------   H1   ------- 
 
ANNEX H  - Weibull survival Analyses of the Dr. Jenkins Scenarios  - Unmitigated 
 
 
Beta parameters:      Beta parameters:    
Optimistic alpha beta    Pessimistic alpha beta  
open water 182166.08 0.6419493    open water 10330.907 0.6372318  
sea ice 3902.091 0.7794621    sea ice 1574.4984 0.6143415  
ice shelf 1774.7144 0.6613925    ice shelf 521.67488 0.5648403  
          
Scenario 1      Scenario 1    
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss   Mission no distance (km) environment P loss 
501 60 Open water 0.0058   501 60 Open water 0.0369 
502 60 Open water 0.0058   502 60 Open water 0.0369 
503 60 Open water 0.0058   503 60 Open water 0.0369 
504 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   504 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
505 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   505 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
506 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   506 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
  Overall 0.286     Overall 0.631 
Scenario 2      Scenario 2    
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss   Mission no distance (km) environment P loss 
501 120 Sea ice 0.0641   501 120 Sea ice 0.1859 
502 120 Sea ice 0.0641   502 120 Sea ice 0.1859 
503 120 Sea ice 0.0641   503 120 Sea ice 0.1859 
504 60 Sea ice 0.0379   504 60 Sea ice 0.1257 
504a 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   504a 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
505 60 Sea ice 0.0379   505 60 Sea ice 0.1257 
505a 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   505a 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
506 60 Sea ice 0.0379   506 60 Sea ice 0.1257 
506a 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   506a 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
  Overall 0.470     Overall 0.851 
Scenario 3      Scenario 3    
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss   Mission no distance (km) environment P loss 
501 60 Open water 0.0058   501 60 Open water 0.0369 
502 60 Open water 0.0058   502 60 Open water 0.0369 
503 60 Open water 0.0058   503 60 Open water 0.0369 
504 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   504 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
505 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   505 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
506 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   506 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
507 120 Ice shelf 0.1549   507 120 Ice shelf 0.3534 
508 120 Ice shelf 0.1549   508 120 Ice shelf 0.3534 
509 120 Ice shelf 0.1549   509 120 Ice shelf 0.3534 
  Overall 0.569     Overall 0.900 
Scenario 4      Scenario 4    
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss   Mission no distance (km) environment P loss 
501 120 Sea ice 0.0641   501 120 Sea ice 0.1859 
502 120 Sea ice 0.0641   502 120 Sea ice 0.1859 
503 120 Sea ice 0.0641   503 120 Sea ice 0.1859 
504 60 Sea ice 0.0379   504 60 Sea ice 0.1257 
504a 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   504a 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
505 60 Sea ice 0.0379   505 60 Sea ice 0.1257 
505a 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   505a 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
506 60 Sea ice 0.0379   506 60 Sea ice 0.1257 
506a 60 Ice shelf 0.1010   506a 60 Ice shelf 0.2553 
507 60 Sea ice 0.0379   507 60 Sea ice 0.1257 
507a 120 Ice shelf 0.1549   507a 120 Ice shelf 0.3534 
508 60 Sea ice 0.0379   508 60 Sea ice 0.1257 
508a 120 Ice shelf 0.1549   508a 120 Ice shelf 0.3534 
509 60 Sea ice 0.0379   509 60 Sea ice 0.1257 
509a 120 Ice shelf 0.1549   509a 120 Ice shelf 0.3534 
  Overall 0.715     Overall 0.973 
 
 
 
-------   H2   ------- 
 
ANNEX H  - Weibull survival Analyses of the Dr. Jenkins Scenarios - Mitigation Strategy A 
 
Mitigation 1. D306 high impact underway fault removed I.e. their cause established and retired for future missions 
 2. Where successful open water/under sea ice runs are assumed pre-ice shelf, and the weibull parameters recalculated 
 3. Also includes Conditional probability - where vehicle monitored for first  25 km  
 4. Optimistic scenario only        
Optimistic Without conditional probability through tracking With conditional probability through tracking 
 alpha beta        
open water 307210.27 0.5942454        
sea ice 26124.243 0.5484013        
ice shelf 4217.7159 0.5320937        
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss  P loss   alpha beta 
501 60 Open water 0.0062  0.0025   307210 0.594 
502 60 Open water 0.0062  0.0025   307210 0.594 
503 60 Open water 0.0062  0.0025   307210 0.594 
504 60 Ice shelf 0.0943  0.0364   4520 0.535 
505 60 Ice shelf 0.0943  0.0364   4520 0.535 
506 60 Ice shelf 0.0943  0.0364   4520 0.535 
  Overall 0.271  0.112     
Scenario 2        Recalculated  
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss  P loss   alpha beta 
501 120 Sea ice 0.0510  0.0297   26124 0.548 
502 120 Sea ice 0.0510  0.0297   26124 0.548 
503 120 Sea ice 0.0510  0.0297   26124 0.548 
504 60 Sea ice 0.0327  0.0125   31244 0.544 
504a 60 Ice shelf 0.0927  0.0353   4995 0.527 
505 60 Sea ice 0.0327  0.0125   31244 0.544 
505a 60 Ice shelf 0.0927  0.0353   4995 0.527 
506 60 Sea ice 0.0327  0.0125   31244 0.544 
506a 60 Ice shelf 0.0927  0.0353   4995 0.527 
  Overall 0.422  0.210     
Scenario 3        Recalculated  
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss  P loss   alpha beta 
501 60 Open water 0.0062  0.0025   307210 0.594 
502 60 Open water 0.0062  0.0025   307210 0.594 
503 60 Open water 0.0062  0.0025   307210 0.594 
504 60 Ice shelf 0.0943  0.0364   4520 0.535 
505 60 Ice shelf 0.0943  0.0364   4520 0.535 
506 60 Ice shelf 0.0943  0.0364   4520 0.535 
507 120 Ice shelf 0.1281  0.0751   4825 0.538 
508 120 Ice shelf 0.1281  0.0751   4825 0.538 
509 120 Ice shelf 0.1281  0.0751   4825 0.538 
  Overall 0.517  0.297     
Scenario 4        Recalculated  
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss  P loss   alpha beta 
501 120 Sea ice 0.0510  0.0297   26124 0.548 
502 120 Sea ice 0.0510  0.0297   26124 0.548 
503 120 Sea ice 0.0510  0.0297   26124 0.548 
504 60 Sea ice 0.0327  0.0125   31244 0.544 
504a 60 Ice shelf 0.0923  0.0352   4995 0.528 
505 60 Sea ice 0.0327  0.0125   31244 0.544 
505a 60 Ice shelf 0.0923  0.0352   4995 0.528 
506 60 Sea ice 0.0327  0.0125   31244 0.544 
506a 60 Ice shelf 0.0923  0.0352   4995 0.528 
507 60 Sea ice 0.0299  0.0115   34175 0.551 
507a 120 Ice shelf 0.1200  0.0700   5649 0.534 
508 60 Sea ice 0.0299  0.0115   34175 0.551 
508a 120 Ice shelf 0.1200  0.0700   5649 0.534 
509 60 Sea ice 0.0299  0.0115   34175 0.551 
509a 120 Ice shelf 0.1200  0.0700   5649 0.534 
  Overall 0.640  0.386     
 
-------   H3   ------- 
 
ANNEX H  - Weibull survival Analyses of the Dr. Jenkins Scenarios  - Mitigation Strategy B 
 
Mitigation 1. D306 high impact underway fault removed I.e. their cause established and retired for future 
missions  2. Simulates June 2008 trials and its one HIU fault included 
 3. Also includes Conditional probability - where vehicle monitored for first 25 km 
 4. Optimistic scenario only 
Optimistic Without conditional probability through tracking With conditional probability through 
tracking  alpha beta        
open water 510584 0.5591252        
sea ice 27283 0.5492827        
ice shelf 3718.2239 0.5369655        
          
Scenario 1         
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss  P loss     
501 60 Open water 0.0063  0.0025     
502 60 Open water 0.0063  0.0025     
503 60 Open water 0.0063  0.0025     
504 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
505 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
506 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
          
  Overall 0.293  0.122     
Scenario 2         
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss  P loss     
501 120 Sea ice 0.0495  0.0289     
502 120 Sea ice 0.0495  0.0289     
503 120 Sea ice 0.0495  0.0289     
504 60 Sea ice 0.0341  0.0132     
504a 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
505 60 Sea ice 0.0341  0.0132     
505a 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
506 60 Sea ice 0.0341  0.0132     
506a 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
          
  Overall 0.442  0.221     
Scenario 3         
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss  P loss     
501 60 Open water 0.0063  0.0025     
502 60 Open water 0.0063  0.0025     
503 60 Open water 0.0063  0.0025     
504 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
505 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
506 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
507 120 Ice shelf 0.1464  0.0861     
508 120 Ice shelf 0.1464  0.0861     
509 120 Ice shelf 0.1464  0.0861     
          
  Overall 0.560  0.330     
Scenario 4         
Mission no distance (km) environment P loss  P loss     
501 120 Sea ice 0.0495  0.0289     
502 120 Sea ice 0.0495  0.0289     
503 120 Sea ice 0.0495  0.0289     
504 60 Sea ice 0.0341  0.0132     
504a 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
505 60 Sea ice 0.0341  0.0132     
505a 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
506 60 Sea ice 0.0341  0.0132     
506a 60 Ice shelf 0.1033  0.0401     
507 60 Sea ice 0.0341  0.0132     
507a 120 Ice shelf 0.1464  0.0861     
508 60 Sea ice 0.0341  0.0132     
508a 120 Ice shelf 0.1464  0.0861     
509 60 Sea ice 0.0341  0.0132     
509a 120 Ice shelf 0.1464  0.0861     
  Overall 0.687  0.429     
 
ANNEX I  - FAILURE PROBABILITY JUDGMENT DISTRIBUTION FOR ANNEX B 
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